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Abstract
To deploy a safety-critical system it is imperative to have confidence in the system’s under-
pinning software. This is gained by performing software safety assurance. If there is not a
sufficient level of confidence in the software then there is not a sufficient level of confidence
in the system. Therefore, the system would not be able to be deployed in applications where
safety is paramount. A traditional method to gain confidence in software is to develop it to
a process centred on the life-cycle. This is subsequently judged against a set of predefined
objectives and the judgement on the level of compliance to the objectives is taken to war-
rant a degree of confidence in the software. However, if only certain types of evidence are
accepted to demonstrate compliance, e.g. process-based evidence, then the solution space is
reduced and some technical solutions potentially excluded.
The aim of the thesis is to provide additional methods and success factors to potentially
expand the scope of the current safety assurance processes.
The research has explored how other domains, both safety and non-safety, judge confi-
dence in evidence to make their informed decisions. An approach has been developed which
allows attributes to be associated with any form of software safety assurance evidence. The
chosen attributes allow the characteristics of the evidence to be understood as well as the
relationship of the evidence to other forms of evidence.
A Decision Support Framework (DSF) has been researched and implemented which is a
usable end-to-end tool for decision makers to construct diverse evidence assurance arguments.
The term ‘diversity’ in this context is to have a variety of independent evidence which
allows overall confidence to be gained for the software safety assurance. Judgements on
the evidence characteristics are captured via Fuzzy Logic. The framework also allows the
practical implications of adopting any evidence to be considered, such as cost and time.
Tools have been devised to visualise confidence propagation across different collections of
various evidence types. Efficient and effective evidence solutions can be identified by using
the tool’s Genetic Algorithm (GA) optimisation techniques.
Diverse evidence can be challenging to measure when compared to traditional process-
based approaches. However, the research has devised solutions to ameliorate such difficulties
via outputs such as a stakeholder communication model. The DSF has been implemented
on a number of defence case studies to understand the non-trivial way in which evidence
attributes combine and how to construct a diverse evidence approach.
This research has demonstrated how the use of diverse evidence can achieve an equivalent
level of compliance to a full process-based approach and therefore that it can form part
of a software safety assurance strategy. The research outputs have not previously been
implemented within the software safety assurance domain prior to this research.
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An aircraft is comprised of many interconnected systems, of varying complexity1, which
provide the fundamental functionality for the aircraft’s operation2. Many of these systems
will perform mission3, security4, or safety5 critical roles and the system’s functionality is
commonly underpinned by software6. If there is a failure in the software then there can be a
failure for the system to perform its function. Unfortunately, there are notable past software
failures which have occurred within a range of systems and domains; examples include, but
are not limited to, the medical domain7 and the military domain8.
To deploy a safety-critical system it is imperative to have confidence9 in the system’s
underpinning software and this is gained by performing software safety assurance10. If there
is not a sufficient level of confidence in the software then there is not a sufficient level of
confidence in the system (and therefore the overall platform). The amount of software that
requires suitable assurance is growing. There are various estimates stating the rate of growth
1For example, from simpler mechanical flight control systems which are common in smaller aircraft to
Fly-By-Wire (FBW) control systems which require a flight computer to convert the pilot’s intended actions
to the movement of aircraft actuators etc.
2For example, the flight control of the aircraft (direction and speed), fuel flow control for the propulsion
system, and the ability to navigate etc.
3Failure may prevent or degrade operation (Stevens et al., 2019).
4Failure adversely impacts confidentiality, integrity, or availability (Stevens et al., 2019).
5Failure may lead to damage (Stevens et al., 2019).
6For example: the flight computer within a FBW flight control system.
7Such as the Therac-25 Medical Accelerator in 1985-87. Further information can be found within Leveson
(1995).
8Such as the Airbus A400M in 2015. Further information can be found within DSIWG (2018).
9The term confidence provides “trust in a thing” and “showing [a level of] certainty” (Collins Dictionary,
1995b).
10Assurance is “a positive declaration intended to give confidence” (OED, 2018a). The distinction between
the two terms, confidence and assurance, in this context is subtle.
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of software within avionic systems; e.g. approximately 400% every 2 years (Carlson, 2016),
with safety-related code doubling in size every 4 years (Zolotas et al., 2017). For military
avionics there is a similar trend of growth (AVSI, 2011). This increase not only has cost
implications but also increases the complexity of the software development and its subsequent
management.
A traditional way to gain confidence in the software is to develop it to a process. In
this context, a process-based approach is one which is centred on the qualitative aspects
of a life-cycle; such as the waterfall model which includes stages for requirements, design,
and implementation. In essence, process evidence is concerned with the intent to build the
software right (Hadley and White, 2008). Therefore, non-process evidence includes, but is
not limited to, the quantitative aspects of a life-cycle (for example testing results). This is in
addition to much wider sets of evidence which can be relevant for pre- and post-release phases
such as in-service data and reliability modelling. Life-cycle evidence can be measured with a
set of predefined objectives11. The amount of rigour which is needed for the development of
the software is determined by the scope and detail of the predefined objectives; e.g. DO-178C
has 71 objectives for any software where a failure could lead to a catastrophic event12 (known
as level A). There is a scale of the levels (A-D) to reflect the severity of the software failure.
Level D, with 26 objectives, is associated with software where a failure could lead to a minor
event13. The number of objectives reduces with each level: A (71), B (69), C (62), and D
(26). The software evidence14 is judged to ascertain the degree of compliance15 against these
predefined objectives. Understanding the amount of compliance leads to having a level of
confidence in the software.
There is debate within the software safety assurance community on the strongest forms
of evidence to gain confidence in software. It has been stated that “there is no evidence
that a good process will result in a good product (although there is a correlation between
bad processes and bad products!)” (Menon, Hawkins and McDermid, 2009b). Also, it
is the “product that runs and it is therefore the product evidence that provides a direct
assessment of that which can fail and give rise to the hazards” (McDermid, 1998). There
are other factors not specifically captured in any process-based objectives which influence
11For example, objectives are stated within the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA)
development guidelines for automotive software (MISRA, 2012) and DO-178C for avionics software (RTCA,
2011a).
12A catastrophic event could have “multiple fatalities (usually with loss of the aircraft)”.
13A minor event could “reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins
or functional capabilities”.
14There are numerous definitions of the term evidence; an apt one in this context is that evidence is to
enable a premise for belief to be held (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy, 2014). The belief being that the
software meets, for example, the predefined objectives to achieve a level of safety assurance.
15To comply is to “act in accordance with rules, wishes etc” (Collins Dictionary, 1995a).
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the confidence in the software16. Also, some systems may not have compliant process-based
evidence available17. Therefore, in addition to a process-based approach, there are other
methods which can gain suitable levels of confidence in the software, e.g. the number of
fault free hours that the software has been in-service on the target systems18.
Software can belong to one of three categories (see Table 1.1) and this dictates the type
of evidence available (UK MOD, 2018). The categories are applicable to all software, from
previously developed, i.e. legacy19, to software which is novel20.
Category Description
Black-box
Little or no information about the internal workings of the soft-
ware is available.
White-box Internal workings, such as the original source code, is available.
Open-box
Not only is the source code driving the software known but it
can be adapted.
Table 1.1: Software Information Availability Categories (UK MOD, 2018)
The functionality delivered by a system, or set of systems, will have supporting evidence
to provide the safety assurance for its software. Any solution needs to meet the technical and
assurance requirements; e.g. for the selection of systems to support an avionics architecture,
such as Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA)21, there will be a number of key features which
influence the choice of technical solutions; e.g. real-time and safety-constraints. For a
system to be considered within a wider technical solution it must have evidence available to
demonstrate that the safety constraints can be met. If there is only a certain type of accepted
evidence to demonstrate compliance, e.g. process-based evidence, then the solution space is
reduced and some technical solutions potentially excluded. This can also lessen the mission
16For example: independent Verification and Validation (V&V) by third-parties and any Quality Manage-
ment Systems (QMSs) in place.
17Due to, for example, the software being developed to another life-cycle standard or the process-based
evidence not being releasable to those that need to gain the assurance.
18With the confidence being established by using guidance such as CAST (1998). Factors such as software
error reporting will determine this confidence as it is not purely based on the in-service hours. The premise
is that the greater the number of fault free in-service hours then the greater the level of confidence gained
in the software. It should be noted that confidence from in-service hours is applicable to a known and
constrained system environment, i.e. one which has identical input states. The applicability of the evidence
to known environments is also true for software process evidence as a change in the operating environment
will result in different reliabilities being exhibited.
19With the term legacy in this context being “of, relating to, or being a previous... computer system” or
“of, relating to, associated with, or carried over from an earlier time, technology etc” (Merriam-Webster,
2018).
20Novel technology is defined as an approach, or item of equipment, which has not undergone any form
of United Kingdom (UK) military airborne assurance (this definition is partly derived from Weaver, Kelly
and Mayo (2006)).
21IMA architectures provide a shared computing, communications, and Input/Output (I/O) resource pool
that is partitioned for use by multiple avionics functions (Watkins and Walter, 2007).
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effectiveness of any wider solution, i.e the ability for the end goals to be achieved22.
The use of diverse23 evidence which could achieve an equivalent24 level of safety assurance
compliance could assist by expanding the technical solution space and improving the mission
effectiveness25. This expanded solution space is illustrated simplistically within Figure 1.1.
Whilst recognising that process-based evidence is an important part of any safety assurance
activities there may be scope to include diverse evidence as part of the overall judgement.
This would be suitable, for example, in circumstances in which full process-based evidence
was not available.
There is a great reliance on expert judgement26 to assess these software-based systems
(Littlewood and Wright, 2007). Judgements are made on a number of factors, including:
the degree of evidence compliance (e.g. as with the process-based objectives); the suitability
of any in-service evidence, and the degree of conformance to other measures (e.g. QMS).
It is also subjective expert judgements which dictates the strength and contribution of the
evidence. In essence, judgements are formed both in terms of the intra- and inter-evidence;
intra-evidence due to each form of evidence being judged as a single entity (e.g. its own
quality) and inter-evidence as each form of evidence is judged in relation to other evidence
(e.g. the comparison to judge sufficiency).
This leads to a number of opportunities to investigate if any enhancements can be made
to the current software safety assurance practices27; e.g. can diverse evidence (which is not
only process-based) provide SMEs with a suitable level of safety assurance? If evidence is
accepted (which is not process-based) then how can it be judged to gain confidence? This may
involve the quantification of such confidence. The current research on the quantification of
assurance confidence has a number of identified weaknesses28. There is a need to understand
and enhance how diverse evidence can be gathered, judged, and implemented within the
22This includes the function that a platform or System-of-Systems (SoS) should perform.
23With the term diverse meaning to be distinct and to have variety (Collins Dictionary, 1995i).
24In comparison to a full process-based approach.
25The need for safety requirements to inform technical solutions is critical and there are a number of areas
which are looking at methods to balance these requirements. Examples of such areas include: Multi-Core
(MC) processors within the United States (US) civil airborne domain (FAA, 2017); security and safety
requirements restricting features within an avionics architecture (Brosgol and Smith, 2018); the need for a
balanced program to optimise safety, performance, and cost (FAA, 2000); and securing embedded systems
without jeopardising safety-properties (SEI, 2019).
26The judgements are being formed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).
27The use of the term enhance is defined as to “further improve” (OED, 2018c). The current safety
assurance practice is robust when considered in the context of a greenfield project with process-based software
evidence which is compliant to well recognised and understood standards. The aim of the thesis is to provide
additional methods and success factors to potentially expand the scope of the safety assurance process. This
concept is important to note as the context of any suggested enhancements are to expand upon an existing
robust safety assurance process.
28For example, the inability to scale up to account for wider sets of evidence. A review of current research
on the topic of quantifying assurance confidence is contained within sub-section 4.2.
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military software assurance domain.
Figure 1.1: Expanded Solution Space Occupied by Systems with Diverse Evidence
1.2 Problem Statement
As safety-related systems will contain increasingly more software and are to become ever
more reliant on this software, it is imperative that the software can be assured. This allows
those that regulate, procure, and operate the software to have confidence that any software
failures which lead to damage only occur at acceptable rates. What different types of evidence
are suitable to gain this confidence and how should this evidence be structured and judged?
If suitable approaches are defined then how should any identified military software assurance
domain enhancements be implemented?
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1.3 Research Questions
The thesis is centred upon responding to the following research grand tour 29 question:
What enhancements can be made to the current UK defence domain’s software safety
assurance approaches for capturing and judging supporting evidence?
The supporting research sub-questions are as follows:
1. What is the current approach to system safety assurance within the UK defence domain
and are there alternative system-level approaches? 30
2. What is the current permissible software safety assurance evidence within the UK de-
fence domain and related domains? 31
3. What software safety assurance evidence is relevant/admissible and what are the un-
derpinning principles for the use of such evidence? 32
4. What are the unintended consequences of adopting incorrect metrics when forming de-
cisions and how can system/evidence relationships be communicated to stakeholders? 33
5. What is a suitable structure for software safety assurance evidence and can mathemat-
ically derived approaches inform how judgements are made on the evidence and for
proposing alternative/optimised solutions? 34
6. What observations and recommendations can be made on how to implement a software
safety assurance evidence argument and how to inform a UK defence software safety
assurance strategy? 35
1.4 Thesis Structure
Following this introduction the thesis comprises ten chapters. There are three broad themes:
the argument for an intervention36 to be made (why the research is needed); the justifications
made for the research strategy (the building blocks for the research); and the execution of
the research plan (to create the research findings).
29A grand tour question is the overall and general question which is answered via sub-questions.
30Sub-question responded to within Chapter 3.
31Sub-question responded to within sub-sections 4.2, 5.2, 5.3, and Chapter 6.
32Sub-question responded to within sub-sections 7.1 and 7.2.
33Sub-question responded to within sub-sections 7.3 and 7.4.
34Sub-question responded to within sub-section 4.3, Chapter 8, sub-sections 9.4 and 9.5.
35Sub-question responded to within sub-section 9.6 and Chapter 10.
36An intervention in this context is to take decisions or perform a role to determine events.
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• Chapter 2; Research Strategy. Provides a description of the research strategy, why
the particular research area was chosen, and the initial exploration of the research,
e.g. stakeholder selection. A summary is provided of the steps taken to execute the
research strategy.
• Chapter 3; Background and the Problem of Interest. States the need for software to
be assured, the initial scope of the problem of interest, and information on the aspects
of a safety case as part of an assurance activity. Context is provided to the safety
management terminology, safety case practice, and how a leading MOD assurance
standard is applied (Defence Standard (DS) 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c)). Information
on what constitutes a Programmable Element (PE) is provided with details on how
PEs are assessed within the MOD. A SLF is described which provides a mechanism to
help inform a safety argument for a SoS. The approach is beneficial in circumstances
where there is limited system information, e.g. due to Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR)
• Chapter 4; Diversity as a Concept and Scope for Further Investigation. Diverse evi-
dence is discussed in terms of its definition, how it is used in other domains, and the
concept of software design diversity is also briefly discussed. An assessment of cur-
rent confidence quantification methods is provided. An outline is provided on how a
DSF could assist with a solution to provide enhancements to current software safety
assurance methods and the benefits which a framework may provide.
• Chapter 5; A Review of the Use of Evidence Within Non-Safety Domains. The def-
initions applied to the term evidence are discussed. Lessons are identified from how
evidence is adopted and assessed within non-safety domains, e.g. criminal justice sys-
tem.
• Chapter 6; Current Permissible Evidence for Safety-Critical Software Assurance. Re-
view of the evidence which is currently adopted for software assurance arguments
within the MOD (land, maritime, and air domains) and other safety-critical domains,
e.g. civil nuclear. Literature/guidelines are stated which add to the sources of diverse
evidence.
• Chapter 7; Potential Permissible Evidence, Underpinning Principles, and Stakeholder
Engagement. Potential evidence is reviewed and a number of fundamental principles
are stated which should be considered for any diverse evidence assurance argument.
An insight is provided into the unintended consequences of using incorrect metrics
and demonstrates the need to choose metrics for software assurance intelligently. A
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visualisation/model is described which allows stakeholders to comprehend and debate
a varied set of evidential data/sources with a view to drive improved decision making,
via a Wheel of Qualification.
• Chapter 8; Framework Design and Implementation Decisions. The key tenets of the
DSF design are explained. Implementation details of the DSF are provided with the
justifications of the decisions made.
• Chapter 9; Case Studies, Exploratory Testing, and Evaluation of the DSF. The aim and
purpose of the case studies are stated. Descriptions are provided of the case studies
which will be adopted to demonstrate the value of the DSF and the use of diverse
evidence. A proposed evidence assessment flow is described which is intended to allow
for the initial review and assessment of diverse evidence by SMEs. The outcomes are
described for when the DSF is used to gather diverse evidence with details on how the
features of the DSF were used. Observations from the case studies and the exploratory
testing are made. Observations are focussed on the relationships between the attributes
of the evidence and how changes are propagated. An assessment of the implemented
DSF is made with a comparison to the related research.
• Chapter 10; Recommendations to Enhance Current Software Safety Assurance Pro-
cesses. Details of a number of enhancements that could be made to the currently
defined permissible software-related evidence and the subsequent safety assessment
process for MOD. A summary is provided of guidance written for Defence Equipment
and Support (DE&S) Delivery Team (DT) Desk Officers which can assist DTs with
their procurement approaches to gain diverse evidence. A review is conducted of the
challenges for the adoption of the findings.
• Chapter 11; Research Review and Contributions to Knowledge. Details the original
argument for the REs intervention and the progress is judged against the research
questions. A review is conducted to assess such aspects as the research quality and
validity to state the legitimacy of the research. Reflections are provided on the re-
search itself, any limitations and further work are described, with information on the
researches publications/conferences. The contributions to knowledge that the research
has made are stated. The implications of the research findings are also provided along
with the industrial impact that the research has had.
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Chapter 2
Research Strategy
Research is undertaken in a variety of domains, e.g. business strategy and healthcare etc,
with each form of research being conducted under different contexts and constraints. Due
to this, the purpose for any research will differ and hence so will it’s definition. However, for
this thesis Collis and Hussey (2009) provide a suitable definition, in that research:
• Is a process of enquiry and investigation.
• Is systematic and methodical.
• Increases knowledge.
Collis and Hussey (2009) also state that research should be purposeful as it is conducted
with a view to achieving an outcome. This is supported by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill
(2012) in that research is conducted to find things out. It is important to note that the
process of research is continually iterative with overlapping stages (Saunders, Lewis and
Thornhill, 2012) - this is a reflection of the reality of research.
A key element to any research is that the findings are underpinned by a reliable approach
which takes into account the paradigm1 and for suitable data collection/analysis techniques
to be used.
This chapter will provide information on:
• Research Structure. Provide the structure and outline of the research strategy to be
implemented.
1A research paradigm is classed as a philosophical framework that guides how scientific research should
be conducted (Collis and Hussey, 2009). As an aside, from the literature that the RE has read there is an
inconstant use of language within the research strategy domain when referring to philosophies and paradigms
etc. As an example, Collis and Hussey (2009) refer to positivism as a paradigm whereas, Saunders, Lewis
and Thornhill (2012) refers to it as a philosophy with paradigms being associated with social theory analysis
(e.g. radical humanist).
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• Research Area and Initial Exploration. Why the particular research area was chosen
and the initial exploration of the research, e.g. stakeholder selection.
• Research Execution. A summary of the research execution steps which continue the
implementation of the research strategy.
2.1 Research Structure
Research structures are commonly presented in a linear or ‘waterfall’ flow with one event
leading to the next. This implies that at each stage there are clear exit criteria from each
of the stages which are correct first time. In reality this is not the case, and the nature of
research means that iterative refinement is common. This is especially true with the creation
of the research questions, for example, which require an understanding of the subject area
with further refinement as more knowledge is gained.
The structure in Figure 2.1 shows the flow of activities to articulate the reality of the
specific research stages (e.g. review of software assurance practice) relevant to the problem
of interest. In addition, the structure shown in Figure 2.1 has been refined to reflect the
final flow of activities to arrive at the thesis findings.
The research structure is composed of two overall themes. The first is the research
exploration and planning which involves scoping the domain and identifying stakeholders of
interest etc (stages 1 and 2 within Figure 2.1). The theme also involves the articulation of
the research questions which informs the research approach and the data collection activities.
The decisions to inform these stages are justified within sub-sections 2.2 and 2.3. The second
overall theme is the research execution which is implementing the defined research questions.
It is this theme which leads to the research conclusions and recommendations. The decisions
made in each of the stages within this research execution theme are justified within each of
the chapters that follow as appropriate analysis is conducted2.
2.2 Research Area and Initial Exploration
The activities to understand the research area and the initial exploration of the research
form the first stage within Figure 2.1. This stage identifies how the influence/power of
stakeholders should be used, which stakeholders are of interest, and determines the initial
boundary for the problem.
2For example, suitable justification is articulated for the chosen method for reasoning under uncertainty
(see sub-section 8.2.4) and the visualisation approach (see sub-section 8.2.6.1).
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Figure 2.1: Stages of the Research Strategy
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 11 of 328
2.2.1 Ability to Instigate Change
2.2.1.1 Concept of Influence and Power
Generally, researchers wish to perform activities which result in high impact outputs which
have broad ranging consequences. This is natural, in that people wish to make improvements
to systems which they believe would benefit from change. However, the ability for change
to occur, based upon any research outputs, is crucial. If influence cannot be applied by
any stakeholder to directly implement the research findings then the value of the research is
limited.
In the world of business and organisational management the concepts of influence and
power are recognised as distinct concepts with each allowing various levels of change to
occur3. In the context of this research the concepts are defined as:
• Influence. Provides a catalyst or a force to allow others to change (or for those being
influenced to enact change).
• Power. There are two forms of power : the power to influence and the power to enact
change.
Both concepts are relevant for this research. Typically, REs and those that conduct
research will only have the ability to influence those that can enact changes. Thus, the
impact of any research may be limited; although the research may be credible and robust.
The RE for this thesis is fortunate in that there is a level of power which can be enacted
to enable elements of the research findings to be adopted. This power is gained due to the
nature of an EngD (it is conducted within an industrial setting) and due to the role that the
RE has within the sponsoring organisation4.
The power is not gained via a management or authoritative role but more from a trusted
technical position with the ability to adopt findings from the research. The findings can then
feed into the advice provided to customers5.
2.2.1.2 MOD Organisational Hierarchy
The level of influence and the level of power to enact change needs to be placed in the context
of the organisational hierarchy of MOD. The influence/power needs to be targeted at the
correct level of the hierarchy with the ability to do this being key.
3From a management perspective these concepts are described within a range of sources, such as Kramer
and Neale (1998) and the famous text by Carnegie (1982).
4The involvement of the researchers within some forms of research, such as qualitative, is seen as essential
and inevitable (Leung, 2015).
5The term advice in this context is used to described all interactions with customers which includes
formal reports, verbal communication, and interactions at workshops etc.
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Within the business and management domain there is a need to consider the different
levels within an organisation6. Within the business and management literature there are
three well understood levels of an organisation: strategic, tactical, and operational (Griffin,
2007). In the context of this research these levels are defined as:
• Strategic. Those with overall authority for strategy and policy for defence, e.g. the
Secretary of State (SofS) for Defence.
• Tactical. Those that define and set regulatory guidelines and standards, e.g. the MAA.
• Operational. Those that interpret regulatory guidelines and standards to achieve the
qualification of systems, e.g. DE&S DTs Desk Officers7.
From a safety assurance perspective the strategic, tactical, and operational elements
are shown in Figure 2.2. Strategic elements (coloured orange ) are shown as the Defence
Secretary and Defence Board. The Defence Safety Authority (DSA) Director and regula-
tion/certification setting is conducted at a tactical level (coloured light purple ). Operational
level activities (coloured light blue ) are conducted by those within DE&S (and those that
support the DTs) and the working level staff within the MAA. The RE has a degree of power
at the operational level in terms of the assurance advice to DE&S DTs. There is a level of
influence of the tactical stakeholders. The level of influence/power on the RE can be taken
into account when the boundary of the problem is considered.
2.2.2 Scoping the Ability to Influence
There are three forms of influence which are relevant to the research problem:
• The ability for the researcher to influence stakeholders.
• What influences a problem area; which may, or may not, be subject to change (e.g.
constraints).
• What needs to be influenced to enact change or resolve a problem of interest.
To inform the research a number of system maps and rich pictures were developed, as
proposed by Wilson (1990). They were to: firstly, scope the boundary of the problem and;
secondly, act as a method to communicate the problem with stakeholders. A rich picture is
6In the context of this research an organisation can be a single business unit or a collection of business
units which are all actors to perform a given role.
7This also includes those that judge evidence against meeting a standard (i.e. the regulator) and those that
are providing evidence for a safety outcome (e.g. technical support to gather evidence against a standard).
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Figure 2.2: Strategic, Tactical, and Operational Units within MOD (adapted from NAO
(2015), DE&S (2017), and MAA (2017b))
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a visual summary of the human activity situation which is the concern at the start of the
enquiry. A rich picture is not a system diagram (Waring, 1996). A rich picture is a very
useful form of analysis but the method can be overlooked due to, what could be perceived to
be, simplistic methods to create the picture. There is a discipline to creating such pictures
and it was used within this research to illustrate conflicts, pressures, stakeholders, and to note
perceived problems. Such a technique allowed an initial context boundary to be discovered
with the stakeholders of interest established.
An important aspect to consider is the influence that stakeholders can have on the re-
search. They can influence the outcome (the proposed transformation or outputs) and they
can influence the ability for the RE to perform the research.
The initial stakeholders of interest for the research are shown in Figure 2.3. The stake-
holders shown are those which are involved in the management of the EngD and those which
influence the objectives. In reality there is a level of cross-over as the EngD supervisors (in-
dustrial and academic) inform the objectives of the EngD; however, Figure 2.3 is sufficient
to show the convergence of the types of stakeholders.
A Mendelow (1981) grid proved valuable to understand the stakeholder roles. The grid
states the power and interest of the stakeholders to allow the RE to identify and prioritise






This was informed by the approach outlined by Cleland (2004) to identify for each stake-
holder:
• Stake in the project.
• What the RE needs from them.
• Perceived attitude and risks.
• Risk if not engaged.
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Figure 2.3: Initial Stakeholders of Interest for the Research
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The Mendelow (1981) power/interest grid for the research is shown in Figure 2.4. The
stakeholders are those that influence the research (i.e. the objectives) and those that influence
the RE (i.e. the management of the EngD)8.
The use of the techniques proposed by Mendelow (1981) and Cleland (2004) allowed
the relevant stakeholders to be targeted so that their power/influence could be used to the
benefit of the thesis. The activity guided which stakeholders to approach as part of the
semi-structured interviews, group discussion, and workshops, for example. The grid was
used throughout the research strategy to identify who to engage with at each of the stages.
Figure 2.4: Stakeholder Analysis - Power/Interest Grid
8The stakeholders shown on the grid are positioned to allow the grid descriptions (e.g. ‘actively manage’)
to be shown. Therefore, the positions of the stakeholders shows their approximate power/influence.
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2.3 Research Questions and Initial Planning
The generation of the research questions and the initial planning is the second stage within
Figure 2.1. This stage involves activities to understand the research paradigms/logic, to
formulate the research questions, identification of the data sources and forms of analysis,
and the intended research outputs.
2.3.1 Research Paradigms and Underpinning Logic
The paradigm of any research is concerned with the philosophical stance of the researcher
and how data and theories are developed. A theory can be established via observations and
experiments with the use of inductive logic. This type of logic is in contrast to that which is
based upon the development of a theory which then uses observations and testing to support
the theory (this is termed deductive logic). These two logic types are summarised within
Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Deductive vs Inductive Logic (adapted from Gill and Johnson (2014))
The implementation of deductive logic is based upon a paradigm called positivism which
is very much based upon a so-called ‘natural science’ perspective. The alternative to posi-
tivism is a paradigm called phenomenology which was developed to study social phenomena
with the natural scientists paradigm (based upon positivism) being insufficient to capture
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uncertain causes (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The two paradigms are based upon a number of
underlying assumptions regarding such aspects as ontology9, epistemology10, and axiology11.
The assumptions span the level of independence of the researcher to the level of bias of the
researcher. In reality, the paradigms are at extremes of a scale with other paradigms sitting
within the two. This continuum means that the features and concepts of one paradigm
are relaxed and replaced with those of the next (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The research
paradigm continuum is illustrated within Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Research Paradigm Continuum
Research can have a mix of paradigms as the logic and theory development can change
during the course of conducting the research, i.e. for each sub-question.
2.3.2 Research Questions
There will be a mixture of paradigms and approaches used to respond to the research ques-
tions. The concept of understanding enhancements to the defence safety assurance process
was originally not based upon a known theory by the RE. There was an element of inductive
logic to develop a theory with regard to the use of diverse evidence to enhance the assurance
process. The use of qualitative methods were adopted to derive the theory (e.g. workshops),
in keeping with the phenomenology paradigm. A theory based upon the concept of diverse
evidence to enhance software safety assurance led to a paradigm which was more in keeping
with positivism, in that the theory was tested via the observations.
9The nature of reality.
10What constitutes valid knowledge.
11The role of values.
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The appreciation of the research paradigms and underpinning logic resulted in a research
question grand tour (GT) question with a set of sub-questions (see Table 2.1). For each
of the research sub-questions the associated paradigms are also shown. Table 2.1 indicates
primary and secondary paradigms to indicate the key approach (and data sources) which
informed each research sub-question. Any research sub-question was mainly responded to
via a primary paradigm with supplementary research utilising the secondary paradigm.
The research paradigm influences the data sources which are used to respond to each
sub-question. This is due to the differing research assumptions that were made for each
sub-question. The choice of data collection methods for this research has been influenced
by Collis and Hussey (2009). Information on the data collection methods and sources are
shown in Table 2.2.
ID Research Grand-Tour Question
GT
What enhancements can be made to the current UK
defence domain’s software safety assurance approaches
for capturing and judging supporting evidence?
ID Research Question Pos.1 Phen.2
RQ1
What is the current approach to system safety assurance




What is the current permissible software safety assur-




What software safety assurance evidence is rele-
vant/admissible and what are the underpinning prin-
ciples for the use of such evidence?
‚
RQ4
What are the unintended consequences of adopting in-
correct metrics when forming decisions and how can sys-




What is a suitable structure for software safety as-
surance evidence and can mathematically derived ap-
proaches inform how judgements are made on the ev-




What observations and recommendations can be made
on how to implement a software safety assurance evi-
dence argument and how to inform a UK defence soft-
ware safety assurance strategy?
‚
Note(s): 1. Pos=Positivistic; 2. Phen=Phenomenological.
Key: ‚=Primary paradigm; t‚u=Secondary paradigm.
Table 2.1: Research Questions (RQs) with Associated Paradigms
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Research sub-question 1 requires an initial phenomenological approach in order to build
a theory from relevant observations regarding current system safety assurance approaches
within the UK defence domain. Document review and analysis12 will inform the sub-question
with the use of semi-structured interviews to corroborate a level of the findings. The obser-
vations will assist in also identifying potential alternative system-level approaches13. At this
stage a more positivistic paradigm may be suitable to test any theories developed from the
initial assurance review. It is envisaged that the approach would be informed via document
review/analysis but also supported by the use of models/frameworks to implement a suitable
case study. This deductive process will allow any system-level approaches to be tested via a
form of experimentation.
Research sub-question 2 follows an initial similar paradigm to sub-question 1 with a phe-
nomenological approach being required to make use of observations from the review/analysis
of suitable documentation. Documentation should provide initial sets of information on the
current permissible evidence but a level of stakeholder interaction may be required14. Fur-
ther document review/analysis and stakeholder interaction may be needed to understand the
concepts of evidence and how/where is it adopted within the safety domain. Articulating the
permissible evidence will require levels of corroboration with stakeholders to understand the
realities of evidence rather than a guidelines/standard perspective. The use of workshops
would be of potential benefit. There is also scope to develop relevant theories on how to
tackle some of the challenges based upon the initial observations to how evidence is adopted
within other safety-critical domains.
Research sub-question 3, again, has a phenomenological stance. There will be a level
of document review/analysis to determine the potential permissible evidence as well as the
use of stakeholder engagement15. Document review/analysis will also be adopted to derive
the underpinning principles for the use of evidence to build a theory. Again, stakeholder
engagement may possibly be necessary.
With research sub-question 4 the approach taken is more towards the positivistic paradigm
as by this stage of the research it is envisaged that there will be a number of theories which
can be tested via the use of observation/experimentation. The importance of metrics and
the consequences of adopting them incorrectly can be tested via a suitable model. Devel-
oping models to illustrate and enhance effective communication of evidence to stakeholders
can be supported by suitable workshops and semi-structured interviews. The stakeholder
engagement will allow feedback to be gained and to test the developed theories.
12In order to identify the focus of any intervention and to define any areas of enhancement to the the
current safety assurance evidential approaches.
13In essence, via reviewing the context of systems safety assurance.
14Potentiality via semi-structured interviews.
15Potentiality via semi-structured interviews.
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Research sub-question 5 strongly continues the positivistic paradigm with the poten-
tial development of a framework to define a suitable structure for software safety assurance
evidence. The sub-question is, in essence, learning from the theory developed from the
previous sub-questions to test them via a framework using suitable case studies. Stake-
holder engagement is required, as with the phenomenological sub-questions, with a potential
broader range of methods for the interaction; e.g. workshops, semi-structured interviews.
Exploratory testing may provide further insight into the software safety assurance behaviour.
The sub-question will play a significant part in testing the thesis main theories via experi-
mentation.
Finally, research sub-question 6 will then move back towards a more phenomenolog-
ical stance with an inductive process to gain an understanding of the previous observa-
tions/experimentation to provide sufficient recommendations. The sub-question will draw
upon the document review/analysis of previous sub-question findings and the subsequent de-
ductive process to test the ongoing theories. In essence, the sub-question derives the findings
from outputs from each data source to amalgamate and distil the recommendations.
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the data sources and analysis methods aligned to the re-
search sub-questions. The exact sources/methods are not fixed. However, the sources/methods
are influenced by the chosen research paradigm for the sub-questions as these inform the re-
search approach. Table 2.2 indicates primary, secondary, and informative elements to indi-
cate the key data sources and methods which underpinned each research sub-question. Each
research sub-question was responded to by adopting the primary data sources with support-
ive research utilising the secondary data sources. The exception is RQ6 which utilised each
of the approaches (via previous RQs) to arrive at the recommendations. Further information
on each of the data sources and analysis methods is contained within sub-section 2.3.3.
Data Source / Analysis Method RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 RQ5 RQ6
Documentation review and analysis ‚ ‚ ‚ t‚u t‚u r‚s
Workshop ‚ ‚ ‚ r‚s
Semi-structured interviews ‚ ‚ ‚ t‚u t‚u r‚s
Group discussion ‚ ‚ t‚u r‚s
Case studies t‚u t‚u ‚ ‚ r‚s
Exploratory testing ‚ ‚ r‚s
Models t‚u t‚u ‚ ‚ r‚s
Key: ‚=Primary data source; t‚u=Secondary data source; r‚s=Informative data source.
Table 2.2: Research Sub-Questions with Associated Data Sources and Analysis Methods
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2.3.3 Data Sources and Analysis Methods
Research is underpinned by data. The role of the data changes depending on the logical
perspective. The data can support the theories being tested, from a deductive perspective, or
it can allow the theories to be developed from the observations, from an inductive perspective.
The following data sources and analysis methods were adopted for the research.
• Documentation review and analysis. The review of existing literature is paramount to
develop the initial theories and to ascertain the need for intervention. It also informs
the observations which are made to support the theories. A systematic and compre-
hensive literature review was undertaken to gain suitable insights into the problem
domain. The review followed the guidance contained within Collis and Hussey (2009)
with a wide range of sources adopted with the use of key word searches conducted from
reputable journal and conference libraries, e.g. Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) Xplore16. Literature was reviewed for relevance to the problem area
and the value to understanding the solution space.
• Workshop. The benefit of a workshop is that it allows for a level of interaction and
discussion which is planned into the structure of the event. The RE designed and
delivered a workshop to a number of MAA representatives (software assurance regula-
tors) to gain feedback on the initial research theories and elements of the framework
design17. The RE also jointly-presented the Wheel of Qualification model and under-
pinning concepts at a workshop attended by defence organisations to articulate the
evidence and relationships of interest for a specific project.
• Semi-structured interviews. This form of qualitative research is typically underutilised
but has great value (Galletta, 2013). Semi-structured interviews were conducted to
understand the approaches adopted by a range of safety-related domains. These inter-
views allowed an understanding to be gained of the realities of software assurance from
the perspectives of experts in their fields. Purposefully, open-ended questions were de-
signed to allow a greater level of discussion and to gather a rich set of data18. Good
practice was followed in relation to the types and forms of interview questions/style,
e.g. requiring elaboration on initial statements (Collis and Hussey, 2009). One-to-one
interviews (face-to-face and via telephone) were deliberately chosen to allow more open
discussions. This qualitative data was used to inform further qualitative assessment as
part of the documentation review and analysis.
16See the following for further information: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/home.jsp.
17See Appendix A for further information.
18See Appendix B for further information.
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• Group discussion. Group discussions allow for effective outputs and dialogue (Young
et al., 2006) which assisted the RE to develop the theory and to scope design features
of the framework. The dialogue was with SMEs in the area of software assurance and
so allowed a level of validation to be conducted on the research findings. As with the
semi-structured interviews, this data was used to inform further qualitative assessment.
• Case studies. The research adopted experimental case studies19 to examine the difficul-
ties in implementing the proposed concepts and techniques using suitable supporting
data (Scapens, 1990). The case studies allowed the refinement of the DSF and of the
diverse evidence concepts. This supported an iterative approach to adapt and learn
from the case study experiments. A case study was also devised to understand SoS
safety interface issues to support the SLF.
• Exploratory testing. In addition to conducting case studies, exploratory testing was
implemented to understand the diverse evidence concepts and the underpinning re-
lationships. The process of exploratory testing is a recognised technique within the
software testing domain. The process generates tests of interest whilst being cognisant
of the action taken and the subsequent impact (Kaner, Falk and Nguyen, 1999). The
exploratory testing allowed further refinement of the DSF and the findings.
• Models. Models are representations that can aid in defining, analysing, and communi-
cating a set of concepts (SEBoK, 2018b). Conceptual modelling was used to understand
the relationships between a number of entities within a variety of contexts, e.g. the
Wheel of Qualification. The models allowed relationships to be stated between sys-
tems and their supporting evidence. They also acted as a method to communicate the
qualification status of a system/platform.
2.3.4 Selection of Interviewees
Based upon the data sources and analysis methods it is anticipated that interviewees/SMEs
and group participants will inform a range of research activities. The criteria for the selection
of these participants will be based, broadly, on the following (Johnson and Weller, 2002):
• Who has the relevant information? With the RE working in the software assurance
domain numerous participants were able to be identified and contacted. Participants
were chosen to provide a cross section of viewpoints from those that set the regulatory
policies to those that are tasked with implementing the standards. It was important
to understand the intent and the reality of any standards for example.
19Experimental studies have interventions introduced with the subsequent effects observed.
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• Who is accessible? Efforts were made to conduct suitable interviews/workshops which
were based on the availability of the right personnel. The key is the suitability of the
person with the methods to gain information, including the location and time, based
upon the value of the information.
• Who is willing to give relevant information? A participant having the information will
not necessarily mean that it will be revealed. The choice of interview settings, e.g. at
participants place of work, and the question sets assisted with allowing the participants
to feel confident in providing relevant information. The fact that participants were
informing research which will have academic and industrial impact assisted due to
participants feeling that they were actively influencing research.
• Who is most able to give the information? A relevant participant may wish to pro-
vide information but may have issues communicating the information. The interview
question sets and workshop agendas were designed to allow participants to provide
information in a style which suited them. Open questions were devised with scenar-
ios and point of discussion included in workshops. These all assisted in creating free
discussion and input.
2.3.5 Research Outputs
Research outputs have value in that they can illustrate learning, communicate ideas, gain
feedback, and show research progress. The outputs from the research are intended to be
proportional and based upon the restrictions that are placed upon the RE and the research
itself, i.e. the EngD management and objectives.
• White papers. Creation of white papers published internally within MOD to provide
confidence to those that may adopt diverse evidence as part of a software safety assur-
ance strategy. Papers were generated to provide guidance on the procurement approach
to ensure that diverse evidence can be appropriately contracted for.
• Formal reports. A number of formal reports were delivered to the REs customers to
implement some of the findings and enhancements identified as part of the research.
The reports were delivered to those that have a degree of power (in terms of enacting a
level of change) to incorporate the research findings and to apply influence themselves.
• Conferences and seminars. Presentations on the wider scope of the diverse evidence
concept were conducted, e.g. from the theory to specific cases of adopting alternative
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evidence. Conference and seminar presentations were provided to internal MOD audi-
ences as well as some of the findings from the research being presented at international
conferences20.
• Journal articles. Articles were submitted to a reputable journal to allow elements of
the research findings to be shared with a wider audience. It is anticipated that further
journal articles will be published based upon the wider research findings.
• IDC reviews/events. The IDC in Systems at the University of Bristol have frequent
reviews and events. These allow research plans and progress to be discussed with EngD
cohorts, other industrial supervisors, and other academic supervisors. The reviews and
events assisted in allowing the theory to be discussed and for the plans to be subjected
to scrutiny.
2.4 Research Execution
The previous sections within this chapter detailed the research strategy with information
on the paradigms and logic which underpins the approach. In essence, the strategy sets the
foundation for the research to ensure that the planned structure aligns with defensible and
quality21 research outcomes.
The execution of the research is putting the strategy into action. This involves responding
to the research questions via the defined paradigms and approaches to complete a systematic
process to meet the research objective. The research execution comprises of stages 3-8 of
the strategy outlined in Figure 2.1 (scoping the requirement for intervention through to the
conclusions).
The research process itself was iterative, as outlined in Figure 2.1. The steps taken for
the execution of the research is detailed in the thesis structure (section 1.4). The chapters
which follow provide the detail on the execution of the research via the activities stated in
this research strategy. The mixed paradigm and supporting data sources, and hence the
forms of analysis, provide a structured approach to deliver the research.
20For example, IET System Safety and Cyber Security Conference.
21From a research perspective the quality is measured by the validity, reliability, and generalisability of
the research (as stated, for example, by Leung (2015)).
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 26 of 328
Chapter 3
Background and the Problem of
Interest
There is a need to place the problem of interest within it’s context and why it is an important
issue to tackle for the defence domain. Is there is a sustained and reasoned argument for the
use of diverse evidence? Are there any software assurance challenges that could be alleviated?
To identify potential enhancements to the software safety assurance methods there is benefit
in understanding software and how it fits in the wider system assurance process. In doing
so, opportunities for enhancements to the system assurance process can also be identified.
This chapter will provide information on:
• Problem of Interest. Why there is a need for software to be assured, the initial scope
of the problem of interest, and information on the elements of a safety case developed
as part of an assurance activity.
• Context of Systems Safety Assurance. Introduction to the safety management ter-
minology and information on how DS 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c) is applied. How the
safety management processes are applied and how safety cases are adopted within
MOD. What constitutes a PE and how PEs are assessed.
• Current Evidential Approaches: Areas for Enhancement. Why there is an existing
and continuing need for the adoption of diverse evidence to support software safety
assurance activities. At a systems level there are a number of enhancements which can
be made to current practices. A SLF is described which provides a mechanism to deal
with limited information as part of a SoS safety argument.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 27 of 328
3.1 Problem of Interest
The problem of interest is focussed on the military airborne domain, although the solutions
may have scope to be applied more widely, e.g. MOD land and navy domains and the civil
sector. The RE is actively engaged with the software safety assurance of military airborne
platforms and this shapes the RE’s research motivation and the industry requirement.
Software is one element within the wider equipment’s assurance requirements, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.1. With equipment itself being an element within the wider environment
which includes the jobs/roles performed and the people themselves. Systems cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from the operating environment. Indeed, any safety assurance review
needs to understand how the system interacts with other systems and the wider environment.
These all have an effect on the safety of the system.
Figure 3.1: Considerations within a Safety Environment (UK MOD, 2018)
Within military systems the safety assurance is assessed at differing levels of abstraction;
e.g. DS 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c) is concerned with the “Safety Management Requirements
for Defence Systems” with DS 00-55 (UK MOD, 2014b) focused on the “Requirements for
Safety of PEs in Defence Systems”. In broad terms, DS 00-56 is focussed on the wider
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safety management issues at a system level with DS 00-55 focussed on the assurance at a
software/CEH level.
To gain a full safety assurance qualification1 the evidence needs to be judged against the
objectives within these standards. Software is one part of the safety assurance environment
but it is a critical element as software failures can result in hazardous2 or catastrophic3
consequences.
3.1.1 The Importance of Software Safety Assurance
Anecdotally, in 1945 engineers found a moth in “Panel F, Relay #70” of the Harvard Mark
II system. The system was running tests when engineers noticed issues. The moth was
subsequently trapped, removed, and taped into an engineer’s logbook with the words: “first
actual case of a bug being found” (Garfinkel, 2005)4.
The impact of software failures and ‘bugs’ span a number of domains (e.g. medical,
aerospace, gas pipelines etc) and software failures have occurred for as long as systems have
been reliant on such software. Historic examples of software failures include, but are certainly
not limited to (Garfinkel, 2005):
• Mariner I Space Probe (1962). Intended flight path diversion due to software fault in
the flight software. The probe was destroyed.
• Therac-25 Medical Accelerator (1985-87). Malfunction of radiation therapy device due
to a software race condition5. Loss of life occurred.
• Ariane 5 Flight 501 (1996). A bug in an arithmetic routine led to an overflow condi-
tion6. The expendable rocket was destroyed.
Within the airborne domain there are also numerous examples of software faults leading
to hazardous or catastrophic events. These include, but are certainly not limited to:
1The term qualification being the process of granting the approval for an aircraft or system to be operated
in flight.
2In an airborne context a hazardous event results in “serious or fatal injury to a small number of occupants
other than the flight crew” (RTCA, 2011a).
3In an airborne context a catastrophic event has “multiple fatalities (usually with loss of the aircraft)”
(RTCA, 2011a).
4There is some debate to the origin of the term ‘bug’, e.g. Magoun and Isreal (2013), but for the purposes
of this chapter the Harvard Mark II system example is as good as any.
5A race condition is an undesirable situation that occurs when a device or system attempts to perform
two or more operations at the same time. However, due to the nature of the device or system, the operations
must be conducted in a specified sequence to be completed correctly (TechTarget, 2015).
6An example of an overflow is that of an integer overflow which is the result of attempting to place into
memory an integer (whole number) that is too large for the integer data type (TechTarget, 2006).
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• Airbus A330-303 (2008). While the aircraft was in cruise at 37,000ft one of the air-
craft’s three Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRUs) started to intermittently
output incorrect values. In response, the aircraft’s Flight Control Primary Computers
(FCPCs) commanded the aircraft to pitch down. The incorrect values were partially
traced to the ADIRUs Central Processing Unit (CPU) due to an unknown software
design limitation in the FCPCs. 12 occupants of the aircraft were seriously injured
(ATSB, 2011).
• Airbus A400M (2015). An issue with a data parameter file resulted in 3 of the 4
aircraft’s engines initiating a power-off shortly after take-off. The error was not in the
code itself but in the configuration settings within the Engine Controller Units (ECUs)
of the engines. 4 aircrew died (Gibbs, 2015, Gallagher, 2015).
Sufficient assurance is needed in the underpinning software so that there is confidence
that severe events have a low likelihood of occurrence. However, the amount of software that
requires such assurance is growing. There are various estimates stating the rate of growth of
software within avionic platforms; e.g. approximately 400% every 2 years (Carlson, 2016),
with safety-related code doubling in size every 4 years (Zolotas et al., 2017). Figure 3.2
shows the estimated civil on-board avionics SLOC growth with the predicted software base
cost (based upon Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO) II).
From a military avionics perspective there is a similar trend of growth. Figure 3.3 shows
the growth of software in military aircraft, stated as KSLOC within the specific aircraft over
time.
This increase not only has cost implications but also increases the complexity of the
software development and its subsequent management. There are efforts to reduce the cost
of certifying airborne software via initiatives such as Future Airborne Capability Environ-
ment (FACE)7 and Software Engineering Costs and Timescales – Aerospace Initiative for
Reduction (SECT-AIR)8. Confidence in the underpinning software is a fundamental element
within any overall platform safety argument. If there is not a sufficient level of confidence
in the software then there is not a sufficient level of confidence in the system (and therefore
the overall platform).
7See the following for further information: http://www.opengroup.org/face.
8See the following for further information: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=113099. The RE is actively
engaged with this initiative, e.g. via Ashmore and Standish (2017).
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Figure 3.2: Estimated Onboard SLOC Growth on Commercial Aircraft (Redman et al.,
2010)
3.1.2 Research Focus on Software Safety Assurance
The focus of the research is on software safety assurance and gaining suitable confidence in
the evidence. How evidence can be used from other elements of the DSs will be explored;
specifically: CEH, the safety assessment process, and airworthiness related security. By
concentrating on software assurance means that the principles of evidence confidence can be
explored. Any lessons learnt can then be applied to wider evidence strands, e.g. CEH, if the
principles developed are appropriate and have merit.
The concepts developed as part of this thesis need to allow software confidence to remain
a consideration within the wider system or platform safety case, see sub-section 3.1.3 for
further information.
3.1.3 Elements of a Safety Case
From a MOD perspective, DS 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c) defines a Safety Case as a: “struc-
tured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible
and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given environment”. It is
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Figure 3.3: Growth of Software in Military Aircraft (KSLOC) (AVSI, 2011)
this body of evidence which is used to gain confidence in a system or platform9.
Bishop and Bloomfield (1998) provide a view on what a Safety Case needs to do via goals.
These goals can assist with ensuring that a Safety Case adheres to the DS 00-56 definition:
• Make an explicit set of claims about the system.
• Produce the supporting evidence.
• Provide a set of safety arguments that link10 the claims to the evidence.
• Make clear the assumptions and judgements underlying the arguments.
• Allow different viewpoints and levels of detail.
To meet the goals, Bishop and Bloomfield (1998) further define the main elements to be
included within a Safety Case:
9Further details on MOD Safety Cases are stated within AESMS (2017).
10A more suitable term might be that safety arguments form a direct implicit relationship and justification
as the term link implies a weaker form of relationship.
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• Claim about a property of the system or some subsystem.
• Evidence which is used as the basis of the safety argument.
• Argument linking the evidence to the claim; which can be deterministic, probabilistic,
or qualitative.
• Inference is the mechanism that provides the transformational rules for the argument.
These main elements are shown in Figure 3.4. There are a number of approaches to struc-
ture such elements; e.g. the Claims, Arguments and Evidence (CAE) notation developed by
Adelard11.
Figure 3.4: Main Elements of a Safety Case (Bishop and Bloomfield, 1998)
It is envisaged that the enhancements to the current methods for software safety assurance
will adhere to the principles of these main elements. Any tool created by the research will
allow judgements on the software confidence to be captured. This judgement will act as
evidence to feed into the overall safety arguments and the subsequent claims. This will
allow the arguments/claims to maintain a level of consistency with any wider assurance
case being formulated. The structure of the sub-claim acting as the evidence to support an
overall safety case will have a similar structure to that in Figure 3.4. This will ensure that
the sub-claim for the software is itself based upon evidence with rules to form the argument.
How a sub-claim for the judgement on the software confidence could feed into an over-
all safety claim is shown in Figure 3.5. This concept is supported further by the current
claims, argument, and evidence approaches which are used to consider existing process-based
guidelines, e.g. DO-178C (RTCA, 2011a)12.
11CAE notations can be structured using such tools as Assurance and Safety Case Environment (ASCE).
See the following for further information: https://www.adelard.com/asce/choosing-asce/index/.
12Further information on the MOD assurance process for PEs is contained within sub-section 3.2.3.
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Figure 3.5: Link Between the Overall Safety Claim and Software Sub-Claim (adapted from
Bishop and Bloomfield (1998))
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There are different layers of abstraction for hazard identification and management. DO-
178C, for example, states that safety analysis is conducted at the systems level. However,
it has been argued that specific hazards could be identified at a software development level,
such as hazard analysis at the source code stage (Hawkins et al., 2011). As an example, the
software design hazard identification stage could assert that: hazardous design errors have
not been introduced and that hazardous behaviour has been assessed and mitigated. A more
traditional safety assurance process would assert that for the design: safety requirements are
appropriate for the design and that safety requirements are satisfied.
The abstraction level for the hazard analysis influences elements of a safety case. Specifi-
cally, the evidence which is gained, the arguments which are formed, and therefore the claim
which can be made. In keeping with DO-178C, and the approach which is adopted widely
within industry and government, the assumption is that the software confidence judgement
from this research will feed into a system-level safety analysis.
3.2 Context of Systems Safety Assurance
The MOD has a defined safety assurance approach at the systems level for safety-critical
systems. This is distinct from the lower-level airworthiness assurance activities conducted
for the software. At a broad level this is illustrated within Figure 3.6 which shows the
aircraft, system, and item supporting processes to achieve the aircraft level certification.
The safety assessment processes are fed from the system process activities. Each of the
system development processes have supporting item development processes, hardware and
software, which are subject to assurance activities.
3.2.1 MOD Approach to Safety Management
DS 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c) is the MOD standard to state the safety management require-
ments for defence systems. It provides the requirements and guidance for the achievement,
assurance, and management of safety. DS 00-56 was initially published in 1991 and has
evolved over time to take into account numerous MOD strategic directions and approaches,
e.g. the policy for MOD to be as civil as possible, and only as military as necessary (Mc-
Dermid and Williams, 2014).
DS 00-56 enables the acquisition of Products, Services and/or Systems (PSS) which
are compliant to relevant safety legislations, regulations, and policies. DS 00-56 is applied
by defence contractors when it is stipulated by the MOD. DS 00-56 can be applied to a
broad spectrum of defence procurements and this is apparent in the definition of PSS (UK
MOD, 2014c, McDermid and Williams, 2014). The relationships within the PSS concept is
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Figure 3.6: Aircraft Function Implementation Process (SAE, 2010)
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illustrated in Figure 3.7.
• Product. A product is a smaller-scale element than a system which cannot be assessed
for safety outside the context of its use, e.g. an engine or its components.
• Service. A service can be any activity which is applied to a system, e.g. maintain-
ing/updating military vehicles.
• System. A system is a combination of elements that are used together to perform a
given task or achieve a specific purpose. The elements may include personnel, pro-
cedures, materials, tools, products, facilities, and/or data as appropriate; e.g. an air
traffic control facility with integrated radar and radio equipment.
Figure 3.7: Products, Services and/or Systems (PSS) Relationship
[Sub-section text redacted]
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 37 of 328
3.2.2 Safety Cases and Safety Assessment Reports (SARs)
From a civil perspective in the UK, greater safety oversight by the Government appears to
have been adopted after the Flixborough explosion in 197413 (Leveson, 2011). However, the
concept of a ‘safety case’ was not introduced until the 1990 publication of the findings of the
1988 Piper Alpha disaster14 (Leveson, 2011). They have been adopted in the MOD since the
mid-1990s; this was due to recommendations made within the Jones Report on Equipment
Safety Assurance (Inge, 2007).
Safety Cases are a method to structure an argument which can help to establish confi-
dence. However, it can be difficult to establish the level of safety evidence needed to gain
sufficient confidence in a system. The judgement of the engineers and practitioners will in-
fluence the type and amount of evidence deemed necessary. Judgements will be shaped by
knowledge of the regulations or previous reviews of similar systems. DS 00-56 has a require-
ment for a suitable Safety Case to be generated as part of the wider Safety Management
System (SMS).
The use of Safety Cases is common within other safety-related domains, e.g. within
the civil nuclear sector. The UK nuclear regulator (Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR))
describe a Safety Case as a logical and hierarchical set of documents that describes risk and
clearly sets out the trail from safety claims through arguments to evidence (ONR, 2016).
There are similar definitions and objectives across a number of domains which implement
Safety Cases. This is positive, as it infers that the approaches developed for this thesis for
the military airborne software assurance domain may be compatible with wider domains,
e.g. civil airborne, and how they adopt Safety Case evidence.
The MOD Acquisition Safety and Environmental Management System (AESMS, 2017)
states that the following evidence should be included within a Safety Case:
• Safety requirements have been met.
• Safety requirements are valid.
• Assessment undertaken is valid.
• Derived safety requirements are traceable and sufficient.
• Safety Management System (SMS) is defined.
• Suitable staff competencies.
• Applicable legislation, regulations, and policies have been adhered to.
13Information on the incident can be found in HSE (2018b).
14Information on the incident can be found in The Guardian (2013).
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• All contractual safety requirements are met.
DS 00-56 also states the need to generate a Safety Case Report (SCR) which summarises
the arguments and evidence of the Safety Case and documents progress against the safety
programme. A SCR is produced/updated at key milestones of the procurement process, e.g.
Initial Gate15. Within the air domain, the focus of the researches problem of interest, Safety
Cases are referred to as Safety Assessments with SCRs referred to as Safety Assessment
Reports (SARs) (UK MOD, 2014c). Further information is contained within the MAA
Regulatory Article (RA) 120516 (MAA, 2017c) with its implication for DTs defined within
RA 122017 (MAA, 2016a).
DS 00-56, in the context of Safety Cases and SCRs, makes reference to arguments being
supported by evidence. Kelly (2011) defines supporting evidence as the “results of observing,
analysing, testing, simulating and estimating the properties of a system that provide the
fundamental information from which safety can be inferred”. High-level arguments are
defined as the “explanation of how the available evidence can be reasonably interpreted as
indicating acceptable safety”.
DS 00-970 (UK MOD, 2014a)18 contains safety-related requirements for what are termed
PEs. DS 00-970 also states that all aspects of the PE should be supported by a SAR as
described within DS 00-56.
3.2.3 Assurance of Programmable Elements (PEs)
3.2.3.1 Defence Standard 00-55
DS 00-55 (UK MOD, 2014b) defines PEs as those PSS that are implemented in software or
programmable hardware which includes any device that can be customised, e.g. Application-
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs), and Field-Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs). DS 00-55 aims to provide the requirements and guidance for the
achievement, assurance, and management of safety of PEs. The guidance is contained in a
number of sections:
• PEs safety management, including: PEs safety governance and PEs information shar-
ing.
• General requirements, including: requirements definition and PEs failure assessment.
15The commencement of the assessment phase within the MOD acquisition model. The acquisition model
is termed Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, Disposal (CADMID).
16RA 1205: Air System Safety Cases.
17RA 1220: Project Team Airworthiness and Safety.
18UK MOD (2014a) is focussed on the “Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft”,
(Part 13: Military Common Fit Equipment).
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• Standards selection, agreement and design integrity.
• PEs management, including: safety requirement traceability and PEs risk reduction
and mitigation.
• Assurance. PEs safety evidence and PEs safety assurance reporting.
[Sub-section text redacted]
3.2.3.2 Defence Standard 00-970
PEs are also considered within DS 00-970 (UK MOD, 2014a). This standard is stated by
the MAA as being the default certification specification for MOD military registered aircraft
(MAA, 2018b). Specifically, for military airborne software and CEH the relevant guidance is
contained within requirement 1.7 of DS 00-970. Requirement 1.7 refers to “Safety Related
Programmable Elements”.
Compliance to requirement 1.7 of DS 00-970 is defined within four sub-sections which
must be considered for any procurement (MAA, 2015). The supporting evidence will be
agreed between the DTs and the MAA.
• System level safety considerations. At the system level, the Safety Assessment process
should define the top level safety requirements and the design objectives of the PEs.
These are detailed in the guidance within ARP476119 (SAE, 1996) and ARP4754A20
(SAE, 2010).
• Airworthiness related cyber security assurance. DO-326A21 (RTCA, 2014a) and the
associated DO-35622 (RTCA, 2014b) combined with arguments made in relation to
JSP44023 (UK MOD, 2001) should be used as an Acceptable Means of Compliance
(AMC) with the cyber security requirements of DS 00-56.
• Safety Related Software (SRS) assurance. DO-178C24 (RTCA, 2011a) and its supple-
ments25 can be considered an AMC to provide design assurance of airborne SRS when
19Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761. Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.
20Aerospace Recommended Practice 4754A. Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems.
21DO-326A. Airworthiness Security Process Specification.
22DO-356. Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations.
23JSP 440. The Defence Manual of Security.
24DO-178C. Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.
25DO-178C supplements:
– DO-248C. Supporting Information for DO-178C and DO-278A (RTCA, 2011b).
– DO-330. Software Tool Qualification Considerations (RTCA, 2011d).
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supported by a robust, documented, and auditable Safety Assessment as described
within DS 00-56.
• Safety related CEH assurance. DO-25426 (RTCA, 2000) can be considered an AMC to
provide design assurance of airborne safety related CEH when supported by a robust,
documented, and auditable Safety Assessment as described within DS 00-56 (as is the
case for the safety-related software).
Figure 3.8 shows the route to determining the software, CEH, safety assessment process,
and airworthiness-related cyber security qualification requirements. The research has a focus
on software assurance27 and it is these which are to be subject to the initial research analysis.
However, diverse evidence is still valid in gaining compliance to other elements of requirement
1.7 within DS 00-970, i.e. system level safety considerations and cyber security assurance.
Figure 3.8: Flow of MOD Military Airborne Software/CEH Qualification Guidance (based
upon MAA (2015))
– DO-331. Model-Based Development and Verification Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A (RTCA,
2011e).
– DO-332. Object-Orientated Technology and Related Techniques Supplement to DO-178C and DO-
278A (RTCA, 2011f).
– DO-333. Formal Methods Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A (RTCA, 2011g).
26DO-254. Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware.
27Also, potentially CEH assurance if the research principles are deemed appropriate.
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3.2.3.3 DO-178C
DO-178C is considered an AMC within DS 00-970 to assess software process life-cycles. The
guideline aims to allow software life-cycles to be developed and reviewed in a consistent
manner by numerous stakeholders, e.g. Independent Technical Evaluators (ITEs).
DO-178C contains a number of objectives, stated in the appendix tables within the
guideline, which cover the software life-cycle processes. The life-cycle processes intended to
be addressed by the guideline should always be considered as part of the wider systems and
hardware processes. The key elements of DO-178C are:
• Software Planning.
• Software Development Processes:
– Software requirements process.
– Software design process.
– Software coding process.
– Integration process.
• Integral Processes:
– Software verification process.
– Software configuration management process.
– Software quality assurance process.
– Certification liaison process.
The amount of objectives to be complied with, and hence the level of robustness, is com-
mensurate with the required software integrity. The integrity of the software is expected to
be determined via the Safety Assessment process as a result of the application of ARP4754A
(SAE, 2010). In particular, the integrity of the software is based upon its failure condition.
The failure condition categories are in Table 3.1.
The failure condition categories are linked to five software levels (A-E), commonly referred
to as DALs28. The relationship between the failure condition categories and the software
levels is shown in Table 3.2. The system safety assessment process determines the failure
condition by the extent of the anomalous software behaviour causing, or contributing to, a
failure of the system function.
28Section 1.1 contains information on the number of DO-178C objectives for each DAL.
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Category Failure Condition Description
Catastrophic Multiple fatalities (usually with loss of the aircraft).
Hazardous
Reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the flight
crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent of:
• Large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities.
• Physical distress or excessive workload (aircrew cannot per-
form tasks accurately or completely).
• Serious or fatal injury to a small number of occupants other
than the flight crew.
Major
Reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the flight
crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent of:
• Significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabil-
ities.
• Significant increase in workload (aircrew efficiency impacted,
discomfort to the flight crew).
• Physical distress to passengers or cabin crew (possibly includ-
ing injuries).
Minor
Would not significantly reduce aircraft safety and involve actions
which are well within their capabilities. Extent of the failure
condition includes:
• Slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities.
• Slight increase in workload.
• Some physical discomfort passengers or cabin crew.
No Safety Effect
Would have no effect on aircraft safety. No increase to crew
workload would occur.






E No Safety Effect
Table 3.2: Software Levels and Failure Condition Categories (SAE, 2010)
The defined DAL for a software development (e.g. via DO-178C) is based upon the
identification and assignment of a probabilistic safety objective as part of the system safety
engineering activities; for example via ARP-4761 (SAE, 1996) (Ledinot et al., 2016). In
essence, it is accepted that the appropriate development of the software to a defined level
of rigour (e.g. meeting all objectives within the DO-178C guideline) can help to achieve
the probabilistic safety objective. However, it should be noted that this is not a scientific
justification that it achieves the probabilistic objective, but a consensual approach which
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is currently suitable given the lack of a more sound software reliability estimation method.
This review of the software to judge conformance consists of a blend of qualitative assessment
(e.g. the requirements specification) and quantitative assessment (e.g. test results).
Using ARP-4761 (SAE, 1996) definitions the assignment of a DAL is providing an indi-
cation (based upon a low level of risk) of the likelihood of an occurrence of a defined severity
of failure per flight hour. As an example, within Table 3.3 the quantitative probability of a
catastrophic event occurring should be extremely improbable, i.e. less than 0.000000001 per
flight hour. Increases to these levels of probability starts to introduce high to medium levels
of risk (FAA, 2000).
Level Category Probability (Quantitative)1 Probability (Descriptive)2
A Catastrophic 1.0E-9 Extremely Improbable
B Hazardous 1.0E-7 Improbable
C Major 1.0E-5 Improbable
D Minor 1.0E-3 / 1.0 Probable
Note(s): 1. Per flight hour. 2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) definitions.
Table 3.3: Software Levels, Failure Condition Categories, and Quantitative/Descriptive
Probabilities (based upon SAE (1996))
Qualitative assessments are based upon judgements and the thesis provides an approach
to capture the judgements in a consistent manner. The potential intent of any tool developed
as part of this thesis is to make judgements on the acceptability of any evidence. It provides
a confidence level built by structured consensus building. In order to achieve this a method
may be required to quantify these judgements. In a strictest sense the safety approaches
adopted at a system safety engineering level (e.g. ARP-4761), at a software level (e.g. DO-
178C), and within this thesis are not providing a statistical confidence as such29. Nor does
the thesis provide strict probabilities of any other kind, it provides an informal confidence
level built by a process of structured consensus building.
3.2.3.4 DO-254
DO-254 (RTCA, 2000) was created due to electronic hardware within safety-critical aircraft
systems becoming increasingly complex. Due to the complexity of the hardware within the
systems they may be increasingly at risk of design errors causing failure conditions. The
DO-254 guideline is an attempt to address/reduce these risks by providing design assurance
guidance for the development of airborne CEH.
29Statistical confidence signifies the level of confidence in the method of constructing an interval and in
some cases is the defined “margin of error” of an experiments sample size (Sauro and Lewis, 2016).
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A hardware design life-cycle is described within DO-254; however a preferred life-cycle
or structure is not provided, e.g. waterfall. The design life-cycle processes are as follows:
• Hardware Planning Processes.
• Hardware Design Processes:
– Requirements capture.
– Conceptual design process.
– Detailed design process.
– Implementation process.
– Production transition process.
– Acceptance test.
• Validation and Verification Process:
– Validation process.
– Verification process.
– Validation and verification methods.
• Configuration Management Process.
• Process Assurance.
• Certification Liaison Process.
In essence, the hardware life-cycle follows a similar process-based approach as the software
life-cycle outlined within DO-178 A, B, and C30.
Within DO-254 the definitions of the failure conditions are the same as those stated
within Table 3.1. The relationship between the integrity levels and the failure conditions
correspond accordingly, as with DO-178C, but with the addition of the term Severe-Major
to accompany the Hazardous failure condition. Appendix A of DO-254 states the level of
rigour which should be applied for the commensurate hardware level.
Figure 3.9 shows the link between the system development process (including the safety
assessment), the software life-cycle process (DO-178C), and the hardware development pro-
cess (DO-254). The software and hardware functions/requirements and design information
feed into the system development process.
30Release dates for the DO-178 versions: A-1985, B-1992, C-2011.
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Figure 3.9: Link Between System, Software, and Hardware Processes
3.3 Current Evidential Approaches: Areas for Enhance-
ment
The MOD software and CEH safety assurance31 approaches have a focus on using the process-
based objectives within guidelines such as DO-178C and DO-254. There is scope to use wider
non-process evidence, e.g. PSH via CAST-1 (CAST, 1998)32.
Gaining a full picture of process compliance, e.g. via DO-178C, requires access to the
life-cycle data artefacts, e.g. a Software Development Plan (SDP), which are produced as
a result of the software development life-cycle. This allows the development and testing
activities to be sufficiently understood for the implemented software. There are a number
of approaches to gain a level of software safety assurance confidence and SMEs may judge
these diverse approaches to be more suitable than a process-based method.
There are also factors which may require the MOD to gain additional evidence in support
of a process-based claim. Examples of such factors include: the evidence being in a different
form; such as the chosen development process not meeting the specific objectives within
DO-178C.
The following sub-sections provide a number of non-exhaustive examples of why addi-
tional evidence may be needed in-lieu of the process-based approach. Some of the examples
may also be applicable to the provision of the non-process based evidence itself. However,
this reaffirms the need for wider sets of diverse evidence to be captured to mitigate such is-
sues; e.g. Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)/Military-Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) systems may
have limited life-cycle evidence available for immediate review. This may be due to the
vendor applying limitations on to whom the information can be released. The same release
restrictions may also apply to the in-service data of the same COTS/MOTS system.
31Via DS 00-970 (UK MOD, 2014a) which is focussed on the “Design and Airworthiness Requirements for
Service Aircraft” (Part 13: Military Common Fit Equipment). Further information on the MOD assurance
process is contained within sub-section 3.2.3.
32Certification Authorities Software Team (CAST) Position Paper (CAST-1) - Guidance for Assessing the
Software Aspects of Product Service History of Airborne Systems and Equipment.
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3.3.1 Software Level
3.3.1.1 Adoption of Novel Technology
Novel technology is defined as an approach, or item of equipment, which has not under-
gone any form of military airborne assurance (this definition is partly derived from Weaver,
Kelly and Mayo (2006)). For these types of technology there may need to be a fundamental
assessment of the assurance requirements. This is due to the principles in the extant stan-
dards/guidelines not being able to be applied in full, e.g. Radack, Tiedeman and Parkinson
(2019).
There is a desire to adopt novel technologies due to the performance benefits and the
subsequent positive impact on capability. An example of a novel technology is the use of
MC processors which, due to the increase in the number of cores on a single processor,
have perceived assurance risks in terms of determinism33. MC processors have been used
within domains which are not safety-critical for a number of years. However, the use of
MC processors within the UK military airborne domain is novel, and due to this there are
assurance considerations that need to be addressed.
Due to the very nature of their novelty some of these technologies may not fully adhere
to the extant guidelines/standards objectives. Due to this there may be a reluctance for
these technologies to be accepted by regulators34. This demonstrates how extant guide-
lines/standards and safety assurance requirements could restrict the adoption of novel tech-
nologies. However, novel approaches may need to become part of future platforms and the
safety assurance regulations must take this into account, e.g. the adoption of MC processors.
The RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor35 have been active in ascertaining ‘solutions’ to
adopting such novel technologies and have provided thoughts on a stepped process for MC
processor qualification36.
There is a balance between the extant assurance requirements/constraints and the tech-
nical designs/solutions to provide a capability. Could the use of diverse evidence assist with
achieving this balance? Further information on this topic can be found in sub-section 7.2.8.
3.3.1.2 Procurements via International Partners/Vendors
There are a number of benefits to adopting a procurement strategy for the UK military air-
borne domain which favours the use of international or multi-national partners and vendors.
33For example, ensuring that the Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) is predictable.
34A technology maybe ‘novel’ to one domain but not another (e.g. use within the rail industry but not
the airborne domain) and therefore the transferring of applicable evidence could be possible.
35Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems.
36Presented at the High-Integrity Software (HIS) 2016 event (Bristol, UK). For further information see
http://www.his-2017.co.uk/session/multi-core-mc-processor-qualification-for-safety-critical-systems.
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Such benefits include shared costs and shared exploitation of Research and Development
(R&D). The F-35 Lightning II platform is an example of a UK platform which is procured
as part of a set of partner countries37. The use of diverse evidence can assist where an SME
would like to form a view on the software assurance level in-lieu of process-based evidence;
e.g. IPR and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) considerations may delay
the provision of process-based evidence.
Procurements from international partners provide opportunities for enhancements to the
current evidential approaches. The software life-cycle approach and the supporting activities
which are implemented may have additional forms of evidence which can be part of the
judgement on the software safety assurance confidence. An example of such evidence are
third-party V&V activities which are performed that, although are not part of an extant
guideline/standard, will still assist in forming a judgement on the confidence.
Other forms of evidence may be suitable to derive a confidence level as it can be gained
in a timely manner or the evidence may be judged to be of greater relevance. The additional
information can assist with qualifying the software when compared to the extant process-
based requirements. Therefore, MOD software and CEH assurance process may benefit from
the adoption of alternative approaches which use diverse evidence.
3.3.1.3 Adoption of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) and Military-Off-The-
Shelf (MOTS) Equipment
For over a decade there has been a clear directive for the MOD to use COTS/MOTS compo-
nents where possible. Indeed, the 2005 Defence Industry Strategy (UK MOD, 2015) stated
that MOD should “increasingly accept COTS technology”. There are a number of well
understood benefits to the use of COTS/MOTS, such as reduced costs due to the scale of
production.
The software and CEH of COTS/MOTS products are not necessarily developed to fully
meet regulatory requirements38. There are instances where full compliance is achieved with
relevant evidence (e.g. SDP) being available for review by regulators. However, in general,
COTS equipment may require additional evidence to support a safety judgement. The
guidelines do take into consideration the use of COTS equipment but the expectation is that
they meet the process-based requirements or that a PSH argument is established. Due to the
nature of COTS equipment the potential reduced level of available process evidence means
there is a benefit in taking into account a more diverse range of evidence.
37See the following for further information: https://www.f35.com/global.
38This topic is well reported: such as within the nuclear domain, e.g. Picca (2018); civilian airborne
domain, e.g. Daniels (2018); and in the general software assurance field, e.g. Menon (2018), Hall (2018),
Spriggs (2018), and Barker (2018).
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3.3.1.4 Reuse of Pre-Existing Evidence
In some scenarios the MOD may need to qualify the software or CEH of equipment that has
previous history and evidence from recognised bodies, e.g. European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) or the FAA. From the perspective of the FAA a Technical Standard Order (TSO)39
would be issued to signify that the design and production of the specific system/part has
been approved. Part of the TSO process would be to gain confidence in the development
activities conducted by the equipment vendor.
Recognising the approvals that have been granted via certification bodies would be of
value. In addition, the recognition also has wider benefits such as the reduction in rework
and a reduction in any costs associated with the certification efforts.
3.3.2 System Level: Safety three-Layered Framework (SLF)
The MOD safety assurance process is strong and defensible; however, there are potential
areas for enhancement. The following sub-sections provide an outline of an approach to
enhance the development of safety cases for MOD. The approach was published in two papers
at the 9th IET International Conference on System Safety and Cyber Security (2014). The
papers were written in collaboration between the RE, two Dstl colleagues40, and a colleague
from Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)41. In addition, the findings have been discussed
with the REs academic supervisors42.
The SLF adopts diverse evidence to ensure that a suitable level of confidence can be
gained via the safety assurance process. This can be achieved in circumstances where there
may be a need to know only certain information and there may be IPR constraints. The
theory of the SLF allows a solution for system level safety evidence issues and it has applicable
lessons for the software safety domain.
3.3.2.1 SLF: Context
The complexity of a system normally determines the scale and severity of its safety assurance
challenges. The argument for why a given system, or SoS, is safe is captured in a Safety
Case which links the claims to the supporting evidence via arguments.
39A TSO is a minimum performance standard for specified materials, parts, and appliances used on civil
aircraft (FAA, 2018).
40Paul Caseley (Dstl, Senior Fellow) and Dr Mark Hadley (Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software
Systems).
41Helen Auld.
42Dr John May (University of Bristol, Reader in Safety Systems) and Dr Theo Tryfonas (University of
Bristol, Reader in Smart Cities).
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There are challenges to making a Safety Case comprehensible when it is significant in
size (e.g. hundreds of pages long) as it is often difficult, if not impossible, for an individual
to develop a complete understanding of it. In addition, due to the complexities of military
systems which the MOD procures there will be many organisations and individuals involved
in creating the Safety Case. Therefore, there is a real possibility that the application and
the environment of the system could be viewed differently by each of the contributors. An
issue such as this could introduce doubt into the validity of the Safety Case due to the
incompatible contexts.
There have also been wider issues with the development of Safety Cases. An independent
review, led by Charles Haddon-Cave QC, into the loss of the UK Royal Air Force (RAF)
Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006 found that there was “a Safety Case
regime which [was] ineffective and wasteful” (Haddon-Cave, 2009). The safety case was
criticised in the review and it was found that the belief that the Nimrod was safe anyway
and acceptably safe to operate blinded many of those involved in the Nimrod Safety Case.
Additional evidence supports the claim that the way in which Safety Cases have been
traditionally developed is not sufficient. Steinzor (2010) identified a number of lessons from
the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Facility (DHF) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Steinzor
(2010) states that the general size and approach to the development of British safety cases was
not satisfactory. Safety Cases from related case studies are referred to within Steinzor (2010)
as being: “bulky”; that “typically a safety case for a medium-size North Sea production
platform covers anywhere from 390-610 pages”; and there can be an “over-reliance on cookie-
cutter prototypes of critical documentation”.
It could be argued that the types of issues experienced with safety cases for complex
SoS will increase in the future due to the growth in the complexity of systems. Also, the
increased globalisation of the manufacturing industry means that a given system may contain
components or sub-systems provided from numerous nations. The systems may not even be
operated in these nations. These concepts introduce issues which may evolve due to differing
safety cultures43.
The aim of the SLF is to only allow need to know safety related information to be
exchanged. This allows the IPR of the systems to be protected, e.g. from other nations. In
addition, a SoS may also include legacy44 elements which may not be fully understood or
documented to the level which would be required to comply with modern standards.
The SLF attempts to enhance the development of safety cases to deal with complex
43The issue of safety cultures at inter - and intra-organisational levels is not a new one and is still subject
to debate, e.g. within Rollenhagen and Wahlstrom (2007) and Jaiswal et al. (2018).
44The term legacy in this context being “of, relating to, or being a previous... computer system” or “of,
relating to, associated with, or carried over from an earlier time, technology etc” (Merriam-Webster, 2018).
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SoS which may have components of varying provenance. The SLF manages the system
complexity by using modularisation of the system with well-defined interfaces to make the
individual safety cases comprehensible. The approach has been informed by the work of the
Industrial Avionics Working Group (IAWG) (Fenn et al., 2007).
The SLF is an approach which characterises the system’s internal and external safety
relationships as arguments, engineering models, and via detailed analysis. This abstract
model was developed to enable suitable levels of assurance confidence to be achieved for
high integrity SoS.
Engineering models are adopted to understand the interfaces, to allow the safety of
the entire system to be understood, and to allow scenarios to be executed in a modelled
environment. The SLF also recognises the need for detailed analysis to be integrated into
the model to ensure the validity of the key safety arguments. Consistency is checked when
integrating modules to ensure the safety case is valid for all of the stakeholders, for a given
application in a given environment.
3.3.2.2 SLF: Introduction
Modular safety cases provide a number of benefits over traditional monolithic safety cases,
e.g. ease of construction and a focus on integration boundaries (IAWG, 2010). The IAWG
process attempted to provide a more structured and efficient method but there are still
limitations with the approach. As an example, the safety case module arguments reference
the evidence rather than having the evidence direct and explicit as part of the model45. The
SLF aims to meet the limitations of existing processes by applying a modularised approach
at a systems level and allowing a greater level of detail to be exposed in a coherent manner
for the assurance of safety-critical system components.
The SLF consists of a flow of information which is fed from the top level down to populate
each stage; modular safety cases, engineering models, and detailed analysis such as formal
models (as shown in Figure 3.10).
As the stages are developed for each iteration the level of safety assurance and confidence
increases due to the greater depth of analysis which is conducted. The SLF layers consist of:
• Understanding and argument layer. Provides a language that the customer/user can
understand for the safety, security, and dependability of the system element.
• Modelling evidence layer. Relevant engineering designs of the arguments showing that
the designers have understood the interfaces and safety requirements.
45Whereas, within the SLF a potential element of the abstract model is the evidence.
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Figure 3.10: Outline of the SLF Hierarchy
• Validation layer. Detailed analysis of the essential safety properties and provides the
necessary confidence for specialists to justify their safety, security, or dependability
assertions.
The SLF helps to form a judgement on the interface interactions, how the relationships
occur, the formal proof of the relationships, and how the relationships can be met. It enables
dependency relationships to be defined at appropriate supply interfaces and at differing levels
of the SLF, e.g. between different systems and suppliers of an ABS (see Figure 3.11).
3.3.2.3 SLF: The Layers
3.3.2.3.1 Modular Safety Cases: An Understanding and Argument Layer
The IAWG refined the modular safety case concept via research into avionic software assur-
ance (Fenn et al., 2007). Utilising this approach allows elements of systems to be separated
into modules. This is dependent on each module having a well defined interface definition
and that the definitions are derived in a consistent manner for the neighbouring systems.
Architectures are used to identify the interfaces and interactions in the system. This al-
lows a safety case to be built on external outputs from each of the modules in a uniform
manner. These interfaces must be captured in a consistent and unambiguous form to allow
sub-system and end-to-end safety assessments to be made. Interfaces can be defined us-
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Figure 3.11: SLF Supplier Interfaces for an ABS Example
ing contract based arguments, such as Dependency-Guarantee Relationships (DGRs)46 and
Dependency-Guarantee Contracts (DGCs)47. The contract arguments should specify all of
the safety related behaviour of the system element, e.g. failure modes.
Provided that the external and internal interfaces are fully defined, access to the internal
arguments in the safety case modules should not be necessary as sufficient information is
available to derive assurance conclusions. This allows suppliers to ensure confidentiality
while making essential information accessible on a need to know basis.
For low risk safety related system elements the modular safety case layer and its defined
interfaces may be sufficient for the overall safety case. The concept of only sharing sufficient
information in each SLF layer is shown in Figure 3.11 with the Display System not requiring
any detailed analysis modelling, e.g. due to a lower assurance integrity level.
46A module will guarantee to exhibit specific behaviour provided specific dependencies hold. If the de-
pendencies on which the module relies do not hold then it cannot uphold its guarantees. For a safety case
argument to use the guarantees provided by a module it will be necessary to confirm that the dependencies
the module relies on have been satisfied (Fenn et al., 2007).
47DGCs state an association where one module’s Dependency is satisfied by anothers Guarantee (Fenn
et al., 2007).
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3.3.2.3.2 Engineering Models: A Modelling Evidence Layer
To support the modular argument layer with any significant safety related implications
evidence from engineering modelling using standard engineering processes may be used, e.g.
MathWorks Simulink48/Stateflow49 or Unified Modelling Language (UML). The engineering
models may be part of the existing design, or an adaptation, but should accurately specify
the contract based safety interfaces and essential internal behaviour of the system. These
models will help inform trade-offs in the safety architecture and the safety functions. Along
with standard safety analysis, the models will provide engineering evidence of safety functions
and safety related interfaces.
Depending on the form of the engineering modelling process, scenarios can be executed
through animation, including human responses to particular failure modes. This animation
can occur across all systems at the engineering layer of the SLF. Only the interface elements
of the engineering models need to be shared between development teams. This maintains
the separation of the detailed design and hence ensures confidentiality.
Where COTS elements are being used in the system it may be necessary to create models
that accurately reflect the declared COTS interface. These models can be used to explore
the safety implications.
3.3.2.3.3 Analysis Models: Validation of Properties Layer
The safety behaviour of high integrity interfaces may require detailed analysis. Formal
mathematical notation allows safety critical arguments and engineering models to be further
refined into a notation which is precise and unambiguous. It can be used to produce well
defined pre- and post-predicates for contract-based interface declarations. This ensures cor-
rectness and understanding of the interfaces between modules in the safety case. It can also
be used to capture the module specifications for parts of the system that are essential to
understand the safety properties; e.g. the mode or state of a system element which influences
the interface50.
Combining the interface and module specifications which are captured in formal notation
can allow formal safety (and security) models to be created. These models can be for systems
composed of bespoke and COTS elements. This can be achieved even when the technical
details of these elements are not known. These models can be configured to different scenarios
to understand safety (and security) arguments. Although the true nature of the COTS is not
known, it may be possible to explore areas of concern and then mitigate through architectural
48For further information see MathWorks (2014a).
49For further information see MathWorks (2014b).
50The use of formal methods is also prevalent for solutions being adopted for evolving concepts such as
Machine Learning, e.g. as detailed at the FLOC (2018) summit.
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re-design or additional bespoke functionality. The information captured via these models can
be used with other diverse evidence, e.g. system test results, to derive a level of confidence.
3.3.2.4 Inclusion of Legacy Systems
The SLF allows for legacy systems to be included within a wider SoS safety case as long as the
interface between the legacy system and the rest of the SoS is well defined and understood.
This is due to the process assuring the interfaces between contributing systems with each
having a self-contained safety argument. This means that there can be a varied quantity of
information provided. Appropriate evidence must be gained before it can be considered part
of the wider SoS.
3.3.2.5 SLF: Implementation Process
The SLF is implemented via a six stage process:
1. Define Safety Case Goals and Functions. Goals are specified based upon the top-level
safety requirements. Functions are captured which specify the characteristics or actions
which the system must perform to contribute to the system safety.
2. Define Safety Case Regions. Regions are created for each safety function and include
the elements of the system required to provide the safety function.
3. Define Safety Case Modules. Safety case modules exist to meet the safety goals and
include all of the elements required to meet that goal. DGRs are created for each
module.
4. Create Arguments. Safety arguments are generated which can be formed of existing
evidence, engineering models, and/or detailed analysis.
5. Create Engineering Models. Engineering models are created for each module and for a
system as a whole.
6. Integrate. Arguments are integrated for the entire system. DGCs are created for the
safety case module information flows.
It should be noted that at any point in the process additional goals, safety functions,
modules or interfaces may be identified. In these cases they should be added to the framework
and the process restarted from the appropriate point. The flow of the six stage process is
shown in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: SLF Implementation Flow
3.3.2.6 SLF: Conclusions
The papers produced as a result of the SLF research contain greater detail on the SLF stages
and includes a worked case study. The main points from the papers have been included within
this section to outline the concept of the approach. A number of clear advantages of the
SLF process have been identified:
• The SLF enables arguments to be formed with traceability to the evidence and their
models, if applicable. These arguments are grouped together into modules allowing
each to be understood in isolation and the whole to be understood by an individual.
• The structure of the SLF allows the information to be presented in a consistent and
unambiguous way. The approach utilises, where possible, existing processes and ter-
minology. Need to know is maintained with the SLF as only relevant information is
released between systems.
• In certain circumstances the entire SoS safety case may be used to assure the system.
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This assurance would be provided by relevant stakeholders under limited information
access.
• The processes supporting the SLF allow various stakeholders with a variety of levels
of interest to appreciate and comprehend the systems and their interactions.
• The SLF allows for human factors to be included within the modular safety cases
and engineering models. Human Factors safety case concepts (UK MOD, 2008) and
traditional methods can be used in conjunction with the SLF.
• Integration risk can be reduced as the SLF concept model should ensure that interfaces
are described with common terminology and definitions. This provides confidence that
those responsible for the separate parts of the SoS are utilising the same language for
system boundary descriptions.
• The SLF and the supporting processes can be adopted for a range of SoS with varying
degrees of complexity. They have utility for commercial and military safety case gen-
eration in line with the Information Set Safety Summary (ISSS) concept51 within DS
00-56.
• Legacy, bespoke, and COTS systems can be integrated to form the SoS safety case.
Issues surrounding IPR and the sharing of sensitive information can be circumvented
due to the method in which information is exchanged within the SLF.
The SLF has acted as a ‘stepping stone’ towards fulfilling the grand tour question. It
has allowed lessons and principles to be learnt from a systems level with the further research
applying these lessons at a lower software level. The SLF has not acted as a significant
contribution to the research but it has assisted in allowing a number of key elements of the
DSF and the rationale for the approach to be articulated.
The SLF has shown that there are non-process based approaches that can be applied
in order to generate and review safety assurance evidence. At a systems level there is a
need to gain an overall level of confidence in the safety assurance of the wider-system (or
SoS). To gain this confidence there is a necessity to review supporting evidence (which can
be determined by extant standards) and to reason with the available evidence. Evidence
which is a requirement within a standard/guideline is not always available for review due
to IPR/ITAR issues, for example. The SLF has shown that systems can trace to a number
51The ISSS contains the core information which third parties, e.g. the MOD or system integrators, need
to know in order to discharge their safety responsibilities. The ISSS would normally also contain information
about failure modes (McDermid and Williams, 2014).
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of evidential types (not only process-based) to generate a safety assurance judgement; in
essence supporting the use of diverse evidence.
The models within the SLF (e.g. engineering models) have also shown the value in only
exposing certain degrees of evidence to varying stakeholders. Different stakeholders will
have diverging levels of interest in the supporting evidence and the claimed confidence in the
system52. A software level assurance solution such as the DSF can feed into a wider systems
level assurance approach such as the SLF.
3.4 Summary of the Background and Problem of In-
terest
There is expected to be an increasing level of software implemented within future military
avionic platforms. This software requires suitable levels of assurance due to its safety-
criticality. In addition, a focus on software as an area of assurance is legitimate due to
the fundamental role that software plays within a wider system. Any research which aims
to enhance software assurance needs to focus on this area to avoid diluting the findings.
There are a number of factors which may limit the level of evidence that can be provided
to the MOD in support of a process-based claim. These factors range from the required
evidence being of a different form to that expected (e.g. a different development process
being adopted) to there being limitations to the release of supporting evidence (e.g. due to
IPR). In such circumstances, the use of diverse evidence is a promising approach.
The safety management requirements for defence systems are stated within MOD stan-
dard DS 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c). The standard provides the requirements and guidance
for the achievement, assurance, and management of safety. DS 00-56 is focussed on allowing
compliant PSS to be acquired. The acknowledgement within DS 00-56 that products, ser-
vices, and systems all require suitable requirements and guidelines allows compliance to be
captured for a range of MOD capabilities and not only the traditional forms of equipment.
Safety Cases are adopted within DS 00-56 to allow arguments to be structured to assist
with establishing confidence. Knowing the level of evidence required to support such Safety
Cases can be challenging. Other domains’ use and definition of Safety Cases has a similarity
with MOD. This is positive in that the approaches developed for this research should have
applicability to other domains. A Safety Case should include a range of evidence which
allows confidence to be gained that the safety requirements have been achieved. Within DS
52The DSF (Chapter 8) and the ‘Wheel’ (sub-section 7.4) are based upon the concept of stakeholder
dialogue to prompt discussion and to gain an understanding of the Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) and the
evidence
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00-56 a key premise is that arguments are supported by evidence.
The requirements and guidance for the achievement, assurance, and management of safety
of PEs is stated within DS 00-55 (UK MOD, 2014b). The failure of unintended behaviour
of PEs within PSS must be managed. The level of confidence for any failures or unintended
behaviours to be within acceptable levels of probabilities can be achieved by establishing
a sufficient design integrity of the PEs. Process-based Recognised Good Practice (RGP) is
the preferred method within DS 00-55 for compliance to the standard. However, DS 00-55
also allows other forms of compliance to be proposed which theoretically permits the use of
wider evidence to express equivalent safety findings.
The assurance of PEs are also considered within DS 00-970 (UK MOD, 2014a) which
contains four sub-sections which must be considered for any procurement of safety related
PEs. The sub-sections relate to system level safety considerations53, airworthiness related
cyber security assurance54, safety related software assurance55, and safety related CEH as-
surance56. The research has a main aim to support the confidence which can be gained
in safety related software assurance. The current defined approaches for compliance, e.g.
DO-178C, are process-based.
The SLF is an approach to enhance how MOD develops suitable Safety Cases. The SLF
adopts the use of diverse evidence to ensure that appropriate levels of confidence can be
gained via the safety assurance process. The framework is based upon a modular approach
using well defined interfaces which allows need to know safety related information to be
exchanged. Evidence is directly explicit within the SLF as the engineering models and
detailed analysis models contain supporting evidence relevant to the safety argument. The
use of the SLF at the system safety level supports the adoption of wider diverse evidence to
achieve suitable confidence in the safety assurance at a software level.
Chapter 3 has responded to the research sub-question: What is the current approach to
system safety assurance within the UK defence domain and are there alternative system-
level approaches?.
53Based upon the guidance within ARP4754A (SAE, 2010) and ARP4761 (SAE, 1996).
54Based upon the guidance within DO-326A (RTCA, 2014a).
55Based upon the guidance within DO-178C (RTCA, 2011a).
56Based upon the guidance within DO-254 (RTCA, 2000).
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Chapter 4
Diversity as a Concept and Scope for
Further Investigation
How diverse1 evidence can be judged, measured, and combined needs to be placed within
the context of existing approaches. It is important to review how any new approach can
compliment and/or progress the current work in this area. Any intervention to enhance
software safety assurance will need to be considered within the scope of what can be feasibly
achieved and how any research findings could be adopted.
This chapter will provide information on:
• Support for Diversity as a Concept. A definition of diversity is provided and a brief
overview of how diverse evidence is used in other domains. The concept of software
design diversity is also briefly discussed.
• Software Evidence Diversity and Quantification of Assurance Arguments. The benefits
of diversity are considered from a review of the academic studies conducted to date.
There is a need for further investigation due to the current research findings in this
area being inconclusive.
• Providing Support to Assist Decision Making. How a DSF could assist by providing
enhancements to current software safety assurance approaches. The benefits that a
framework may provide are briefly described.
4.1 Support for Diversity as a Concept
The concept of diversity is one which is commonly used. However, the scenarios in which
diversity is applied results in subtle and fundamental differences in its application.
1The term diverse being to have variety or to be assorted (Collins Dictionary, 1995i).
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4.1.1 What is Diversity?
The terms diverse, diversity, and diversify are referred to throughout this thesis and they
are defined as:
• Diverse, adj. 1. Having variety, assorted. 2. Distinct in kind (Collins Dictionary,
1995i).
• Diversity, n. 1. The state or quality of being different or varied. 2. A point of difference
(Collins Dictionary, 1995k).
The key premise in this thesis is that there is a variety of distinct evidence that can be
put forward to gain confidence in a system. The variety of evidence is not currently used
consistently within the safety assurance process. The definition of the term diversify is also
relevant and articulates an interesting perspective.
• Diversify, vb. 1. (tr.) To create different forms of; variegate; vary. 2. (of an enter-
prise) To vary (products, operations, etc.). in order to spread risk, expand, etc. 3.
To distribute (investments) among several securities in order to spread risk (Collins
Dictionary, 1995j).
Thus, diversification may reduce dependencies on certain evidence types and increase
confidence in the software (or PEs) through a number of evidential strands.
4.1.2 Use of Diverse Evidence within Related Domains
A number of domains which contain safety-critical software have process-based artefacts as
their predominant form of evidence. However, when required, other evidential strands such
as in-service data can be used to provide partial or full alternative approaches to process-
based evidence. An example includes the assessment of ground-based avionics systems which
are judged against DO-278A (RTCA, 2011c)2. Any shortfalls in evidence can be mitigated
by in-service data. In addition, evidence can be adopted which is based upon the Suitably
Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP)3 status of those performing the activities, i.e.
those that produce the system/software. As an example, a vendor may claim that software
engineers must have attained certain qualifications (e.g. Bachelor of Science (BSc)) and a
level of direct experience (e.g. 10 years) to develop safety-critical source code. This can help
gain confidence as part of a wider set of supporting evidence.
2DO-278A is a process-based guideline within the air-traffic domain.
3The term SQEP originated in the UK nuclear industry and is now used within other domains (such as
defence). SQEP provides recognition that the skills and understanding of an individual can be relied upon
to resolve (or advise on) a technical problem to the required standards (NAFEMS, 2018).
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Other domains are not consistently in a position to review the process-based evidence
for a system of interest. Indeed, it is not only process-based evidence that is unable to be
consistently judged but also other evidence of interest, e.g. SQEP and in-service data. In
these instances the approach is to gather a range of the available evidence to form a suitable
judgement. Any limitations on the evidence would also then limit the confidence that could
be placed in the software/CEH. This type of scenario would commonly be more prevalent
with COTS equipment.
Further, more detailed, analysis of the non-safety and safety domains which conduct
evidence assessments are contained in sub-sections 5.2 and 6.2.
4.1.3 Software Design Diversity
Diversity from a software design perspective allows key properties, such as resilience, to be
considered within a risk reduction strategy (Popov et al., 2014). Diversity among redun-
dant components can reduce the risk of common failures caused by design faults. Without
diversity these faults would be replicated in the redundant components. In essence, in the
simplest case two or more versions of these components are built independently and placed
within an architecture so that the system will perform correctly (or safely) if a certain ‘quo-
rum’ of components do. To ensure independence between the versions, measures need to be
applied for the development processes and the designs to be as different as possible (Popov
et al., 2014).
From a nuclear industry perspective the concept of diversity is one which is summarised
well within a report on “Defence-in-Depth and Diversity: Challenges Related to I&C Ar-
chitecture” (World Nuclear Association, 2018). The definition of diversity provided in the
report is:
• The presence of two or more independent (redundant) systems or components to per-
form an identified function, where the different systems or components have different
attributes so as to reduce the possibility of common cause failure, including common
mode failure (World Nuclear Association, 2018).
The World Nuclear Association (2018) report identifies a number of attributes of diversity
in the context of the above definition, such as: human, life-cycle, software, and equipment.
The attributes and their associated criteria are contained within Figure 4.1. The focus of
the diversity is in relation to mitigating CCF concerns with Instrumentation and Controls
(I&Cs).
The topic of software diversity has been subject to a relatively substantial level of research
from the 1970s to the present (Baudry and Monperrus, 2015) with various approaches devised
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Figure 4.1: Diversity Attributes in Relation to CCF Mitigations (World Nuclear Association,
2018)
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to implement the diversity concept. Approaches include N-version programming or the
concept of a sufficiently simple secondary system as backup to a more complex primary, e.g.
Littlewood et al. (2000)4.
Within existing research diversity has been used to influence a number of software de-
sign areas. This includes influencing the architectural features of the software itself to the
development and testing of the design. The application of design diversity can be used to
generate reliability assessments and to inform proof arguments (e.g. Littlewood (2000)).
Specific architectural properties of the design can be established such as with the creation of
very asymmetric architectures, and associated safety and reliability claims, which is claimed
by Littlewood, Popov and Strigini (1999) to have benefit over two fully functional diverse
subsystems5. Design diversity has been applied to phases of the development process, in-
cluding: requirements analysis to maintenance/evolution (Schaefer et al., 2012); and the
use of multiple-version software to validate specifications (Avizienis, Lyu and Schutz, 1995).
The combination of software detection techniques which optimise differing fault finding pro-
cedures (Littlewood et al., 2000) have also strengthened design diversity. Kharchenko and
Brezhnev (2015) and Kharchenko (2016) claim that diversity allows not only reliability and
safety improvements, but also security.
However, within the existing research there are perceived issues with software design
diversity. The usefulness of software diversity is a controversial topic in some forums due
to the results from empirical evidence showing varied effectiveness (Popov et al., 2014). In
addition, the efficacy of the approach to mitigate some design concerns is debated, e.g. in
relation to CCF or software reliability (Baudry and Monperrus, 2015). It is also acknowl-
edged that it is problematic to assess the reliability of: fault-tolerant systems (Littlewood,
Popov and Strigini, 2001), design diversity (Popov and Strigini, 2001), and multiple-version
software (Popov et al., 2003). Diversity is not a simple concept to measure, although there
are supporting techniques proposed such as fault simulation/failure searching (Luping, May
and Hughes, 2001) and also fault injection (Luping and May, 2014). However, it remains
that software diversity is not an alternative for careful quality control (Bishop, 1995).
Despite these perceived issues regarding the effectiveness of software design diversity,
from an overall academic and practical perspective diversity finds favour and has precedence.
Obviously, the notion of software design diversity and software assurance diversity differs
but clear linkages can be made to be able to articulate the benefits.
4A full review of software design diversity is not appropriate for this thesis as Baudry and Monperrus
(2015) contains a recent and interesting review and should be referred to for an introduction to the topic.
The point to note is that the concept of diversity is a commonly understood approach for providing resilience
within safety-critical systems.
5Littlewood, Popov and Strigini (1999) describe functional diversity as having differing versions of the
system design and a deliberate decision to make the inputs into the systems different.
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4.2 Software Evidence Diversity and Quantification of
Assurance Arguments
The concept of diversity to reduce risk via variety and independence is one that is subject
to research in the field of software assurance. There have been various research studies to
implement frameworks and methodologies using both qualitative and quantitative measures
of attributes. These aim to assist decision makers in understanding the confidence in the
evidence and the subsequent safety claims. However, as will be shown, the results of these
studies are far from conclusive and further work is required to demonstrate the advantages
of a diverse evidence approach.
4.2.1 Diverse Evidence as a ‘Good Thing’
There is general consensus within the safety-critical systems domain that the use of diverse
evidence can be seen to be plausibly a “good thing” (Littlewood and Wright, 2007). However,
the methodology and structures to accept and reason upon diverse evidence are subject to
debate. There have been claims that such assertions do not have a theoretical underpinning
(Littlewood and Wright, 2007). Diverse evidence does have scope to support a number of
methods which construct assurance claims, for example methods based upon argumentation
schemes (Yuan and Kelly, 2011) or dependability statements (Bloomfield and Littlewood,
2006).
Research has suggested that there are benefits of applying diverse software assurance
evidence. An increase in the confidence of safety claims (Yuan and Kelly, 2011) is possible
when compared to single evidential strands (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006, Littlewood and
Wright, 2007). Indeed, it can be said that these research findings can be expected (Littlewood
and Wright, 2007). However, research has also concluded that counter-intuitive results can
occur when multi-legged arguments are constructed via probabilistic means (Littlewood
and Wright, 2007)6. The richness of data gained via counter-intuitive results cannot be
captured via methodologies which apply qualitative measurements of attributes as there is
no underpinning data to lead to such observations.
Analytical treatment of certain methodologies, e.g. Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), can
allow what-if calculations on the effects of additional diverse legs (Littlewood and Wright,
2007). Forms of what-if analysis could also be applied to assist decision makers to understand
the impact of any changes on the diverse evidence prior to their implementation. Cost Benefit
Analysis (CBA) could prevent expensive evidence collection measures being instigated to
6Noting that counter-intuitive results are valid and valuable outputs from any research as they offer the
ability to learn about the problem of interest.
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mitigate perceived shortfalls (Littlewood and Wright, 2007). The research to date provides
some potential methods and benefits but they are not clearly articulated.
4.2.2 Quantifying Confidence Within Evidence Assessments
Quantifying confidence7 within a safety argument has significant backing based upon the
number of models which have been proposed, e.g. Guo (2003), and the varied paradigms to
implement such methods, e.g. BBN. However, the concept does not gain universal support;
e.g. Graydon and Holloway (2016) states that further validation is required before it can be
recommended as part of a basis for deciding whether an assurance argument justifies fielding
a critical system. Due to the intrinsic link between the use of diverse evidence and that of
quantifying confidence there are lessons which can be learnt from the current approaches.
There are number of research papers which are based upon the topic of confidence judge-
ment for safety assurance with some having a more specific aim to assess software-based
systems. However, the direction and focus of the various forms of research are subtly dif-
ferent; for example: to understand the behaviour of the strands of evidence, to articulate
the benefits of quantifying confidence, or to investigate appropriate methods to combine
evidence.
Littlewood and Wright (2007) adopt the use of multi-legged arguments to support the
generation of dependability claims for software-based systems. The use of multi-legged argu-
ments and BBN allows Littlewood and Wright (2007) to manipulate the data to identify any
behaviour of interest. Bloomfield and Littlewood (2006) examine the benefits of diversity to
an assurance case approach. Similarly, Hobbs and Lloyd (2012) adopt the use of BBN to
build an assurance case to illustrate the benefits that such an approach can have, such as
flexibility and expressive capabilities. Dahll (2000) utilises BBN from a different perspective
which is to examine how to combine disparate sources of information.
Other research takes the position of claiming that a specific approach is the most suitable
to capture safety assessment confidence values. Dempster´Shafer Theory (DST) is favoured
by Zeng, Lu and Zhong (2013) and conversely Guiochet, Hoang and Kaâniche (2015) and
Guo (2003) propose BBN as suitable methods to capture the safety case confidence. However,
Guiochet, Hoang and Kaâniche (2015), Wang, Guiochet and Motet (2017), Yuan et al. (2017)
each have a focus on the most appropriate argument forms, e.g. redundancy, as the method
to drive the propagation of confidence assessment. The method to achieve the confidence
propagation varies, e.g. BBN, DST, and subjective logic. Duan et al. (2015) also adopts
subjective logic to represent confidence in assurance case evidence but also adopts the use
7The term confidence in this instance is to have “trust in a thing” and “showing [a level of] certainty”
(Collins Dictionary, 1995b).
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of the Joseng Opinion Triangle and Beta Distribution.
Zhao et al. (2012) propose a wider set of analysis to derive the evidence and the confidence
judgements with BBN forming a part in a limited chain of steps, e.g. creation of model
instances. The approach to adopt methods such as Evidential Reasoning (ER) within a
wider approach is also utilised by Nair et al. (2015) and Cyra and Gorski (2008).
The varying approaches taken by the existing research supports the use of confidence
measurement for safety assessment. In addition, there are a number of particular areas of
the existing research which provide further and more detailed scope to target particular
shortfalls in the domain.
4.2.3 Scope for Further Investigation
There are various studies which describe the specific concept of quantifying confidence within
an assurance argument. There is a need to understand the limitations of such approaches
so that any devised solution advances these concepts. The following sub-sections provide
a review of a body of current work which claim to use diverse software evidence, quantita-
tive measurement, or include related topics. Any identified limitations can lead to further
investigation and may form part of the thesis outputs.
4.2.3.1 Existing Approaches Lack Sufficient Case Studies and Adoption
Littlewood and Wright (2007) acknowledges that there are limitations with their proposed
approach with the research being based upon a simplified and idealised example8. Research
concepts have been presented using incomplete treatment for the sake of brevity (Delic,
Mazzanti and Strigini, 1995) or provide a simplification of the captured attributes (Bouissou,
Martin and Ourghanlian, 1999). In some instances only special examples of diverse argument
legs were reviewed as part of the research (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006) with others using
very small sample sets, e.g. evaluation via a single example (Yamamoto, 2015). Also, it has
been observed that areas of research adopt simplifying assumptions to demonstrate concepts
(Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006).
There is a need for the research concepts to be applied to problems which are: (a)
proportionate to the scale of the target systems, and (b) validated via a sufficient quantity
of case studies. In essence, if the concept is to be applied to multiple forms of evidence
with numerous diversity legs then the case studies should reflect the intended scale. Also, a
suitable number of case studies should be adopted which illustrate and test a variety of the
features proposed by the concept.
8In addition, the concept is limited to a model of a two-legged argument with a deliberate simplification
of the real situation with each of the argument legs unrealistically simplified.
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The proposed approaches, e.g. by Littlewood and Wright (2007), may be conceptually
valid but they do not remove the need for further research in this area. The simplifica-
tion of examples, or not implementing a scaled concept, is valid for research which is at a
broad conceptual level. However, to fundamentally challenge how evidence diversity and
argumentation is formed in the real world needs additional research.
4.2.3.2 Existing Approaches Require Further Analysis
The proposed approaches to diversity within the existing research need to be further refined
before they are considered effective, e.g. in dependability arguments (Bloomfield and Little-
wood, 2006). A number of the existing approaches have not been validated via: operational
testing (Fenton et al., 1998), real projects (Neil and Fenton, 1996), or real-life case studies
(Delic, Mazzanti and Strigini, 1995). Concepts proposed, in some instances, only addressed
a small part of a large and difficult problem (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006). Some of
the research had further work ongoing at the time to provide additional confidence in the
approach (Weaver et al., 2005). Others required additional research to validate the approach
(Neil and Fenton, 1996) or to undergo years of calibration to yield reliable forecasts (Bouis-
sou, Martin and Ourghanlian, 1999). Many of the proposed approaches aimed to progress
the concept of assurance quantification but there is further research required to validate the
findings (Yuan and Kelly, 2011).
The methodologies which are adopted within the research are also very much open to
discussion. Approaches such as BBNs need to be treated with “great respect and humility”
as it is possible to have a false sense of certainty and security from the numerical values
(Littlewood and Wright, 2007). Ayoub et al. (2013) adopts DST which results in an as-
sumption on evidence nodes acting independently with further work required to consider the
dependencies.
There is acknowledgement within the research that their concepts are part of a wider
decision making process and so they need to be placed within context. Safety assurance
argument decisions can not be based upon the sole output of the techniques (Fenton and
Neil, 2001). Many examples of the existing research require further analysis to establish the
role which the research outputs would have within the wider safety assurance argument. This
acknowledgement that further analysis is required certainly validates the need for further
research due, in part, to the inconclusive study outputs.
4.2.3.3 Diverse Evidence Analysis is not Currently Fully Understood
The current literature indicates that the analysis of diverse evidence is complex, e.g. the
relationships between one-legged and two-legged argument topologies are not trivial (Little-
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wood and Wright, 2007). Also, an indicator of the complexity of the concept is that the
models developed to implement a diverse evidence argument can lead to unexpected and
counter-intuitive outcomes (Littlewood and Wright, 2007). Models can be difficult to com-
prehend even with simplistic case studies and may need analytical treatment to understand
fully (Littlewood and Wright, 2007). It is difficult to determine which attributes should
be part of a diverse argument. There is also difficulty in determining and measuring these
attributes, e.g. an independence attribute can be extremely elusive (Littlewood and Wright,
2007). How to structure diverse arguments also has no consensus due to the myriad of case
studies and approaches. It is not clear how suitable goals for a diverse argument can be
achieved, e.g. the ability to make claims at the highest structural level in the argument
(Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006). How goals and numerical values should be formally
expressed is also contentious (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006).
How to measure diverse arguments is also subject to some debate. Some studies state
that the size and complexity of safety arguments, when combined with subjective compo-
sition, means that it is difficult to quantitatively assess (Weaver, Fenn and Kelly, 2003).
Indeed, Weaver, Fenn and Kelly (2003) believe that a qualitative approach is sufficient and
not unreasonably burdensome on those that create and assess the arguments. Delic, Maz-
zanti and Strigini (1995) supports this view, in that the quantitative safety evaluation of
software products is difficult, and as a result the software safety case is usually a weak link
in the demonstration of system safety. In contrast, other approaches use quantitative as-
sessments which need analytical treatment to determine the nuances of the evidence and
the relationships (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006, Littlewood and Wright, 2007). These
divergent views illustrate the difficulty in finding a definitive approach to measure confidence
within diverse evidence.
The general consensus is that diversity is a useful paradigm; however, there is a caveat: it
is not a panacea for the problems which exist when building dependability cases (Bloomfield
and Littlewood, 2006). There is a limit to what diverse evidence can achieve and therefore
any proposed solution must be cognisant of this. Any proposed concept should be scrutinised
to ensure that naive trust is not placed in the results (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006).
4.2.3.4 Expert Judgement is Needed
The existing research provides different views on the layer of abstraction that the expert
judgements can be applied to; e.g. if there is a need to form an opinion only on the overall
quantified confidence level9 or opinions being formed and propagated at all levels of the
9In essence, drawing conclusions only on the root node of the evidence set, if presented as a tree structure.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 69 of 328
review process10. In either case, expert judgements are required from a number of safety
assessment stakeholders11. However, there are a wider set of actors who can influence the
ability of the system to meet the assurance requirements. As an example, there is evidence
that good managers and designers can determine the difference between failure and success,
in the context of software quality (Neil and Fenton, 1996).
The quality of any software is determined at the design and implementation stages, with
those that make judgements on the software quality, e.g. safety assessment stakeholders at-
tempting to determine the quality of what has been achieved12. This illustrates that any ap-
proach should recognise its place in a wider decision making process which is influenced by a
range of supporting evidence. This includes aspects such as: individual skills/experience; the
novelty of the application; and time/cost constraints. Irrespective of the processes adopted
factors such as these can impact the quality of the software (Yuan and Kelly, 2011).
Choosing which evidence is to be included within a diverse safety argument and the
knowledge about the implications of such evidence is subject to expert judgement; in essence
all relevant evidence should be accounted for. This selection process requires competence
(Delic, Mazzanti and Strigini, 1995), e.g. the choice of PSH evidence over process-evidence
and the expectations for the level of supporting data13.
It is claimed that it can be difficult to assess how the final judgements on the evidence
have been reached, and therefore much has to be taken on trust (Fenton et al., 1998). A struc-
tured approach to capture and reason upon the diverse evidence could allow third-parties
to understand the final judgements made by SMEs. Methods to assess diverse evidence can
act to validate judgements which have been made due to the systematic way in which the
judgements are captured.
A method to quantify confidence to judge diverse evidence can provide a number of
further benefits, such as: determining where the focus of effort is required for generating
evidence; remove incoherent and inconsistent arguments; act as an approach to build con-
sensus in argument structure and inference judgements; and can provide a shorthand for
understanding the associated time and financial costs to create the arguments.
Haddon-Cave (2009) believes that quantitative risk assessment is an art and not a science
with there being currently no way to avoid engineering judgement. There is general acknowl-
edgement that expert judgement is fundamental to any safety argument. The assessment
10In essence, having to draw conclusions on the leaf, parent, and root nodes of the evidence set, if presented
as a tree structure.
11The stakeholders include, but are not limited to, the MAA, DT, ITE, Independent Safety Auditor
(ISA), and SMEs to derive the confidence level. These roles range from those that form direct opinions on
the evidence to those with the authority and overall legal obligations for the release of any system/platform.
12It is also stated that software is designed rather than manufactured (Yuan and Kelly, 2011).
13Judging PSH data is not a trivial task with a need to consider such attributes as the level of change,
the environment of use, and the error detection capability.
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of software-based systems has long been acknowledged to be difficult and there is a great
reliance upon expert judgement (Littlewood and Wright, 2007). It is envisaged by the RE
that this reliance will continue.
4.2.3.5 Differing Underpinning Principles to the Existing Approaches
An important aspect to the existing research is that the underpinning approaches can differ,
e.g. the argumentation schemes (Yuan and Kelly, 2011). In addition, the underlying methods
to measure diverse evidence can also differ, e.g. the use of the term relevance as a metric
(Hawkins and Kelly, 2010). The evidential legs, such as software requirements or reliability
modelling, can differ in both the content and type of claim (Bloomfield and Littlewood,
2006); e.g. the evidence can be to gain a prior belief or to support the belief via in-use
evidence.
Due to the various methods which can be adopted to analyse the diversity of evidence
there needs to be assumptions made about the evidence itself (Bloomfield and Littlewood,
2006). These assumptions should be formally captured with restrictions placed on any
results, e.g. assumptions regarding the independence of DST evidence. Any restrictions on
the results would also, therefore place restrictions on the level of confidence which can be
claimed (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006).
The methods to understand diverse evidence and how it interrelates have also been
subject to debate within the research. The concepts of dependence and independence play
an important role in determining the levels of confidence that are derived from multi-legged
arguments (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006). There is also the concept of relevance for how
the evidence impacts on the parent goal (Weaver, Fenn and Kelly, 2003). The attributes
and measurements implemented in the research do not provide a clear approach as there is
no dominant theory which emerges.
4.2.3.6 Differing Applications of the Existing Approaches
The various methods which make judgements on software assurance evidence differ subtly
in intent. The adoption of diverse evidence can allow a greater insight into how the results
of the arguments have been determined (Littlewood and Wright, 2007). It can also improve
the understandability and repeatability of assessments, due to the judgements being repre-
sented by mathematical models (Bouissou, Martin and Ourghanlian, 1999). Bloomfield and
Littlewood (2006) examined how diversity might be used to increase confidence in depend-
ability claims (reliability and safety) and specifically how a probabilistic approach, when
successfully applied to design diversity, can equate to a diversity of safety argument.
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Other research has discussed how to combine sources of information in the safety assess-
ment of software-based systems via BBNs (Dahll, 2000). Research has looked at improving
the assessments of dependability claims of software intensive safety-critical systems by tak-
ing account of, and combining, the many types of evidence available, e.g. failure data and
competence of the development team (Hall et al., 1992).
Within the research there has also been a focus on the structure of the argument. The
theory being that the argument structure allows stakeholders to determine if individual items
of evidence are needed. It also allows reviewers to determine if the evidence satisfies the
requirements (Weaver et al., 2005). The structured approach of Goal Structured Notation
(GSN) is used to determine what evidence is required to satisfy requirements whilst being
applicable to a variety of evidence-based software engineering approaches (Weaver et al.,
2005). In addition, patterns have been adopted for the safety argument structures based
upon tiered models with a focus on the software safety requirements themselves (Hawkins
and Kelly, 2010).
It is clear that the aims and the intent of the research which adopts diverse evidence
have differing objectives. This indicates that the utility of diverse evidence structures can
have a broad spectrum of purposes. This is positive for the thesis as it allows greater scope
for how the outputs can be adopted.
4.2.3.7 Inconclusive Results from the Reasoning Under Uncertainty Approaches
Any approach which aims to quantify the confidence of evidence needs to account for the
reasoning being undertaken with uncertainty. This is due to a person, in any situation, not
having all of the information to describe, prescribe, or predict deterministically a system
and its behaviour (Zimmermann, 2000). The sources of this uncertainty can be due to a
number of reasons: a lack of information; too much information; and conflicting evidence
etc (Zimmermann, 2000, Colyvan, 2008). There are a number of approaches to assist with
this reasoning under uncertainty, e.g. DST; however, there is no definitive approach which
is fully supported or adopted.
Existing research states that the approach adopted should be suitable for the context
and be fit for the purpose in which the results will be applied; e.g. to guide decisions on
the suitability of adopting software within an overall system safety claim. Wright and Cai
(1994) states that for their approach there was scope for a number of different mathematical
formalisms and no single formalism was shown to be superior to any other. Fenton et al.
(1998) supports this as no single formalism for uncertainty was perfect for their purposes.
There are a number of approaches proposed to reason under uncertainty or to act as a
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method to measure confidence, for example14:
• ER: Nair, Walkinshaw and Kelly (2014).
• BBN: Hobbs and Lloyd (2012) and others, e.g. Zhao et al. (2012).
• DST: Ayoub et al. (2013), Cyra and Gorski (2008), and Zeng, Lu and Zhong (2013).
• Subjective Logic: Duan et al. (2015).
• Weighted Average: Yamamoto (2015).
• Hierarchical Process Modelling (HPM): Yearworth et al. (2015).
How the reasoning approaches have been applied within the research is subject to de-
bate. Graydon and Holloway (2016) believes that there is potentially limited confidence in
a number of the proposed methods; e.g. there is no empirical evidence that the approach
adopted by Guo (2003), adopting BBN, provides a trustworthy basis for deciding whether to
release a system into service. This same assessment is also made by Graydon and Holloway
(2016) for the approach and concepts proposed by Hobbs and Lloyd (2012).
The range of techniques adopted to achieve similar aims for confidence measurement
demonstrates that there is not one universally accepted approach. The choice of approach
can also be influenced by the precision and computational complexities associated with it.
4.2.3.8 Minimal Existing Visualisation Techniques within Existing Approaches
It is helpful for the propagation of the confidence calculations to be easily ascertained. This
can assist with allowing stakeholders to comprehend the data. The original concept for GSN
was to assist with the structuring of qualitative information and the supporting arguments
to aid comprehension. Some approaches which are based upon structured arguments do
attempt to quantify the measured confidence. However, there is currently a limited ability
to visualise these confidence values.
Within some of the approaches there is no linkage between the evidence structure (e.g.
GSN) and the actual quantified data which states the confidence levels, for example. There
is a need for a combined approach to allow the data of interest to SMEs, e.g. the confidence
values, to be comprehended. As an example, Ayoub et al. (2013), Duan et al. (2015),
Zeng, Lu and Zhong (2013) adopt GSN to capture the structure and the relationships of
the evidence. However, there is no direct link between the GSN representation and the
14Sub-section 8.2.4.4 contains a fuller review of relevant approaches applicable to this research
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procedures to capture and calculate the confidence values. This same observation is equally
applicable to approaches proposed by Hobbs and Lloyd (2012), Cyra and Gorski (2008).
Allowing stakeholders to gain an understanding of the evidence is key. Kirk (2016) states
that there are three stages to facilitate understanding: perceiving (what does it show?);
interpreting (what does it mean?); and comprehension (what does it mean to me?). The
quantification of confidence should assist with these three stages where possible. There is
scope to enhance how the analysis of the results is currently presented to stakeholders.
4.2.3.9 Inconsistent (or Lacking) Information on the Use of Outputs
A number of the proposed strategies do not specify how to use the results to determine if a
system is sufficiently safe, nor do they say which attributes should be measured. This is the
case for Cyra and Gorski (2008), Duan et al. (2015), Guiochet, Hoang and Kaâniche (2015),
Yamamoto (2015), and Denney, Pai and Habli (2011). This lack of specification indicates
that there is scope for a method which provides an output of direct utility. Approaches
to quantify confidence or to judge diverse evidence should be intuitive and reflect how the
outputs will be used by stakeholders.
4.2.3.10 Lack of Simplicity for Capturing Evidence within Existing Approaches
For an approach to add value to any decision making process it needs to be intuitive to how
the judgements on the evidence, such as PEs, will be captured. Ideally, the data captured
by the approach should be capable of being efficiently gathered by SMEs.
There are examples of approaches, e.g. Wang, Guiochet and Motet (2016), which allow
data to be captured intuitively. However, there are other approaches; such as Guo (2003),
Nair, Walkinshaw and Kelly (2014), Duan et al. (2015), which apply data capture methods
that require interpretation and concepts of abstraction. A number of approaches require
the evidence capturing process to be restructured to allow an overall confidence value to be
gained. There can be a lack of simplicity to how the data is gathered.
4.2.3.11 Lack of Scalability to Capture and Assess Evidence within Existing
Approaches
A number of the existing methods have reasonably complicated structures to quantify the
confidence. This includes the way the attributes are captured, the evidence and attribute
association, and the argument formation. As an example Wang, Guiochet and Motet (2017)
use the argument types dependent and redundant to propagate the confidence within the
structure. However, the argument types must be specifically user defined for each parent-
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child relationship in the tree structure. This would be problematic and time consuming for
a larger tree.
The use of diverse evidence within a safety argument involves multiple forms of evidence
to be captured and assessed. For an approach to adopt diverse evidence it must be able to
scale as more evidence is captured. A failure to do so would limit the applicability of the
approach and place undue restrictions on the evidence which can be captured. Any approach
should scale as more diverse evidence is captured to ensure a usable and valid solution.
4.2.3.12 Lack of Ability to Optimise and Conduct What-If Analysis within
Existing Approaches
A key aspect of a decision making process is the assessment of alternative solutions (Turban,
Sharda and Delen, 2010). Allowing judgements to be captured using a valid reasoning
approach is only one element of a wider decision making process. It would be valuable for
stakeholders to devise and assess alternative scenarios for confidence measurement via what-
if analysis. The alternative options available to stakeholders could be to gather specific
evidence, e.g. further design documentation, or to generate evidence, e.g conduct additional
testing. The choice between these alternatives will be based upon a number of factors such
as feasibility, cost, time, and the value that it provides.
The use of diverse evidence is to implicitly adopt a wider set of evidence. A wider set of
evidence increases the number of potential solutions, also known as the solution space; this
is a positive consequence15. However, the increase in the solution space also increases the
potential evidence options to be reviewed and assessed.
The current approaches which allow confidence to be quantitatively measured do not
provide tools to explore the solution space. A tool would allow alternative evidence to
be proposed to determine the impact compared to a known baseline, i.e. what-if analysis
of the potential options. However, current tools lack an ability to compare or to measure
differences. They also lack the ability to ensure that any decisions are based upon efficient
changes.
4.2.3.13 Existing Approaches Lack an Ability to Inform Decisions Based Upon
Multiple Risks
There are a number of factors to consider before gathering any evidence; it is not solely based
upon the availability of data. There should be the ability to base any evidence gathering
decisions on known or perceived risks.
15See Figure 1.1.
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What could be perceived to be the right evidence to gather, based upon confidence
values, may not be achievable in reality. The practicalities of obtaining evidence must also
influence the decisions made. As an example, a Modified Condition/Decision Coverage
(MC/DC) testing objective is part of a rigorous software testing regime which can be nearly
40-50% of the system development cost (Ammann and Offutt, 2008). In addition, MC/DC
is approximately 40% of the total testing time (Dupay and Leveson, 2000). This provides
an indication of the retrospective cost and time to apply such a technique. Having such
factors as cost and time included within any intrinsic decision making process would be of
value. This would avoid the need to iterate between the tools output and the reality of the
implementation. In essence, the tool should model the reality of the cost and the time to
implement changes to the evidence.
Approach (a) within Figure 4.2 shows the approach adopted by current confidence quan-
tification methods. Any judgements on the cost/time impacts for changes to evidence must
be made on the tools outputs with interpretation needed to compare other evidence strands.
Approach (b) within Figure 4.2 shows a method where the confidence of the evidence in-
trinsically considers the cost/time impact of any changes to the evidence. Judgements are
needed to consider the cost/time implications but these are recorded within the tool. When
presented to the decision maker the confidence in the evidence, and any potential options
to alter the evidence, already takes into account the perceived overhead to implement any
changes. Such a tool in the context of software safety assurance does not currently exist.
4.2.3.14 Myriad of Attributes to Measure Confidence and Diversity within Ex-
isting Approaches
The current approaches to measure confidence and to capture diverse evidence arguments
adopt a myriad of attributes, such as relevance. The attributes and their definitions are
inconsistent. Many of the approaches consider the attribute quality ; this can be to partially
measure confidence or to equate to confidence itself, e.g. Nair, Walkinshaw and Kelly (2014)
and Denney, Pai and Habli (2011). Other approaches consider belief and plausibility, e.g.
Cyra and Gorski (2008). Correctness is another attribute which is captured, e.g. Denney,
Pai and Habli (2011). Trustworthiness is considered by Nair, Walkinshaw and Kelly (2014)
with completeness an attribute within Guo (2003). There are many others.
The lack of consistency is to be expected. This is due, in part, to the attributes deemed
important to SMEs differing. This illustrates that there is not a clear and defined set of
attributes which to measure evidence confidence and diversity.
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Figure 4.2: Differing Approaches to Consider Cost/Time When Gathering/Generating Evi-
dence
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4.2.3.15 Remark on Shortfalls within Existing Approaches
From the review of the closely related research in the fields of diverse evidence and confidence
quantification there are clear shortfalls and a lack of support for a clear model or paradigm.
There are a number of avenues for further investigation which, if tackled suitably, could
enhance the understanding in this domain. This thesis will consider the shortfalls in the
current approaches and how they could be resolved by the research.
4.3 Providing Support to Assist Decision Making
Based upon the shortfalls within the existing research there is the potential for a suitable
framework to be constructed which allows software safety assurance assessors and suitable
stakeholders to:
• Devise arguments using diverse evidence.
• Understand the permutations of such arguments.
• Arrive at a suitable level of confidence.
A key element to this is the ability to assist with the decisions being made. Holsapple
and Whinston (1996) states that from a management perspective a decision is a choice. The
concept of choice is debated and there are a number of definitions to describe the term:
• Choice is a course of action.
• Choice is a strategy for action.
• Choice leads to a certain desired objective.
Such definitions suggest that the decision making process is an act which culminates in
the selection of one option from a set of multiple alternative courses of action (Holsapple
and Whinston, 1996). A Decision Support System (DSS) is a system that assists in such an
activity.
A DSS can provide support in reviewing alternatives with a further capability of a DSS
being to potentially recommend alternative approaches.
Within decision support theory there are a range of definitions which allow potentially
complicated DSSs to be developed16. From the perspective of this research a focus could be
on providing a capability which assists stakeholders in:
16For example, degrees of decision concurrency and organisation design.
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• Adopting diverse evidence to support gaining confidence in the software/system of
interest.
• Making judgements on the characteristics of the evidence.
• Being provided with options and alternatives to assist with decisions regarding gath-
ering/generating additional evidence.
• Allowing any decisions to be optimised so that suggested options maximise the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of gathering/generating additional evidence.
Such a process could be adopted as part of a DSF. There are various types of decision
makers which includes an individual (person or computer) to multi-participant (unilateral or
negotiated) (Holsapple and Whinston, 1996). The potential environment for the adoption of
such a DSF would be one which could consider individual perspectives or that of a number
of stakeholders to gain consensus.
Turban, Sharda and Delen (2010) states that in a business context managers usually
make decisions using a four-step process, namely to:
• Define the problem.
• Construct a model that describes the real-world problem.
• Identify possible solutions to the modelled problem.
• Compare, choose, and recommend a potential solution to the problem.
An approach to support such a process does not necessarily have to automate or provide
technical solutions to all of the above steps. A framework which assists with such steps, or
a partial number of steps, would be of value to the current domain. Likewise, Holsapple and
Whinston (1996) states that a DSS can have a number of purposes (see bullet-list below).
A valuable outcome of this research would be one which assists with at least one of these
concepts.
• Increase decision makers productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness.
• Facilitate one of more of a decision makers abilities.
• Aid one of more of the three decision making phases: intelligence, design, and choice.
• Help the flow of problem-solving episodes proceed more smoothly and rapidly.
• Assist in the making of semi-structured or unstructured decisions.
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• Help the decision maker manage knowledge.
The concepts of diverse evidence and the application of suitable attributes for judgements
would benefit from a decision support process and as such this research will attempt to deliver
a practical and proportionate17 DSF.
Linked to the concept of assisting with decision support is that of optimising any re-
sults/decisions which are made. If there is the ability within a framework for evidence
attributes to be reviewed and altered by a decision maker then there is a need to ensure
that the values guide the efficiency/effectiveness to gather/generate the evidence. The use
of optimisation would allow any decisions to be adopted with a minimal level of additional
evidence gathering or refinement. Acknowledging that confidence in the software needs to be
improved is a start to gathering/generating evidence but optimisation can determine what
evidence is required and how much improvement is possible.
Approach (a) within Figure 4.3 shows the current methods which requires an iterative
application of judgement to understand the evidence to gather/generate. Approach (b)
within Figure 4.3 shows the benefits of an optimisation capability within a tool. Such a tool
does not currently exist in the context of the software safety assurance domain.
The exact need and the method for such an optimisation process is obviously to be
determined as the research progresses. However, from a review of existing research in this
area there is a clear opportunity to provide such a facility.
4.4 Summary of the Scope for Further Investigation
For any intervention to be fruitful there is a need for the problem of interest to exist and
for the existing research in this area to not sufficiently fulfil the identified need. From the
analysis which has been conducted within this chapter, it is believed that there is a sufficient
gap in the software assurance domain to benefit from intervention. This premise is based
upon the following:
• Diverse evidence is used extensively within other safety-related domains and diversifi-
cation is used within software design. Diversity can also be applied to specific evidence
to gain confidence in the suitability of the software itself in relation to safety. Diverse
evidence can legitimately be seen as a ‘good thing’.
• The existing concepts for diverse software evidence and confidence measurement have
clear shortfalls. The shortfalls are, in some cases, in the fundamental principles under-
lying the models and also in the end-to-end process which is assisting decision makers.
17Proportionate in balancing the theory of evidence diversity and the practicalities of a tool which is of
value to decision makers.
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Figure 4.3: Differing Approaches to Determine What Evidence to Gather/Generate
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The arguments put forward to date are inconclusive and there is scope to conduct fur-
ther analysis of diverse arguments. The existing shortfalls which have been discussed
in this chapter include:
– Concepts lack sufficient case studies and adoption of approaches.
– Concepts acknowledge further analysis is required.
– Complicated concept to argue and resolve.
– The need for subjective opinion and expert judgement.
– Differing applications of the approaches.
– Differing underpinning principles to the approaches.
– Inconclusive results on approaches which reason under uncertainty.
– Minimal existing approaches for visualisation of diverse argument structures and
results.
– Inconsistent (or lacking) information on how method outputs should be utilised.
– Lack of simplicity to how evidence is captured.
– Lack of scalability to how evidence is captured/assessed.
– Lack of ability to perform optimisation and what-if analysis.
– Lack of ability to inform decisions based upon multiple risks.
– Myriad of attributes to measure confidence and diversity.
• There are DSSs adopted within business and management domains. The research
conducted as part of this thesis can deliver value if it results in a revised and more
effective approach to capture, judge, and optimise evidence decisions.
Chapter 4 has informed two research sub-questions:
• Sub-section 4.2 has partly responded to the sub-question: What is the current per-
missible software safety assurance evidence within the UK defence domain and related
domains?.
• Sub-section 4.3 has partly responded to the sub-question: What is a suitable structure
for software safety assurance evidence and can mathematically derived approaches in-
form how judgements are made on the evidence and for proposing alternative/optimised
solutions?.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 82 of 328
Chapter 5
A Review of the Use of Evidence
Within Non-Safety Domains
This section reviews what evidence is valid and how evidence is used within different domains
which do not have a focus on software safety. A verbose discussion on the philosophy of
evidence, e.g. such topics as the Ravens Paradox1, is purposefully avoided to concentrate on
the practical implementations2. A focus on the practical use of evidence will help to identify
lessons to enhance current software safety assurance practice.
This chapter will examine:
• Evidence: A Definition. Assessment of a number of definitions applied to the term
evidence.
• Evidence: How and Where is it Used. A review of how evidence underpins decisions
within a number of domains.
• Evidence: A Discussion. Discussion points from the review of the domains.
• Lessons for the Problem of Interest. Lessons which can be applied to the software
safety assurance domain.
5.1 Evidence: A Definition
Within a number of domains, e.g. criminal justice and medicine, evidence plays a funda-
mental role to provide confidence in decisions. How evidence is assessed and adopted varies
1What appear to be irrefutable assumptions lead to a consequence that seems intolerable (DiFate, 2017).
2Philosophical concepts about evidence can assist with understanding practical perspectives; however, a
detailed analysis of such concepts is not germane to the chapters purpose.
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between these domains. There are a number of definitions for the term evidence which
reflects the role it has within the decision making processes:
• Kim (1988) states that the concept of evidence is inseparable from that of justification
with evidence making a difference to what one is justified in believing or what it is
reasonable for one to believe (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy, 2014).
• Evidence is a premise for belief (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy, 2014).
• A general definition is that evidence is the available body of facts or information indi-
cating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid (OED, 2018d).
• Evidence is not proof as this is gained via deductive or logical reasoning (Weinstock,
2007).
• Evidence is data on which to base proof or to establish a truth or falsehood (Collins
Dictionary, 1995l)
• From a legal perspective it is any matter of fact that a party to a lawsuit offers to prove
or disprove an issue in the case (Lehman and Phelps, 2005).
• Within the UK Government policy-making domain it is the process to establish and
bring together relevant facts, figures, ideas, analysis, and research (HM Government,
2013).
From the definitions it can be concluded that evidence is a basis to enable a premise or
a proposition to be believed or justified. There is a requirement to reason with, i.e. make
sense of, the relevant data or the body of facts. The purpose of the decision influences the
relevance of its supporting evidence; e.g. evidence can inform decisions which are post-event
to build on a belief as is the case in a court of law. Evidence can also create a belief that
a future event will or will not occur, e.g. with trials to learn that a medicine will not cause
harm. What makes evidence good is based upon the context which it supports.
5.2 Evidence: How and Where is it Used
The following sub-sections review how a number of relevant domains assess and adopt ev-
idence. The review spans law, healthcare/medicine, and policy-making, see Figure 5.1. A
number of different domains could have been chosen, e.g. dentistry, teaching etc; however,
the domains analysed are sufficient to allow observations and discussion.
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Figure 5.1: Non-Safety Domains of Interest
5.2.1 Criminal Justice System (Prosecution)
Within the UK legal system evidence is assessed at a number of stages. This includes at the
initial point of evidence collection, e.g. a crime scene, through to the critical evaluation and
judgement on the evidence, e.g. within the court of law.
The CPS prosecute criminal cases3 that have been investigated by the police and other
investigative organisations, such as the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The
CPS: decides which cases should be prosecuted; decides the appropriate charges and provides
advice to the police; prepares cases and presents them in court; and provides information,
assistance, and support to victims and prosecution witnesses (CPS, 2018a).
To proceed with a charge the prosecutors within the CPS must be satisfied that there
is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction and that prosecuting is in
the public interest (CPS, 2018a). A Full Code Test is applied by prosecutors which has two
stages: (1) Evidential Stage and (2) Public Interest Stage (CPS, 2018c)4. The defence case
is also considered to determine how likely it is to affect the prospect of the CPS obtaining a
conviction.
An objective assessment of the evidence is required from the prosecutor to determine the
realistic prospect of conviction5. It is important to note that the test which the CPS applies
to the decision to prosecute is not the same as that applied by the criminal courts. The CPS
base their test on if a reasonable jury, magistrates, or Judge is more likely than not to convict
of the alleged charge. A criminal court may only convict if it is sure that the defendant is
3Within England and Wales.
4It should be noted that CPS (2018c) is a significant source of the information contained within this
sub-section.
5How such an assessment can be truly objective is questionable given that it is based on the opinions of
experts. The issue of ensuring objectivity within decisions is also debated within the field of forensics, e.g.
Dror and Cole (2010), with differing contexts resulting in different opinions on the same forensic evidence.
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guilty.
The sufficiency of the evidence is part of the decision to prosecute. An assessment must
be made on whether the evidence can be used in court. This is achieved by determining
the likelihood that the evidence will be admissible and the importance of the evidence in
relation to the evidence as a whole. The reliability of the evidence is considered which
includes an assessment on the accuracy and integrity6 of the evidence. Credibility7 is a
further consideration to establish the sufficiency8. Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationships of
the attributes to determine evidence sufficiency.
Figure 5.2: Establishing the Sufficiency of CPS Evidence (based upon CPS (2018c))
Having sufficient evidence does not automatically result in a decision to prosecute. There
is also a need to assess if the prosecution would be in the public interest ; this is the second
stage of the Full Code Test. To determine if a prosecution passes the public interest test
seven questions are considered (CPS, 2018c):
1. Seriousness of the offence? More serious offences increase the justification for the
prosecution.
2. Level of culpability of the suspect? Considerations include: the level of involvement,
extent of premeditation (if any), and past convictions etc.
6Integrity relates to having unimpaired judgement or an ethical code, for example.
7In this context, the term credibility relates to the believability of statements made by a witness, for
example.
8The presentation in a court of law of the three core concepts to criminal evidence (relevance, admissibility,
and weight (Hannibal and Mountford, 2016)) will be discussed in the next sub-section (5.2.2).
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3. Circumstances and harm caused to victim? The vulnerability of the victim is con-
sidered and the impact that the event(s) has had on the victim, both physically and
mentally.
4. Suspect under 18 at time of offence? The justice system implements different proce-
dures for suspects (and victims) who are under 18 years of age. The adverse impact
that a prosecution might have on the suspect would also be considered, e.g. future job
prospects.
5. Impact to the community? If the offence has a more significant impact on the commu-
nity then the greater likelihood of a prosecution being brought.
6. Prosecution a proportionate response? The severity of the alleged offence is a fac-
tor when considering a prosecution. Considerations include the cost of bringing the
prosecution.
7. Sources of information require protecting? The circumstances of a case may mean
a decision to prosecute could lead to harming sources of information, international
relations, or national security. The risk of causing ‘harm’ needs to be considered by
the prosecutor.
For decisions on domestic abuse charging an evidence-led prosecution is adopted. This
ensures that a robust prosecution case is not solely reliant on evidence from the victim
themselves as this would act as a single ‘thread’ of evidence. Wider evidence is used to
remove the risks of this single ‘thread’. Wider evidence includes: res-gestae statements9;
bad-character evidence; understanding circumstances regarding victim reluctance or due to
a victim becoming “hostile”; and even hearsay evidence (CPS, 2015a).
5.2.1.1 Salient Observations: Criminal Justice System (Prosecution)
The decision to prosecute or not, based upon evidence sufficiency and the public interest,
is centred upon the judgements of the CPS prosecutor. There are guidelines, case law, and
processes to enable a prosecutor to reach an informed decision but the key outcomes are
determined via judgement and interpretation. Any conclusion formed by the prosecutor
should be able to be defended to peers and within the court of law. As with many decisions
within the safety domain, decisions regarding prosecution are based, in reality, upon subjec-
tive judgements and these will differ between CPS prosecutors. It could be argued that the
aim is for a defensible decision to be made not necessarily a consistently repeatable one.
9A statement with limited potential for distortion or concoction due to the victim being “emotionally
overpowered”, e.g. recording of 999 calls.
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Another point of interest is the attributes of the evidence and how these are judged to
allow a conclusion to be reached. The importance of evidence is considered to determine
the admissibility. Other attributes relate to reliability (accuracy and integrity) and the
credibility of the evidence. The notion of assigning attributes to evidence and establishing
values/relationships has applicability to a software safety judgement. An observation from
the CPS public interest test is that it places the evidence within the context of the wider
scope of society. This is relevant to a software safety judgement process, e.g. to ensure that
the correct evidence and its attributes are considered.
The CPS consider the cost of a prosecution when determining how proportionate a po-
tential prosecution is. This principle has similarities to the concept of As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP) within the general safety domains10. ALARP involves weighing a risk
against the trouble, time, and money needed to control it (HSE, 2018a). Cost is a con-
sideration rather than a key driver for both the ALARP principle and the CPS review of
prosecution proportionality. Within the software safety domain the efficiency of the assur-
ance process could be supported by having a range of diverse evidence which offers equivalent
safety findings.
The CPS also looks towards building a case using different ‘threads’ of evidence when
considering domestic abuse charges. This is to limit the risk of an unsuccessful prosecution
due to a single source of evidence, i.e. the domestic abuse victims testimony. There can
be preferred sources of evidence but the benefits of having additional strands of evidence is
recognised by the CPS process. The additional strands can allow a more robust argument
to be achieved. There is clear cross-over to how software safety evidence is gathered.
5.2.2 Criminal Justice System (Court of Law)
The criteria used to establish whether to prosecute a case is different to that used within the
court of law. Criminal evidence has three core concepts which are tested within the court of
law: relevance, admissibility, and weight (Hannibal and Mountford, 2016). These concepts
also form part of the decision to prosecute, as outlined by CPS (2018c).
• Relevance. For evidence to be put to the court it must be relevant. There must be
a relationship between the evidence tendered and the fact to be proved; and it must
also increase, or diminish, the probability that a fact in issue exists (this is supported
by Davis (2018)). However, there are no distinct rules for deciding upon relevance
and within some literature there is the notion of it being a matter of common sense
(Hannibal and Mountford, 2016).
10For example, the oil and gas industry.
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• Admissibility. Evidence to be presented to the court also has to be admissible. The
concept of admissibility is to ensure that the defendant in the case is subject to a fair
trial and to ensure that mandatory rules for evidence are adhered to. Evidence may be
inadmissible, or become inadmissible, if the evidence is the opinion of a lay witness11
or unlawful disclosure of evidence protected by legal privilege. Any disputes regarding
the admissibility of evidence is decided by the judge or magistrate.
• Weight. The third core concept regarding criminal evidence is that of weight. Evidence
should be convincing or persuasive to a Judge or jury. The type of evidence being
presented will influence the weight which is applied to it; e.g. the weight of oral
testimony evidence will be dependant on such factors as the demeanour and credibility
of the witness. Less weight would be placed on the statements of a witness not perceived
as independent. A jury or magistrate may place greater weight on some evidential
items more than others, for example Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence might
have significant weight (Hannibal and Mountford, 2016).
The types of evidence which are presented to the court is also relevant to the problem of
interest. Evidence will be presented in one of the following forms (Hannibal and Mountford,
2016):
• Oral testimony. Evidence provided orally by a witness. This is deemed the preferred
method for evidence to be put forward. Hannibal and Mountford (2016) states that it
is likely that this type of evidence may be the most persuasive to a court.
• Opinion evidence. A witness should provide factual evidence and not offer an opinion
on what was seen/heard. Generally, evidence such as this would be inadmissible.
There are exceptions to this: where the opinion is that of an expert witness or where
the opinion is of a lay person which does not require expertise.
• Documentary evidence. There are a myriad of documentary evidence types: pho-
tographs, plans, expert reports etc.
• Real evidence. Objects which are produced in court which may allow inferences to
be drawn from them, for example Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) footage of an
incident.
• Direct and circumstantial evidence. The difference between these two types of evidence
is that of the need for inference. Direct evidence can be accepted (or rejected) based
11‘Layman, (noun): amateur, civilian, non-professional, non-specialist, one who has no specialised training,
unskilled practitioner, untrained person’ (Burton, 2007).
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upon the actual evidence presented. Circumstantial evidence is that which alludes to
an event and requires an inference to be made by a juror or magistrate.
5.2.2.1 Salient Observations: Criminal Justice System (Court of Law)
The admissibility attribute raises a number of points. For evidence to be deemed inadmissible
there needs to be an interpretation of guidelines and a judgement on the evidence itself. The
judgement is made by the those that “control the proceedings... and decides questions of law
or discretion” (Lehman and Phelps, 2005). Within a software safety domain it is feasible
to have a number of SMEs with equal experience and knowledge. However, the point of
decision will rest with the qualification/certification authority (the MAA in the case of the
MOD), with relevant SME input.
The weight of evidence is also relevant to a software safety domain. Amongst SMEs
there may be interpretations of the importance of evidence based upon their views of the
guidelines/standards and beliefs in certain academic theories. This is an important issue
when determining the value of evidence.
‘Types of evidence’ are used within a criminal justice system with each having rules and
understood interpretations of how the evidence will be judged; e.g. circumstantial evidence
needing inference on the part of the jury or magistrate. Within the software safety domain
there are also ‘types of evidence’, e.g. process-based, but there are not the same forms
of rules and interpretations to judge the evidence. Due to such features of software safety
evidence there is a requirement to capture any decisions made by SMEs to allow a transparent
judgement to be recorded.
5.2.3 Criminal Justice System (Expert Witnesses)
The CPS issues guidance on the use of expert witnesses and the evidence which can be put
forward in these circumstances. Full guidance can be found within CPS (2015b). However,
the point to note from CPS (2015b) is if there are a range of expert opinions on the matter
in question (or value placed upon a type of evidence) then there is a need to understand
where the expert’s own opinion lies and for the preference(s) to be explained.
In a court of law, where expert witnesses have clear and valid differences in opinion the
expert witnesses can be requested to write a joint report/submission. This highlights the
agreed matters and to clarify any points which are disputed. There are direct parallels with
the use of diverse software safety evidence in that the differing judgements of SMEs need to
be understood and to have a mechanism for progress if there are conflicting views. It would
be of value for a method to capture a consensus of SMEs judgements and to compare any
disputed opinions.
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5.2.4 Healthcare and Medicine
The term Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) became popular in the early 1990s12. EBM is a
process to adopt the “conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in
making decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett et al., 1996).
EBM integrates the clinical expertise of individuals with external clinical evidence via
systematic research. The expertise of the individual clinician is formed from their proficiency
and judgements. External clinical evidence is research which is patient centred. This external
evidence should be able to invalidate previously accepted patient treatments and have the
ability to replace the treatments with more powerful and more accurate ones (Sackett et al.,
1996).
Importantly, Sackett et al. (1996) states that EBM is not a cookbook as it requires a
bottom up approach that integrates external evidence with individual clinical expertise.
There cannot be a slavish cookbook approach to care.
This mix of clinical expertise and clinical evidence has an ordering which is informed
by the significance and weight assigned to the evidence. Howick (2013) states a simplified
hierarchy of evidence, shown in Figure 5.3. The hierarchy is based upon three central claims:
• Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) or systematic reviews of many randomised trials
are stated to provide stronger support than observational studies13.
• Comparative clinical studies (including RCTs) and observational studies offer stronger
support than mechanistic-reasoning14.
• Comparative studies in general offer stronger evidence than expert clinical judgement.
An expansion to the scope of EBM is the use of evidence within general science. It is
useful to include this expanded definition here due to the overlap in the evidence of EBM.
There are many references which include information on scientific evidential types and their
potential hierarchies, e.g. NRC (2011); Cwik and North (2003); Parkhurst (2016); Perry,
Potter and Ostendorf (2015); Hoffmann, Bennett and Del Mar (2013); and Imwinkelried
(2014). A succinct illustration of a number of evidential types used within general science
is shown within Compound Interest (2015). Figure 5.4 shows the evidential types which are
particularly relevant to healthcare and medicine.
12Although whether it was a new paradigm is debated (Howick, 2013) with theories that the philosophical
origins extend back to the mid-19th century (Sackett et al., 1996). This debate is outside of the scope of
this thesis.
13Within observational studies inferences are derived from a sample to a population in which there is less
control of the independent variable.
14This is where inferences are made from mechanisms to the claims that an intervention produces a
patient-relevant outcome (Howick, 2013).
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Figure 5.3: Simplified EBM Hierarchy of Evidence (Howick, 2013)
The University of Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM) levels of evidence
provides supporting metrics and quantitative information for the number of studies to be
conducted for each of the evidential types within Howick et al. (2011). Howick et al. (2011)
states that the evidence hierarchy and the quantity of the studies conducted is not intended to
provide a definitive judgement on the quality of evidence. This is because lower-level evidence
may be stronger than higher-level evidence which, for example, provides inconclusive results.
NICE (2017b) allows clinical decisions to be structured based upon: guidance and policy
(e.g. safety alerts and quality indicators); secondary evidence (e.g. systematic reviews and
economic evaluations); primary research; ongoing trials; current awareness of medicines;
practice based information; implementation; and patient decision aids.
NICE (2017b) advocates the use of patient decision aids to help determine medical treat-
ments. The British Medical Journal (BMJ) reports that a patient decision aid should:
improve knowledge of the options and help patients reach choices that are more consistent
with their informed values (BMJ, 2013). A decision aid is defined as an approach to: describe
the decision to be taken; the options available; and the outcomes of these options (including
benefits, harms, and uncertainties) based on a careful review of the evidence (BMJ, 2013).
A remit of National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is to assess the
benefits of introducing medical interventions, e.g. a drug or treatment, which could improve
the prognosis of a patient’s condition. The assessment of these benefits is evidence-based with
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Figure 5.4: Common Evidential Types Relevant to Healthcare/Medicine (adapted from Com-
pound Interest (2015))
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a range of factors informing the decision making process. Factors include, the effectiveness
of the intervention and any short- and long-term costs (NICE, 2017a). Other interventions
are considered if they are more effective and/or efficient.
5.2.4.1 Salient Observations: Healthcare and Medicine
It is clear that the concept of EBM and the underpinning philosophy prior to the adoption
of EBM is based upon a balanced appraisal of the evidence. The appraisal involves clini-
cal expert judgement, in essence SME judgement, with scientific evidence underpinned via
research. Wider than EBM is the more general adoption of evidence within science and
there are clear rankings which are associated with the evidence presented as part of a clin-
ical statement. There appears to be a domain-wide understanding of the types of evidence
which need to be gathered to arrive at a conclusion which can be defended to peers. Also,
the relative strengths of each form of evidence appears to be understood.
These observations are relevant to the software safety domain as even with a ‘preferred’
hierarchy of evidential types the evidence still needs to be judged on the context of the
results and the support that the evidence provides.
Lessons can be learnt from the use of patient decision aids by the National Health Service
(NHS). Providing stakeholders with information in a format which assists their knowledge
of the options and for choices to be made which are consistent with their values, or beliefs,
is a concept which has value to the software safety domain. The use of visual aids for
decision making is recommended by BMJ (2013) and this concept could also be applied to
the software safety domain.
Sackett et al. (1996) claims that there should not be a slavish cookbook approach to care
within the EBM domain. Sackett et al. (1996) is advocating using evidence based upon its
merits and the value that the evidence has towards reaching a justified conclusion. This
concept has relevance to the software safety domain as an assurance claim can be supported
by a range of relevant diverse evidence which is not focussed on a particular form of evidence.
The EBM domain acknowledges that there is a necessity to integrate individual clinical
expertise with external clinical evidence to inform a medical treatment. There could be scope
within the software safety domain for expertise to drive the choice of external evidence to
inform decisions based upon relevance and value.
NICE and the NHS conduct budget impact tests to assess the affordability of introducing
new drugs (NICE, 2017a). Considering cost is a necessity to ensure that any interventions
are as efficient as possible. Within other domains, the decision making process may not
necessarily include the cost of gathering diverse evidence as a key driver. However, the
efficiency of gathering any evidence could act as a differentiator when selecting diverse
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evidence when there are equivalent safety findings.
5.2.5 Government Policy Strategy
The concept of decisions being ‘evidence-based’ is one which became prevalent in UK politics
during the 2000s through the Labour Government’s stated commitment to Evidence-Based
Policy Making (EBPM) (Rutter, 2012)15. This stated commitment has been subsequently
supported by successive Governments and was referenced within the 2012 Civil Service Re-
form Plan with a stated requirement to be “building on evidence that works” (HM Govern-
ment, 2012).
There are various stages at which evidence-based decisions should be made. Sense about
Science (2018)16 evaluated the Government’s use of evidence from the following stages:
• Diagnosis. The issue that will be addressed.
• Proposal. The Government’s chosen intervention.
• Implementation. How the implementation will be introduced and run.
• Testing and Evaluation. Assessment of if the policy has worked, or, in the case of
consultations and further investigations, how the information gathered will be used.
The evaluation of the numerous Government agencies scrutinised for the Sense about Sci-
ence (2018) study shows mixed results for each stage and for each Government Department.
At present the UK Government is most transparent about the evidence which is adopted
for the diagnosis stage of policy-making. The Government is least transparent on how it
plans to conduct the test and evaluation of the policy (Sense about Science (2018) and Sense
about Science (2017)).
The use of evidence to underpin advice for policy making is also part of a Govern-
ment Office for Science (GO-Science) paper on “The Government Chief Scientific Advisor’s
Guidelines on the Use of Scientific and Engineering Advice in Policy Making” (GO-Science,
2010). GO-Science (2010) advocates the use of a range of evidence sources to support the
advice which is provided. This includes using appropriate expert sources and recognising
that SMEs will have differing viewpoints. GO-Science (2010) contains guidance that risk
and uncertainties should be stated clearly. This is an acknowledgment of the limitations of
certain evidence.
15Although it is recognised that an evidence-based approach predates this period (Panjwani, 2017).
16Sense about Science (2018) is a study which evaluated how evidence informed policy adoption for a
number of areas within Government.
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Panjwani (2017) states a number of challenges with EBPM which may impact its adoption
or continued use within Government:
• Actors in the policy making process. Agreed terms of engagement are required due to
the complexity created from policy making involving individuals/organisations with
different incentives etc.
• Types of evidence. Scientific, economic, social, and cultural evidence may form part
of a policy decision. Such evidence may take many forms, e.g. peer reviewed papers,
user experience, SMEs. The mix and types of evidence is varied within Government.
• Other factors. Values, experience/judgement, information gaps, secrecy, need for ex-
pediency, funds, and timings etc are all factors which are part of the policy making
process in addition to the evidence itself.
• Matching supply and demand. There needs to be a balance between the supply and
the demand for evidence. To form part of a solution to a problem, the research must
be balanced by quality, credibility, and relevance.
Within the UKs central and local Government the standards for applying evidence are
adopted inconsistently. Some areas of policy making are more adept in making judgements
on underpinning evidence; e.g. for UK social policy decision making there are a number of
‘standards of evidence’ used. Puttick (2018) analysed 18 standards of evidence which UK
organisations use for judging evidence. Examples include: The Confidence Review (Catch-
22, 2018), Evidence Principles (Bond, 2018), Standards of Evidence (Project Oracle, 2018),
and the Teaching and Learning Toolkit (Education Endowment Foundation, 2018).
There are calls for EBPM to be more in keeping with EBM in terms of an agreed hierarchy
of evidence. However, Cairney (2017) states that a more reasoned solution is to understand
how and why policy makers demand information and to understand the complexity of the
operating environment.
5.2.5.1 Salient Observations: Government Policy Strategy
Not all UK Government policy domains which implement EBPM use a hierarchical structure
for assessing evidence. There is recognition that there are disparate sources of information,
e.g. Bond (2018), but the EBPM domain in general has resisted applying preferences to
certain types of evidence. This method is a valid approach but within EBPM there is a need
to fully understand the context and the limitations to any evidence used to inform a decision
or argument. For the software safety domain this is useful as it supports the validity of a
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non-hierarchical evidence structure for decision making. The uncertainty regarding evidence
could be captured via suitable attributes which describe characteristics of the evidence.
There is an acknowledgement within the EBPM domain that user experiences and SME
judgements will inform the methods which are adopted for a decision making process. This
recognition is two-fold: for the SME making a judgement they need to be cognisant of other
SMEs valid perspectives; and that where SME judgements inform a decision there may be
a level of bias, most likely unintentional, towards a certain process/outcome. Within the
software safety domain there may be a need to allow the decisions of stakeholders to be
formed via consensus, as can be the case with EBPM.
Other factors such as the time for the implementation and the available funds should form
part of a decision making process. These may influence the success of a policies outcome.
Decision making processes should be shaped by the wider influences/dependencies of the
evidence, e.g. an overhead associated with gathering the evidence.
Panjwani (2017) cites attributes (quality, credibility, and relevance) to be considered for
evidence and decisions which inform a solution. The use of such evidence attributes which
have pedigree within other domains could assist a potential software safety decision making
process.
5.3 Evidence: A Discussion
5.3.1 Need for Evidence-Based Decisions
For policy-making there is a need for decisions to be transparent and to be justified when
subjected to the scrutiny of stakeholders, such as the media or the public. In addition, there
is the need to do more with less due to the reduced funding which many policy-making
organisations have when compared to the past. Policy-makers cannot afford to get it wrong
(Nutley, Powell and Davies, 2013), although this is also the case for many (if not all) domains.
Evidence is also required to ensure the effectiveness of decisions, policy-based or other-
wise. This is linked to managing perceptions and needing to have transparency but, more
importantly, the need to arrive at a legitimate decision which is in the best interests of
achieving a solution.
5.3.2 Understanding the Context
Understanding context is important for decision making and for the use of evidence. Deci-
sions can be informed by evidence which is based upon ‘past’ events. In such cases, there
may be a lessened degree of inference to make a decision as the evidence can potentially be
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directly linked to an event. This is the case with criminal law17. Decisions which are based
upon a prediction of a forthcoming event (e.g. clinical trial) or the belief in a wider hypothesis
(e.g. the extensive release of a medical treatment) are of differing contexts. Therefore the
decisions can be legitimately based upon different evidence and different judgements on the
comparable evidence. A software assurance judgement on development/process evidence is
one which is based upon a prediction (i.e. establishing a prior belief) as with clinical trials.
An assurance judgement based upon in-service evidence is one based upon ‘past events’, as
with criminal law18.
Another consideration is that decision makers should review evidence “in the round”
(Nutley, Powell and Davies, 2013). Evidence may support the judgements to form a conclu-
sion; however an evidence-based process needs to consider the wider characteristics of the
evidence. Considerations include cost and acceptability (Nutley, Powell and Davies, 2013).
5.3.3 What is ‘Good’ Evidence?
What counts as good evidence will vary considerably given the context (Nutley, Powell
and Davies, 2013). The quality of the evidence, the rigour associated with capturing the
evidence, and the subsequent judgements on the evidence will differ depending on “what
we want to know, why we want to know it and how we envisage that evidence being used”
(Nutley, Powell and Davies, 2013). Depending on this context then the concept of quality
and the acceptability of the methods can be agreed upon with relevant stakeholders. For
certain decisions and problem domains an overall consensus would be unreachable; however,
for a problem domain which has a modest and manageable number of stakeholders then a
consensus could be agreed.
Is there a need for the evidence to be compelling or just good enough? Does there
need to be multiple sources of information/data to arrive at a justified decision? What
weight and judgements can be applied by those applying the recommendations? Context
will dictate. Project Oracle (2018) includes the concept of using criteria to determine the
level of supporting research/evidence depending on whether the decision needs to be the
best or only good enough. In essence, evidence which is deemed good enough should be fully
sufficient to make the argument that a particular claim is true to a certain level of confidence.
However, for decisions on software safety it would be difficult to defend the use of evidence
which was only good enough.
17Not including particular nuances such as exceptions for the right to bail which are based upon a person
being be denied bail if there are substantial grounds for believing that any of the exceptions in Schedule 1
of the Bail Act 1976 are made out (CPS, 2018b). The belief is, in essence, based upon a prediction.
18Although in-service data is used to predict that the confidence can continue in future based upon the
same context of use.
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5.3.4 Hierarchies of Evidence?
As highlighted, there are a number of ‘hierarchies of evidence’ adopted in a number of
domains19. The hierarchies determine the standard of evidence in support of a particular
outcome. Within the science domain there are commonalities with the various hierarchies
as randomised experiments with clearly defined controls (RCTs) have the highest prefer-
ence. Case studies/reports usually with the least preference (Nutley, Powell and Davies,
2013). However, there are issues with the adoption of hierarchies. Hierarchies can neglect
too many important and relevant issues around evidence and they can exclude all but the
highest-ranking evidence. This can lead to a loss of useful and relevant information (Nutley,
Powell and Davies, 2013). The value of the evidence synthesis can be weakened with such
hierarchies (Ogilvie et al., 2005). Using evidence hierarchies as a technical filter prior to
research synthesis is wasteful and can lead to misleading conclusions (Pawson, 2003).
Even ‘accepted’ evidence hierarchies are subject to debate with suggestions for wider
evidence to be included (Bagshaw and Bellomo, 2008); e.g. the debate on if further evidence
such as biological plausibility should be included within Grading of Recommendations As-
sessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE). Matrices of evidence are seen as a way
forward within some domains; however, there are conflicting views about the merits of the
different forms of evidence (Nutley, Powell and Davies, 2013).
5.4 Lessons for the Problem of Interest
A number of lessons have been stated in the salient observations which accompany each sub-
section in this chapter. This section draws upon these observations to provide a high-level
view of the lessons for the software safety domain.
The definition of evidence is not straightforward. There are a number of philosophical
elements that are of interest, such as the concept of evidence being a premise for belief
and evidence not being proof. Any concept which provides the ability for evidence to be
gathered is, in essence, supporting beliefs to be formed via reasoning which allows proof 20.
The context is key to ensure that the types of evidence adopted and the judgements that
are captured via relevant attributes are proportional and adequate for the problem.
Within a number of domains the processes used to gather and form the basis for de-
cisions is underpinned by the judgement of the decision makers. Hierarchies of evidence
and standards of quality for evidence exist to allow a decision, or judgement, to be made
19See Bagshaw and Bellomo (2008) and Petticrew and Roberts (2003) for a study design for the medical
domain.
20The term proof is used in the context of the establishment of a fact by the use of evidence (Lehman and
Phelps, 2005) rather than an inferential argument for a mathematical statement (Cupillari, 2012).
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using defensible approaches. However, the key principle to this process is that judgements
are being formed. This is the case for domains which appear to apply ‘robust’ evidential
approaches, e.g. EBM, and the strategic policy-making domain. The concept of ‘hierarchies
of evidence’ clearly has it’s merits but there are issues to consider, e.g. wasteful use of data
Pawson (2003).
The attributes associated with evidence allows it to be judged. This means that the belief
of a proposition being true is based upon the understanding of the evidence itself. Within
the CPS there are the concepts of reliability, accuracy, and integrity (CPS, 2018c). Policy-
making refers to attributes such as quality, credibility, and relevance (Panjwani, 2017). These
examples illustrate that evidence attributes can play a fundamental role in understanding
the value of evidence and also as a mechanism to measure evidence via judgements. There
are various forms of evidence, e.g. documentary and real (CPS, 2018c)21, with each having
levels of weight. This concept is worthy of consideration for any judgments on software
safety.
Evidence needs to be considered on the basis of what would lead to a successful outcome.
Relevant factors include implementation cost and risk. Cost is a key factor within the NICE
and the NHS decisions on interventions but other domains use cost as a consideration rather
than a key driver. These factors are not always part of the decisions which determine a
technical solution; however, evidence which is the most suitable is not always the most
obtainable.
The NHS advocates the use of patient decision aids to provide information in a format
which assists their knowledge of the options and for choices to be made which are consistent
with their values, or beliefs. There are clear advantages to adopting such an approach within
the software safety domain. Visualisations and models can allow stakeholders to comprehend
the range of options which diverse evidence can provide.
Caution is needed when comparing the domains which have formal evidence-based deci-
sions due to the differences in the use of evidence and the contexts. An example is with the
acceptance of evidence within the justice domain as the principle of case law22 has cross-over
to the software safety domain. There is an acceptance of precedence within the legal and
safety domains. Evidence or techniques from previous safety assurance arguments can be
put forward for the current arguments. An example, is a claim that reliability models may
not be explicit objectives within extant standards but they may still have had acceptance
as part of a prior software safety assurance argument. This acceptance sets a precedent.
However, within a legal domain the case law acts as the confirmed precedence which other
future judgements must consider. Therefore it has a greater degree of weight. This could
21See sub-section 5.2.1 for further information.
22Case law is a past ruling which can be cited as a precedent (Apple and Deyling, 2012).
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be analogous to process-based evidence within the software safety domain as process-based
evidence is the confirmed precedence and therefore has greater weight than evidence with
perceived precedence, e.g. reliability models. However, with the weight of process-based
evidence not always considered as the strongest form of evidence, e.g. as stated by Menon,
Hawkins and McDermid (2009b), there may be scope to increase the weight of other evidence
(which has precedence or not).
Within the safety domain there should be varying degrees of conformance to a particular
standard or objective. However, within the legal system the outcome is based upon a binary
decision, i.e. guilty or not guilty, but the sentencing can reflect the degrees of culpability.
The review of a number of non-software safety domains has provided valuable observa-
tions which can be considered for any enhancements to the software safety domain. This
ranges from the types of evidence, how such evidence can be measured, the non-technical
factors which could differentiate evidence, and the value in allowing stakeholders to visualise
data to make informed decisions.
Chapter 5 sub-sections 5.2 and 5.3 have partly responded to the research sub-question: What
is the current permissible software safety assurance evidence within the UK defence domain
and related domains?.
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Chapter 6
Current Permissible Evidence for
Safety-Critical Software Assurance
Chapters 4 and 5 assessed a number of non-software domains to ascertain how evidence
can be used to form judgements. The use of evidence for decision making is complicated1
with a number of approaches adopted to manage the challenges of evidence assessment, e.g.
establishing the relevance of evidence.
This chapter will examine:
• MOD Software Assurance. It is important to understand the evidence which is cur-
rently adopted for software assurance arguments within the MOD.
• Software Assurance Within Other Safety-Critical Domains. There are lessons to be
learnt from the observations made on other safety-critical domains. Figure 6.1 shows
the safety-critical domains of relevance to understand the potential permissible evi-
dence.
• Literature to Inform Software Assurance Evidence. In addition to the relevant obser-
vations from the domains there is also literature and guidelines which can inform the
permissible evidence to inform a safety argument.
The information related to airborne software and CEH assurance will undergo a greater
level of analysis by the RE in comparison to other domains. This is deliberate as the focus
of the thesis is on enhancements to software/CEH airborne assurance arguments.
1With the definition of complicated problems being those which are “hard to solve but they are addressable
with rules and recipes” (Kinni, 2017).
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Figure 6.1: Safety-Critical Domains of Interest
6.1 MOD Software Assurance
A high-level overview of the MOD safety assurance process was described in the previous
chapter. This section will look at how the current software assurance processes deal with
evidence and how diverse evidence is currently captured and managed.
6.1.1 Airborne Platform Software Assurance
DS 00-970 (UK MOD, 2014a), specifically requirement 1.7 - Safety Related Programmable
Elements, contains considerations for determining the airworthiness of PEs. However, it
is recognised via the MOD Military Certification Review Item (MCRI) process that rigid
considerations, as part of the DS 00-970 default airworthiness code, are not always applied
(MAA, 2017d).
Within DS 00-970 the PE considerations relate to:
• System-level safety considerations.
• Airworthiness related cyber security assurance.
• SRS assurance.
• Safety-related CEH assurance.
For this thesis the system-level safety considerations and airworthiness related cyber se-
curity assurance will not be reviewed as, although important considerations for safety assur-
ance, they are out of scope of the immediate research focus on software/CEH. However, any
diverse evidence approach should be able to take the assurance of such aspects into account
when measuring the overall safety assurance confidence.
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6.1.1.1 Safety Related Software (SRS) and Safety Related Complex Electronic
Hardware (CEH) Assurance
The AMC for SRS is DO-178C (RTCA, 2011a) which has a focus on life-cycle process. It
can be argued that the process-based stages lack variety in terms of the assessment methods
and hence the level of evidence diversity2.
DO-178C contains details on additional considerations to life-cycle evidence. This in-
cludes a reference to software reliability models and PSH. However, the reference to software
reliability models within DO-178C is only included within the guideline to state that such
models do not provide results in which confidence can be placed. This position on reliability
modelling is arguable for some models and applications and is worthy of debate in itself;
however, the arguments will not be discussed further within this thesis.
Positively, DO-178C supports the use of PSH as it indicates that it is a viable form of
evidence (which, interestingly and as contradiction, is a form of reliability model). DO-178C
states that it is possible for an equivalent level of software safety to be demonstrated by
the use of PSH. There are a number of dependencies which need to be met for the method
to be accepted (e.g. configuration management of the software); however, there is a clear
statement of support for PSH.
It is not clearly stated within DO-178C what level of credit that can be claimed via
PSH, i.e. partial or full compliance. DO-178C states that “some certification credit may
be granted” which indicates that full credit may not be gained. However, DO-178C also
indicates that any use of PSH should be included in the Plan for Software Aspects of Cer-
tification (PSAC). DO-178C goes on to direct that any inclusion within the PSAC should
state which objectives in sections 4 to 93 of DO-178C are to be addressed through the use of
PSH. This indicates that all objectives are valid for a PSH argument if an equivalent level of
confidence can be demonstrated. However, the guidance is not definitive in relation to the
use of PSH and is very much open to interpretation.
Discussion Paper #4 within DO-248C (RTCA, 2011b) contains additional guidance on the
DO-178C terminology and the intent of PSH, i.e. the service history rationale for DO-178C.
However, within the guidance it is not clear if PSH can be used fully in-lieu of processed-based
evidence. However, there should be a recognition that there are overlaps in the evidential
requirements for PSH and process-based assessment, mainly CM.
DO-254 (RTCA, 2000) refers to the use of PSE4, stating that service experience may
2This is based upon the premise which was determined in Chapter 3 (and throughout this thesis) that
diversity is a good thing (Littlewood and Wright, 2007).
3Software planning process, software development process, software verification process, software Con-
figuration Management (CM) process, software Quality Assurance (QA) process, and certification liaison
process.
4Section 11.3 of RTCA (2000).
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 104 of 328
be used to substantiate design assurance for previously developed hardware and for COTS
components. The use of any PSE in the context of DO-254, should:
• Be assessed against a number of acceptability criteria, e.g. actual failure rates in
operation.
• Make an assessment of the PSE data to satisfy the criteria and to also meet the PSE
data requirements.
As with DO-178C this indicates that there is an acceptance that PSH can be a valid form
of evidence in-lieu of process-based evidence. There are a number of criteria which must be
met to validate any PSH data. It should be noted that although DO-254 is supportive of the
use of PSH the section which defines the use of PSH is far shorter and less comprehensive
than DO-178C. SMEs in the field of CEH assurance5 have stated that PSH is actively used for
CEH assurance; however the level of service data required to provide equivalent confidence
in-lieu of design information is very subjective. Also, there can be belief gained in the PSE
of the component itself and of the component’s design (Fulton, 2017). There is a clear
preference within the MOD software and CEH assurance regulations for judgements to be
based upon the use of process-based evidence.
It is clear that in two of the most recognised guidelines for software and CEH assurance,
i.e. DO-178C and DO-254 respectively, there is support for the use of PSH. PSH can form
an equivalent safety argument if certain criteria are met for the supporting data. However,
the use of DO-178C and DO-254 by the regulatory authorities is to determine the process-
based life-cycle objectives and not for the use of PSH. This is also the case for DS 00-55
which outlines a number of requirements and objectives with references to RGP and open
standards. These are referenced in the context of the process-based life-cycle guidance.
PSH evidence is seen as a method to be employed if the preferred, process-based, evidence
cannot be gathered. However, there is debate to the value of process-based evidence; e.g.
Menon, Hawkins and McDermid (2009b) states that “there is no evidence that a good process
will result in a good product (although there is a correlation between bad processes and bad
products!)”.
CAST-1 (CAST, 1998)6 provides information on the attributes which could be assessed to
gain a level of assurance confidence for a system based on PSH. The attributes are focussed
on broad categories which link to DO-178B (RTCA, 1992). The categories are (CAST, 1998):
5For example, Fulton (2017).
6CAST Position Paper (CAST-1) - Guidance for Assessing the Software Aspects of Product Service
History of Airborne Systems and Equipment.
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• Means of compliance.
• Service history duration.
• Product quality.
• Problem detection and reporting.
• Modifications and control.
• Evidence of compliance.
A number of attributes are considered for a PSH argument. CAST-1 provides attributes
for consideration such as: service duration length, change control during service, and error
detection/reporting capability. It is expected that these attributes will be judged, using
linguistic terms, to determine the acceptable level of the PSH evidence. The judgements are








Table 6.1: PSH Attribute and Scale (CAST, 1998)
The individual attributes are judged by a level of acceptability to provide credit towards
the software assurance confidence. This is shown in Table 6.2. Once these judgements are
made then CAST-1 provides a matrix to judge if the evidence associated with an attribute




Credit allowed based on engineering judgement
Ù
Engineering judgement for no or some credit allowed
Ù
Little if any credit allowed
Ù
No credit allowed
Table 6.2: PSH Attribute and the Acceptability Scale (CAST, 1998)
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The CAST-1 concept is very much subjective, e.g. what is a long level of service du-
ration?, and is open to conflict between stakeholders. However, there are benefits to the
approach as it allows a commonality of language and a method for stakeholder dialogue.
The use of PSH via the CAST-1 method indicates that PSH can be used as a valid approach
to gain assurance confidence and not necessarily in-lieu of process-based evidence.
The MAA undertake reviews to ensure that DTs seek counter-evidence7 as part of their
safety argument. Evidence that the DTs have sought counter-evidence is just as important
as the counter-evidence itself (as stated in the interview with the MAA)8.
Also stated within the interview with the MAA is that there needs to be an underpinning
philosophy to the standards that are applied by a DT for the software safety argument. Some
standards have different approaches and principles but the terminology used within a safety
argument has to be consistent and in keeping with the standards that are being applied. It
would not be possible to take the definition of a Software Integrity Level (SIL), for example,
from one standard and apply it using a differing context. In essence, DTs cannot “cherry
pick” from standards as there is a need to retain the context to the original intent of the
objectives (as stated within the MAA interview).
The MAA allows the clearances of aircraft which may be subject to limited evidence which
has not been derived from a fully substantiated safety assessment (MAA, 2016b)9. These
clearances are termed Clearances with Limited Evidence (CLE). In addition, the MAA also
has the concept of Operational Emergency Clearances (OEC) for when the equipment does
not satisfy the project safety standards. These will be subject to Special Conditions whilst
ensuring that full clearances are granted as soon as possible (MAA, 2016b)10.
6.1.1.2 Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Design Approved Organization
Scheme (DAOS)
RA 1005 (MAA, 2018d)11 is focused on providing guidance to DTs for contracting with
competent organisations. The RA is relevant for organisations within the Defence Air Envi-
ronment (DAE) who may be contracted to conduct design, maintenance, contractor flying,
or air traffic management activities. RA 1005 is clear that without competent organisations
contracted to conduct activities there may be a compromised level of air safety.
The MAA have a number of approval schemes to establish the competencies of organi-
7Counter-evidence refers to the provision of an item of evidence which has the potential to undermine a
claim (Menon, Hawkins and McDermid, 2009a).
8A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
9RA 1300 - Release to Service. For further information see the following: https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/637458/RA1300 Issue 3.pdf.
10ibid.
11RA 1005 – Contracting with Competent Organizations (sic).
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sations which are to be involved in military platforms, e.g. to conduct maintenance. This
allows consistency when comparing the organisations and allows an evidential threshold to
be established.
Organisations which provide air systems (including products, parts, appliances), airborne
equipment, air launched weapons, and post-design services are classed as Design Organisa-
tions (DOs) within RA 1005. There is a MAA requirement that only competent DOs will
be contracted, and a DO needing to be approved under the Design Approved Organization
Scheme (DAOS). Where a DO also holds a relevant EASA approval then there are related
evidential artefacts that should be submitted to support any competence case.
RA 5850 (MAA, 2018c)12 contains guidance on the responsibilities of a DO, information
on the approvals scheme processes, and instructions on sustaining type airworthiness. Annex
B of RA 5850 includes information on the DO exposition requirements. Granting of approval
under DAOS to a DO is only relevant for given systems, in stated locations, within certain
contexts. For DAOS approval the following DOs areas of business are assessed.
• Organisation structure.
• Human resources.
• Management of staff.
• Certifying personnel.
• Independent system monitoring.
• QMS certification evidence.
• Design process information.
• Design documentation control.
• Subcontractor selection process.
• Continuing airworthiness.
• Process to collect and investigate failures, malfunctions, and defects.
• Statement of qualification and experience.
12RA 5850 – Military Design Approved Organization (MRP 21 Subpart J).
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Once a DO has gained DAOS approval they are included within a consolidated list of
approved organisations which is published by the MAA13. Any approval is time-bounded
with elements of the scheme being repeated periodically to maintain confidence in a DO.
The DAOS process has a number of benefits to the MAA and those organisations which
wish to become a contracted DO. The process allows the MAA to gain suitable satisfactory
confidence in an organisation, which is consistent across different organisations. From an
industry perspective the DAOS process is a tried and tested approach (Kritzinger, 2017).
However, the DAOS process has been classed as inflexible and difficult to navigate for soft-
ware specific evidence (Kritzinger, 2017).
There is a level of confidence gained in the DO via the DAOS process. However, the use of
direct evidence captured as part of the DAOS process could be enhanced to form mitigations
to non-process compliance for the software. There is scope to include such evidence to form
part of a direct and consistent narrative to support a software safety argument.
6.1.1.3 Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Mutual Recognition (MR)
The MAA have a process in place to evaluate other military regulators for their airworthiness
artefacts. This can potentially support the DT air system safety argument submissions. The
MAA states that the granting of Mutual Recognition (MR) status to an authority does not
mean that the evidence and activities of the recognised organisation can be taken at “face
value” as the context of the recognition must be assessed and understood (MAA, 2017a).
There are clear benefits to MR, e.g. with a reduction in costs. This is due to reduced
duplication of effort and bureaucracy across the DAEs of the nations. In addition, a shared
understanding of airworthiness information and principles can be gained as well as a shared
certification approach, e.g. a major change14 certified by one nation could be accepted
by others (Robinson, 2016). The MAA has traditionally been committed to a recognition
activity with other competent authorities where direct benefits may be realised (MAA, 2013).
As at December 2017, the last update to the publicly available MAA list of recognised
military regulators, there are 7 organisations that have gained MR (MAA, 2017a). This
includes regulators from:
• France (Direction de la Sécurité Aéronautique d’État (DSAÉ) for Airbus A400M).
• Spain (Dirección General de Armamento y Material (DGAM) for Airbus A400M and
Eurofighter Typhoon).
13For further information refer to MAA (2018a).
14RA 5820 contains guidance on changes to the type designs of air systems. In essence, a change to an air
system which has “no appreciable effect on the mass, balance, structural strength, operational characteristics,
or other characteristics affecting the Airworthiness of the Air System” should be classed as a minor change.
All other changes should be classed as a major change (MAA, 2017e).
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• Germany (Luftfahrtamt der Bundeswehr (LufABw) for Eurofighter Typhoon).
• Italy (Direzione degli Armamenti Aeronautici e per l’Aeronavigabilità (DAAA) for
Eurofighter Typhoon).
• United States of America (USA) (e.g. Aviation and Missile Research, Development,
and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) Aviation Engineering Directorate (AED) for var-
ious platforms).
The number of MAA mutually recognised organisations is encouraging. It could play
an important element in supporting the MOD procurements and subsequent certification
activities in the future, e.g. in the post-Brexit era with European Union (EU) procure-
ments and redefined EU directives (Butler, 2016). In addition, this will potentially support
the procurement efforts with suppliers which have traditionally received significant portions
of MOD procurement expenditure15. Examples include Finmeccanica SpA (Italy), Airbus
Group (trans-European), and Hewlett-Packard (HP), Lockheed Martin Corporation (LM),
and Boeing (all US)16.
The MR process assesses regulator responsibilities in the following areas (MAA, 2017a):
• General functions of an airworthiness authority.
• Airworthiness inspection regulations.
• Production oversight regulations.
• Aircraft certification regulations.
The European Defence Agency (EDA) have a number of approved Military Airworthiness
Authority (MAWA) documents which provide requirements for European member states to
implement within their own military airworthiness regulations. These are the basis for the
MAAs MR. EDA MAWA Forum (2018) states the requirements for such processes as:
• Aircraft maintenance training (EDA MAWA Forum, 2014).
• Continuing airworthiness (EDA MAWA Forum, 2015).
• Military flight test permit procedures (EDA MAWA Forum, 2016b).
• Information on the recognition process itself (EDA MAWA Forum, 2016a).
15This can have an advantage in that a consistent capability can be maintained.
16Company information in relation to MOD expenditure informed by Utterly and Wilkinson (2016).
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EDA MAWA Forum (2016a) provides information on a number of areas which should be
considered as part of establishing MR, either one-way or two-way. The critical elements, as
they are termed within EDA MAWA Forum (2016a), includes:
• Primary aviation legislation.
• Specific operating regulations.
• Aviation system and safety oversight functions.
• Technical personnel qualification and training.
• Technical guidance, tools, and the provision of safety-critical information.
• Licensing, certification, authorisation, and approval obligations.
• Surveillance obligations.
• Resolution of safety concerns.
There is a degree of overlap in terms of the evidence which is requested from a DO as
part of the DAOS process and that which is required for regulatory authorities within the
MR activities.
6.1.1.4 Salient Observations: MOD Software Assurance (Airborne Platforms)
There are a number of observations that can be made on the current use and exploitation
of evidence. There is a rich set of evidence which can form an initial judgement on specific
PEs due to the broad set of evidence captured via DAOS and MR processes. The evidential
requirements at a PE level will need to be much more detailed and focussed to understand
specific PE risks; however an initial level of confidence can be established. Evidence from
DAOS and MR processes could be evolved to account for PE specific evidence. This could
remove the need to re-establish confidence via process-based means, e.g. life-cycle artefacts.
The underpinning principles of the evidence captured as part of DAOS or MR procurement
could form additional evidence in the event of PE level evidence shortfalls, for example. This
could occur even if the direct evidence captured from the initial DAOS and MR activities is
at a higher level of abstraction.
The process-based standards for software (DO-178C) and CEH (DO-254) which are tra-
ditionally adopted within MOD airborne domain procurements do make reference to the
fact that PSH can play a role in establishing confidence in a given system. Indeed, the RE
has been actively engaged in projects and explored a number of MOD airborne procurement
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case studies. These case studies have adopted wider non-process based evidence as part
of the software and CEH assurance arguments made to the MAA. The report in question
(Standish, Hadley and Lennon, 2017) is releasable only within MOD; however the lessons
from these case studies can be found within the research output titled Use of Diverse Soft-
ware Evidence within a Safety-Critical Software Airborne Qualification Strategy17 as well as
supporting concepts within this thesis18.
CAST-1 provides a method to judge PSH attributes and can be used in the event of
shortfalls in software and/or CEH process-based evidence. However, the CAST-1 method
does not form part of any formal MOD assurance guidance and is not necessarily fully
adopted. Despite this the concept of assessing evidence attributes applied via engineering
judgement is an approach which has a merit which is accepted by the FAA19. Many of the
domains, e.g. medical, have formal structures in place to assist with gathering evidence
types/weightings20.
6.1.2 Land and Maritime Platform Software Assurance
The MOD airborne regulator21, the maritime regulator22 and the land regulator23 are teams
within the DSA (DSA, 2018a). Within the DLSR it is the Land Systems Safety Regulator
(LSSR) which regulates the acquisition and use of equipment within the land domain (DSA,
2018b) with DS 00-56 (UK MOD, 2014c) being applied for the contracting of safety (LSSR,
2017). DMR0224 (DMR, 2016a) and the Naval Authority Notice (NAN) Software Integrity
Policy (SIP) (DMR, 2016b) is the focus for software assurance within the MOD maritime
domain.
Within the land and maritime domains the context and environment of the platforms
influences the severity of any hazards which can occur, e.g. the severity of a hazard as-
sociated with an engine failure within the air domain is greater than that within the land
domain. Due to the differing contexts and environments, the guidelines and standards which
are applied vary. Therefore, the approach to mitigate any perceived shortfalls in software
17The case studies were generated/reviewed as part of this research and subsequently published within
the customer deliverables.
18For example by supporting the potential permissible evidence for MOD airborne safety-critical software
assurance (see sub-section 7.1).
19Noting that CAST-1 is a FAA guidance paper.
20There is an argument that the medical domain is now becoming more pragmatic due to necessity, e.g.
drugs to counter Ebola had a very limited level of testing before being adopted, although in reality there
were very few alternatives! See the following for further information: https://jme.bmj.com/content/44/1/3.
21The MAA.
22The Defence Maritime Regulator (DMR).
23The Defence Land Safety Regulator (DLSR).
24DSA02-DMR - MOD Shipping Regulation for Safety and Environmental Protection.
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evidence also differs. Interviews with Dstl colleagues and a MOD Naval Authority Group
(NAG) representative has informed the REs understanding of the MOD land and maritime
domains25.
[Sub-section text redacted]
If there are known risks associated with any evidential shortfalls, within any domain26
and with any assurance item27, then the operational environments and capabilities of the
system may be limited. Within the MOD air domain these limitations can result in a CLE28.
6.1.2.1 Salient Observations: MOD Software Assurance (Land and Maritime
Platforms)
The environments and contexts of the domains can shape the evidential requirements for
assurance. The adoption of continuous operator mitigations, e.g. via Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs), can be generally sufficient for systems which are within environments
which allow timely Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) or Human-on-the-Loop (HOTL) action(s)29.
This reaffirms that the context to the use of software and CEH is paramount as the assurance
requirements and evidence needs to be proportionate and sufficient.
Within the air domain there is a need to gain suitable confidence of a software’s depend-
ability prior to the adoption of the software into service. HITL, HOTL, and the fail-safe30
options are significantly less tolerant within the air domain. However, it should be noted that
non-air domains undergo significant assurance on focussed hazards, e.g. those that could
lead to harm of the vehicle occupants. The aim, reasoning, and adoption of the ‘proven
in use’ concept and the context of the environments are significant observations from the
MODs land and maritime domains.
25A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
26Including non-MOD domains.
27Including non-software items.
28See MAA (2016b) for further information.
29HITL actions are those which “require a positive affirmation from the human operator for the machine to
proceed” whereas with HOTL “the operator need not approve of the action beforehand but retains the ability
to veto it before the execution of the machine’s action or abort the action once it has begun” (Schaub and
Wenzel-Kristoffersen, 2017). The exact distinctions and variations of these relationships is more complicated
but for the purposes of illustrating the concept these definitions suffice.
30The concept of to fail-safe is in the event of a breakdown or malfunction the machinery reverts to a safe
condition (OED, 2018e).
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6.2 Software Assurance Within Other Safety-Critical
Domains
There are a number of domains which operate within safety-critical environments, i.e. haz-
ards may lead to catastrophic events. Each domain must ensure that the software performing
the safety-critical functions is robust and dependable. Due to the various contexts in which
the software is used the methods and principles that are adopted will differ. These will also
be influenced by the political and technical environments. There are certainly lessons that
can be learnt from these domains to inform the possible forms of permissible evidence and
how they can be judged.
Within this section each of the domains are described31. At the end of the section there
is discussion on the salient observations of the software assurance conducted within other
safety-critical domains32.
6.2.1 Civil Aviation Software Assurance
It should be noted that a key source of information for this section is the REs interview with
a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) representative33. Additional information is sourced from
references including, but not limited to: CAA (2019a)34, EASA (2017a), DfT (2018), CAA
(2018), and CAA (2019b).
EASA have the remit for the regulation and assurance of airborne software for LRUs
and platforms which operate within UK airspace. This is in keeping with the EU single
Single European Sky initiative35. The CAA have a remit for the regulation and assurance
of Air Traffic Services (ATSs) and the broader Air Traffic Management (ATM) (CAA, 2018,
2019b).
The CAA regulatory objectives for software safety assurance of bespoke software within
ATM equipment are contained within CAP670 SW0136 (CAA, 2019a). The guidance can
also be used in circumstances where the published guidance does not fully address the needs
of software within the scope of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No. 482/2008; e.g. COTS
software and changes to legacy software (CAA, 2019a). The document does not prescribe
how the assurance evidence is to be produced or its adequacy argued, this is due to guidelines
31See Appendix B for further information on the open/probing questions adopted for the semi-structured
interviews used to gather this information.
32This allows the various strands to be described and assessed in a single coherent sub-section.
33A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
34This sub-section has been amended to reflect version 3/2019 of the CAP670 regulations.
35See the following for further information: https://www.eurocontrol.int/dossiers/single-european-sky.
36CAP670: Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements. Specifically, Part B, Section 3, “SW 01: Regulatory
Objectives for Software Safety Assurance in ATS Equipment”.
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such as DO-178B (RTCA, 1992) being able to be used in conjunction with the document.
The prime software safety objective for ATS systems which contain software is “to ensure
that the risks associated with deploying any software used in a safety related ATS system
have been reduced to a tolerable level” (CAA, 2019a). To achieve the objective CAA (2019a)
states that it is necessary “for arguments and assurance evidence to be available which show
that the risks associated with deploying any software used in a safety related ATS system
are tolerable”.
CAP670 SW01 provides general requirements for the evidence of requirements satisfac-
tion, e.g. that software safety requirements are satisfied. Differing sources of evidence are
permitted for the different software safety requirements and the same evidence may be used
for different software safety requirements if it valid to assess the requirements independently.
The guidance itself only considers evidence from testing, field service experience, and anal-
ysis.
Within CAP670 SW01 the concept of Assurance Evidence Levels (AELs) are used to
relate the safety criticality of the software safety requirement to the depth and strength
of evidence required for the assurance of the correct implementation. The purpose of an
AEL is to define the minimum set of assurance evidence required for a given software safety
requirement for any proposed system. The AEL safety criticality level for a given safety
requirement can be reduced with the consideration of architectural and operational defences
within other parts of the system. For each type of evidence (i.e. test, field service experience,
or analysis) the level of rigour is commensurate with the AEL. As an example, for field
service experience AEL 1 requires relevant statements with AEL 5 requiring the completion
of analysis, justification, and verification by an independent organisation. The evidence
to satisfy the AELs should be formed of direct37 and backing38 evidence. CAP670 SW01
also provides guidance on the behavioural attributes of a software safety requirement and
the expected supporting evidence. As an example, analysis and testing for AEL 5 timing
properties with worst case timing analysis and performance modelling forming part of the
analytical evidence.
The AMC document to CAP670 SW0139 (CAA, 2010) aims to provide guidance to Air
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and their suppliers on addressing the objectives of
CAP 670 SW 01 (CAA, 2019a) when deploying COTS equipment.
The AMC for COTS (CAA, 2010) states that there are at least four types of integrity
37With direct evidence being that which is produced by an activity taking place or software behaviour
occurring, which is directly related to the claim being made (CAA, 2019a).
38With backing evidence being that which shows that the direct evidence is both credible and soundly
based (CAA, 2019a).
39Acceptable Means of Compliance to CAP670 SW01. Guidance for Producing SW01 Safety Arguments
for COTS Equipment.
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assurance evidence which can be adopted to claim a suitable level of assurance confidence.
The evidence is to gain a direct level of confidence in the software itself. Therefore, the ap-
proach is not reliant on a process-based review. The use of varied evidence strands to inform
the direct software confidence is positive in supporting the thesis arguments to enhance the
software assurance for the defence domain.
• Testing.
• Field-service information.
• Supplier experience and reputation.
• Supplier software design and development.
The AMC attempts to quantify the judgements on the evidence to allow the impact
of the evidence to be measured. This is achieved by a points based system which has
a defined target dependent on the required fault free hours, e.g. set number of integrity
assurance points for no worse than 1 x 10-4 occurrences per hour. There are varying levels
of confidence (scaled 1-3) which can be attributed to the evidence, e.g. if the evidence is
below the expected requirements. The levels have a range of ‘points’ associated with them.
To assign the level of confidence each form of evidence states the artefacts expected to be
available and reviewed. The AMC for COTS provides information on the range of points
which each evidential type can provide towards the target. An example is shown in Table
6.340.
Evidence Points
Appropriate software development process
10 for a level below the recommendation
Ó
25 for a level meeting the recommendation
Ó
30 for a level above the recommendation
Table 6.3: Example of Points Associated to Software Evidence (CAA, 2010)
In essence, the points-based approach is cognisant of the quality of the evidence as it’s
being measured against a recommended level. Also, the relevance of the evidence is captured
as it’s being judged in relation to the other forms of evidence.
The CAA adopts the EU2017/373 regulation41 (EASA, 2017b) which supersedes the
40Extracted from Table I.4 within CAA (2010).
41Regulation (EU) 2017 373 - the Air Traffic Management Common Requirements Implementing Regula-
tion (ATM IR).
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EU482/2008 regulation42 (EASA, 2008). EU482/2008 was an attempt to focus on a software
process assurance approach whereas EU2017/373 ensures that software is one element of
many for safety judgements. This indicates that non-process based software evidence can be
legitimately considered.
[Sub-section text redacted]
The context in which the CAA software assurance is adopted should be noted. As with
other domains, there are a number of mitigations that can be enacted if a software failure
occurs; there is a very high level of HITL within a ATS for example. Therefore, the very
limited set of mitigations within an airborne software domain does not apply to an ATM
environment.
6.2.2 Civil Air Traffic Services Software Assurance
It should be noted that a key source of information for this section is the REs interview with
a National Air Traffic Services (NATS)43 representative44.
[Sub-section text redacted]
For ground-based systems NATS adopts the European Organization for Civil Aviation
Equipment (EUROCAE) ED 109 standard. In essence, EUROCAE ED 109 has the same
requirements as the DO-278A45 guideline (RTCA, 2011c). DO-278A calls out DO-178B
(RTCA, 1992)46.
6.2.3 Automotive Software Assurance
It should be noted that key sources of information for this section are RE interviews with
two Vehicle Certification Agency (VCA) representatives47.
[Sub-section text redacted]
42EU 482/2008: Establishing a Software Safety Assurance System to be Implemented by Air Navigation
Service Providers.
43The acronym NATS is now only the company name although the name was derived from National Air
Traffic Control Services (NATCS) originally. See the following for further information: https://www.nats.
aero/about-us/our-history/.
44A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
45DO-278A. Guidelines for communication, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management
(CNS/ATM) systems software integrity assurance.
46DO-278A is unofficially termed the “DO-178B of the ground”.
47A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
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6.2.4 Rail Software Assurance
It should be noted that a key source of information for this section is the REs interview with
a rail domain representative48.
Within the rail sector the predominant standard adopted for software assurance is an
equivalent to International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61508, called IEC 6227949.
There are two communities within the rail domain: signalling and then the other elements,
including rolling stock. Edition 2 of IEC 62279 will move from a focus on the signalling to
include other aspects (such as rolling stock).
[Sub-section text redacted]
RSSB (2017) is a UK Rail Industry Guidance Note which aims to assist with providing
information for a number of defined processes for High-Integrity (HI) software and software-
based systems50:
• Procurement.
• Preparation of specifications.
• Contractual arrangements.
RSSB (2017) is aimed at companies which procure HI software. The guidance states that
there are a number of methods that can be used to provide a suitable level of rigour, for
example: V&V; clear documentation and traceability; appropriate consideration of organi-
sation; and personnel competency issues. The guidance recognises that software testing, in
all its forms, is only part of the validation of the software. The guidance refers to the need
to have a number of requirement categories (e.g. safety, security such as protection from
cyber-attacks) but the guidance does not elaborate further on the security requirements51.
Animation and model simulation are also seen as a useful methods of verification.
The rail industry reviews a broad level of evidence, including simulation, to directly
inform the confidence in the software safety assurance. This is in keeping with other safety
domains.
48A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
49IEC 62279: Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - Software for
railway control and protection systems.
50HI systems encompass those which can be mission, security, or safety-critical. They are designed to have
a high probability of conducting their intended behaviour.
51Rail industry guidance on cyber-security is available from https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/improving-
industry-performance/2016-02-cyber-security-rail-cyber-security-guidance-to-industry.pdf.
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6.2.5 Civil Nuclear Software Assurance
It should be noted that a key source of information for this section is the REs interview with
a ONR representative52.
[Sub-section text redacted]
A common position report53 contributed to by a number of Nuclear Regulators aims to
provide a consensus of eight international regulators (1 from Canada and 7 from Europe).
The report consists of two major parts:
• Generic licensing issues; e.g. pre-existing software, security, and formal methods.
• Life-Cycle phase licensing issues; e.g. software implementation and verification.
The report states that software assessments cannot be limited to verification and testing
of the end product. Other factors should be considered, e.g. process quality. The view is
that there are three basic independent types of evidence that must be produced to support
the safety demonstration of a “computer based digital system”:
• Quality of the development process.
• Adequacy of the product.
• Evidence of the competence and qualifications of the staff involved in all of the system
life-cycle phases.
The report supports the use of pre-existing software as it can increase confidence that
the system is safe. International Nuclear Regulators (2018) contains recommendations such
as: need for a well understood life-cycle approach, e.g. requirements, design, and implemen-
tation; the need for quality assurance; and for graded requirements compared to classes of
software etc. Wider considerations such as organisational requirements, e.g. safety culture
and staff competencies, are also included.
A ONR guide on Computer Based Safety Systems (ONR, 2017) aims to advise and
inform ONR inspectors for when they perform their professional regulatory judgements.
The guidance draws upon a number of supporting standards, e.g. IEC 6234054. ONR (2017)
contains a large guidance section on software for computer based safety systems. This covers
the:
52A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
53International Nuclear Regulators (2018). Licensing of safety critical software for nuclear reactors. Com-
mon position of international nuclear regulators and authorised technical support organisations.
54IEC 62340:2007 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Requirements to Cope with Common Cause Failure.
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• Need for defensive programming55.
• Need to run in a fixed sequence pattern, rather than employ interrupts.
• Coding standard requirements, both prohibited practices and those which are encour-
aged.
• Use of static analysers by the designers with an independent tool used by the assessors.
• Checks that should be adopted by V&V teams, e.g. appropriate use of fault tolerant
and defensive programming features.
• Testing principles, extended period of testing to establish reliability.
6.2.6 Health Information Technology (IT) Systems Software As-
surance
It should be noted that a key source of information for this section is the REs interview with
a representative with the company Consultants to Government and Industries (CGI)56.
[Sub-section text redacted]
6.2.7 Salient Observations: Software Assurance Within Other Safety-
Critical Domains
The review of a number of domains which undertake the assurance of safety-critical software
has allowed a range of trends and observations to be made. These can significantly inform the
evidence which can be permitted for a software assurance argument. Obviously, the contexts
in which the domains operate influences both the methods and evidential requirements.
There are a number of process-based standards which are adopted within the domains,
with many based upon IEC 61508. These standards set an initial benchmark in terms of
the expectations on suppliers by the regulators, Certification Authorities, and assessors.
However, there is also an acknowledgement within a number of domains that the preferred
process-based evidence is not guaranteed to be provided in all instances. Therefore, it is
common for wider, more diverse, evidence to be adopted to support the software safety
assurance argument. Evidence includes, but is not limited to: SQEP data, in-service use,
formal methods, organisational competence, test plans/results, and safety hazard analysis.
55Defensive programming aims to ensure that software will function under unforeseen circumstances. The
method restricts the functionality of the software to increase the probability that it will perform as intended.
This has safety and security benefits and can be adopted within the airborne domain.
56A list of the research interviews are contained in Appendix B.
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Such evidence forms part of a standard argument within some domains. However, the level of
weighting for the evidence is applied inconsistently across the domains. The ability for such
diverse evidence to significantly support other evidence strands is also applied inconsistently.
Evidence requested by regulators, Certification Authorities, and assessors can vary within
a single domain to ensure that the evidence is proportionate to the context of the system57.
Other domains do not have the nuances or sophistication of the integrity levels and so the
range of evidence sought is reasonably consistent from system to system.
One of the original arguments for this thesis was that there is a need to significantly
reassess how diverse evidence is adopted to expand the system solution space (see Figure
1.1). This concept is not confined to the MOD airborne software assurance domain. Other
domains have similar challenges which require adopting a wider set of evidence to support
and mitigate perceived evidence shortfalls. In some instances, the concerns regarding access
to supporting artefacts can be mitigated via the use of Crown Servants, such as Dstl.
All of the domains discussed must assess evidence for brownfield and greenfield projects.
Each has its own challenges and a greenfield project does not necessarily lead to full initial
compliance with the software assurance requirements. The supplier may not necessarily
adhere to the initial standards and the issues regarding release of information are the same
for brownfield and greenfield projects. An approach which embraces diverse evidence is
required for both types of projects.
Within some domains there is an acceptance that there are benefits to allowing suppliers
to use an in-house development process rather than a defined standard prescribed process.
There are merits to this approach as long as the in-house development is suitably robust.
Adopting such a view further supports a need to provide a holistic view of the evidence.
Such evidence presented for a system needs to have the supporting evidence ascertained on
a case-by-case basis.
The levels of review conducted to gain sufficient confidence varies between the domains
and within some domains this is further dependent on the criticality of the software. Within
one domain there is a requirement to gain full objective-by-objective evidence and to mitigate
where required. Other domains take a suitable sampling approach. As identified previously,
the context and the environment shapes these requirements and the ability to tailor the
evidence.
Some domains can have no preference for the diverse evidence which is judged, based
upon having limited supplier information and a lower severity of hazards. Whereas other
domains have clear hierarchies of evidence and strong concepts of which evidence is valid.
Interestingly, some of the hierarchies are from a stringent regulatory perspective, based
57Such as the environment of the operations or the integrity level of the software.
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upon standards. Others are based upon SME judgement to inform the software assurance
argument. The preferences for evidence to be reviewed is based upon the practicalities of
receiving the supporting information and the legal requirements which are adopted.
Counter-evidence is an important element to the software assurance processes of a number
of domains, as with the MOD airborne software assurance requirements. The ability to gather
counter-evidence requires strong supporting legislation. There is a necessity for data owners
to allow such information to be reviewed and assessed.
COTS evidence is a common thread within the domains. Legislation may support the
review of suitable information; however, for COTS systems the available evidence may be
limited and increasing the legal requirements will not assist in such circumstances. Again,
this is a supporting case for the use of diverse evidence to mitigate such a lack of sufficient
evidence.
There are differing levels of rigour and depth of software evidence reviews, and therefore
there are varying levels of trust which is placed in the suppliers. This trust is based upon
the suppliers being able to suitably develop the software in the initial and continuing phases,
e.g. for software fault resolution. This trust can only be established by a firm understanding
of the organisational processes and, where possible, the pedigree of those processes. Trust
is not a concept that can be granted blindly and therefore continual review and assessment
is required.
The differing software architectures and contexts of use results in terminology and def-
initions changing between the domains which have been discussed. As an example, the
concept of simple and complex hardware/software differs between domains and this alters
the expectations of the evidential artefacts/results and the ability for sufficient reviews to
be undertaken. This supports MAA comments with regard to the need for consistency, not
only with the adoption of standards but in terms of the methods in which cross-domain evi-
dence is assessed. This is to be noted for this research and for scenarios in which supporting
evidence is fed from one domain to another, for example any testing requirements/results
from the rail domain to the airborne domain.
There is a clear preference within the discussed domains for simple and non-novel de-
signs/concepts to be adopted. Traditionally it is easier to gain suitable assurance confidence
in these types of systems. The concepts can be ‘easily’ understood with designs adopting so-
lutions with pedigree. However, as stated within the argument for this thesis, there are cases
where the use of novel technology is becoming less optional and more a hard requirement.
Therefore, there is a need for the domains to adapt. This can be in terms of the interpreta-
tion of how existing standards can be achieved but also in terms of how the standards reflect
the changing technology landscape.
A number of domains provide a consensus on a number of aspects which are in keep-
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ing with the current MOD software assurance policy. However, the evidential require-
ments/realities of the domains does prompt the question as to what additional evidence
could be used to inform a safety argument beyond the traditional life-cycle elements; e.g.
animation and model simulation and the ramifications of the evidential requirements for
this. A review of the domains leads to a conclusion that additional evidence could be used
to inform a direct software safety argument (e.g. staff competencies, common cause failures
etc) and also the need to consider how such evidence will be measured.
6.3 Literature to Inform Software Assurance Evidence
The sub-sections which follow are additional to the activities which are conducted in cur-
rent safety assurance arguments; however, they are potentially suitable to be considered as
evidence strands.
6.3.1 Software Architecture Complexity
Process-based standards would normally require a suitable architecture to be designed. How-
ever, a deeper understanding of the software architecture could act as a form of supporting
diverse evidence. This is due to not all software being of equal complexity.
Complexity can drive the maintainability of software and also the ability for a system to
be extensively tested. Therefore, there is an argument that the complexity of the software
and the associated assurance activities should be assessed in their context. Does a very
simple system require full process compliance compared to very complex software? This
approach is quite nuanced and is, as with other evidence, subject to SME judgements.
Clements, Kazman and Klein (2001) propose a number of metrics which can allow code
to be located within larger code-bases which may be challenging to maintain or which does
not adhere to software design RGP . The Clements, Kazman and Klein (2001) metrics are
as follows:
• Number of events (synchronous and asynchronous calls) to which an object reacts.
• Number of synchronous calls made by an object to other objects to get or set some
data/resource.
• Number of asynchronous calls made by an object to other objects.
• Number of component clusters of which a component is composed.
• Depth of structure (layers of encapsulation).
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• Depth of Finite State Machine (FSM).
• Number of data classes used or referenced by an object.
• Number of extended state variables.
• Depth of inheritance tree.
The ability to capture such information may be limited due to the level of source-code
detail required for this. However, the software complexity illustrates that relevant evidence
can inform a judgement on the diverse software safety assurance confidence. In theory, the
more simple the software architecture the less likely errors are to have been introduced.
Complex software architectures may have a higher risk of errors occurring due to the in-
creased probability of an incorrect implementation, for example. Also, understanding the
complexity of the architecture and the safety-critical function it provides will allow focussed
reviews of relevant artefacts.
6.3.2 Data Safety Working Group: Data Safety Guidance
DSIWG (2018) states that the role of data is becoming more prominent and therefore,
data needs to be considered as a “first class citizen” within any system safety analysis.
This concept is supported by the fact that DSIWG (2018) provides information on over 25
incidents and accidents, from numerous domains: naval, air, space etc, where data “failures”
can be considered to be a contributory factor.
The Data Safety Guidance provides the concept of a Data Safety Management Process




• Evaluate and treat risks.
Each of the phases have clear objectives and outputs, e.g. to identify key stakeholders
within the “establish context” phase, in addition to a set of activities to achieve the ob-
jectives. The adoption of such principles could provide additional evidence to support the
perceived level of rigour of the software.
Wider evidence such as that associated with data safety can inform a perceived software
safety assurance confidence level. This is due to the potential relevance of the evidence and
the contribution it has according to the SMEs forming the judgements.
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The data safety concept and that of software architecture complexity is concerned with
the context of the software. It attempts to establish the role that the software plays in the
wider system and the actual nuances regarding the software itself. It is intended for these
evidence types (data safety and software architecture complexity) to be considered within
any framework which is developed as part of this thesis.
6.4 Summary of Current Permissible Evidence for Safety-
Critical Software Assurance
This chapter has reviewed a number of software safety domains which adopt a range of
evidence to support the safety assurance confidence. The diverse evidence is not only used
to support the wider system safety review but it also directly informs the software assurance.
Evidence can also be judged by applying a quantified measurement to gather ‘points’ to
obtain an assurance argument, e.g. in the civil airborne domain. From a military airborne
software assurance review this is positive as within other domains diverse evidence frequently
judges process-based and non-process evidence.
There is also information from wider guidance and literature which can inform an assur-
ance argument. This ensures that the software is being considered as a unique entity which
is being judged on its own particular characteristics.
The information reviewed within this chapter allows assertions to be made on the evidence
which may be permissible to a software safety assurance argument, see Chapter 7.
Chapter 6 has partly responded to the research sub-question: What is the current permissible
software safety assurance evidence within the UK defence domain and related domains?.
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The previous chapter reviewed a number of safety-critical domains to explore how they
gather and assess software evidence. Each of the domains have challenges in gaining a level
of confidence and assurance1 of safety-critical software. The domains differ in context and
this impacts on the acceptable tolerances for certain hazards. This is due, in part, to which
mitigations can be implemented2, which in turn impacts the acceptable evidence and its
weight within any assurance argument. This chapter will explore the forms of potential
evidence in further detail.
This chapter will examine:
• Potential Permissible Evidence for MOD Airborne Safety-Critical Software Assurance.
Evidence which could inform a diverse assurance argument.
• Underpinning Principles for the use of Evidence. Information on a number of funda-
mental principles to consider when using diverse evidence for a software and/or CEH
assurance argument.
• Importance and Unintended Consequences of Metrics. The metrics for software as-
surance need to be chosen intelligently. An insight is provided into the unintended
consequences of using incorrect metrics in the software supply chain.
1The distinction between the two terms in this context is that confidence provides “trust in a thing”
and “showing [a level of] certainty” (Collins Dictionary, 1995b) with assurance being “a positive declaration
intended to give confidence” (OED, 2018a).
2For example, HITL and HOTL.
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• Communicating Evidence with Stakeholders. How can stakeholders comprehend and
debate a varied set of evidential data and sources? Is there a way to drive better
decision making?
7.1 Potential Permissible Evidence for MOD Airborne
Safety-Critical Software Assurance
The reviews of the software assurance domains in the previous chapter show there are a range
of evidential items which could inform a diverse software argument for airborne PEs. The
strength of such evidence would be subject to stakeholder dialogue, e.g. between the MAA,
DT, and the ITE. The concept of evidence being able to inform an argument to a degree is
one which should be exploited. Figure 7.1 shows the potential evidence strands which can
form a part of a diverse evidence argument; each will have varying levels of weighting3. When
constructing a diverse software assurance argument the features of both the evidential types
(e.g. software life-cycle) and the supporting evidence of the types (e.g. software requirements
planning) will need to be considered4.
Figure 7.1: Potential Diverse Evidential Types
3The sub-sections which follow are stated within Figure 7.1 in an anti-clockwise direction.
4See sub-section 8.2.2.
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7.1.1 Safety Assessment Process
The creation of, or amendment to, safety-critical systems needs to consider the safety func-
tions of a system, or sub-system, and how these functions interact. The safety assessment
process defines the required DALs. This then underpins the software and/or CEH develop-
ment. The safety assessment process includes, but is not limited to, a number of methods
such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), System Safety Assessment (SSA), Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA), and Common Cause Analysis (CCA). An example of a suitable safety as-
sessment process is outlined within Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 47615 (SAE,
1996). Figure 7.2 shows a simplistic flow of the DAL determination, assignment, and imple-
mentation6.
Figure 7.2: Flow of the DAL Determination, Assignment, and Implementation (adapted
from SAE (2010))
5ARP 4761. Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne
Systems and Equipment.
6Figure 7.2 contains the abbreviation in accordance with (iaw).
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 128 of 328
7.1.2 Life-Cycle (Software and/or Complex Electronic Hardware
(CEH))
The life-cycle activities for software and CEH consists of a number of stages. These result in
a solution which is adopted within the final system build. The stages traditionally include:
requirements capture, design, implementation, testing, deployment, and maintenance. Dur-
ing the life-cycle process the product matures and builds upon the decisions and outputs
from the preceding stages. It could be argued, that the requirements are fundamental to any
development as any errors and omissions propagate into the later life-cycle stages. This can
be termed a ‘snowballing’ scenario. Figure 7.3 shows a simplified V-model with the flow of
the stages stemming from the requirements.
Figure 7.3: Simplified Software Life-Cycle V-Model (adapted from Ghanbari (2016))
There is also a need to consider the pedigree and novelty of any life-cycle approaches
which are adopted. A ‘waterfall’ approach is a traditional method with each stage instigated
after the completion of the preceding stage. However, there is a move towards adopting
more modern life-cycle approaches within the domain, e.g. agile methodologies with iter-
ative patterns of development7. It is important to consider the pedigree of use within the
7There are challenges to adopting agile methods within the safety-critical domain due to there being a
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wider domain but also the pedigree of use within the organisation itself. How experienced
the organisation is at implementing the life-cycle approach will have implications on the
confidence of such evidence. Figure 7.4 shows a simplistic view of the differences between
plan-driven (e.g. waterfall) and agile methodologies.
Figure 7.4: Differences Between the Plan-Driven and Agile Development Methodologies
(adapted from Kaisti, Rantala and Mujunen (2013))
7.1.3 Testing
As stated by Myers (2004), “software testing is a process, or a series of processes, designed
to make sure source code does what it was designed to do and that it does not do anything
unintended. Software should be predictable and consistent offering no surprises to users”.
This description is also valid for CEH in the context of DO-254. There are a range of test
traditional focus on documentation and the level of upfront planning which is required, for example (Kasauli
et al., 2018).
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strategies, e.g. structural coverage methods, which allow confidence to be gained in the
implementation. Figure 7.5 shows a number of typical software testing approaches.
Capturing test information should not be limited to the code created/revised during the
development activities. Information should also be captured on the testing from the ongoing
use of the implementation itself, in essence the BITs, e.g. during system initialisation. These
BITs, although requirements driven, provide additional confidence in relation to the system
being able to capture and correct errors. Figure 7.6 shows a number of the typical types of
software BIT approaches.
7.1.4 Data Integrity
The accuracy and consistency of the data used by a system is vital to ensure that the system
performs in a correct and predictable manner. Data integrity issues can have catastrophic
safety implications8. Data integrity errors can manifest themselves via a number of channels
such as data recording or data transfer. The design and development of the airborne software
can exacerbate or mitigate such data integrity issues. Vulnerabilities in the design and/or
development of the software can also allow exploitations via cyber-attacks.
The data itself can take a number of forms, including that used by an application and
the data about a system, e.g. configuration data file. Therefore, there is a need to have
confidence in the types of data used, e.g. application or system, and also in the methods
adopted to retain and transfer such data.
There are methods to minimise the impact of low data integrity via activities such as
initial risk assessments to understand the data of concern and also via the implementation
of checks and controls. Any assessment of the data integrity would take into account the risk
assessment and subsequent actions. Confidence in the underpinning data allows confidence
in the accuracy of the system.
7.1.5 Source Code Architecture
An assessment of the source code architecture requires access to low-level information re-
garding the structure of the code itself. The architectural considerations can provide an
indication of the complexity of the code which can impact the code’s maintainability. Com-
plexity can also potentially introduce errors during the code development. Architectural
considerations include, but are not limited to, the number of data classes and the number
of synchronous calls.
8As described in sub-section 3.1.1 with the Airbus A400M accident in 2015 (Gibbs, 2015, Gallagher,
2015).
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Figure 7.5: Examples of the Types of Software Testing Approaches (adapted from Function-
ize (2018))
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Figure 7.6: Examples of the Types of Software BIT Approaches (adapted from Firesmith
(2015))
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There are a number of attributes which can be used to judge the confidence in the source
code architecture. The confidence can be formed via an analysis of the in-service system, e.g.
performance and reliability. Confidence can also be gained via the development principles for
the source code, these are part of a group of characteristics classed as ‘design for attributes’,
e.g portability and modifiability.
It is possible for such information to be obtained via evidence of compliance to a detailed
coding standard. However, access to such information can be an issue due to restrictions on
the release of such data by the vendor. This may be the case if there are broader limitations
on accessing life-cycle data. Source code architecture information is a significant element of
the Intellectual Property (IP) owned by vendors. However, methods can be used to obfuscate
the low-level information to ensure that only the metrics of interest are captured.
7.1.6 Quality Assurance (QA)
Assessing evidence which is part of a diverse argument requires a number of subjective and
independent judgements. This independence plays an important part in allowing confidence
to be gained in any system assessment. The concept of independence is also relevant to the
development process itself to ensure that there are sufficient measures in place to provide
ongoing confidence in the activities conducted. Confidence from the QA process comes from
knowing that a QA process exists, that the QA process is conducted, and that the QA has
been applied to the project.
The QA process covers a substantial number of the development stages for software which
is an ‘in-house’ product. There is also a need to consider the QA processes which are adopted
by third-parties; either for COTS or via subcontracting any element of the life-cycle stages.
The prime vendor needs to ensure that there is sufficient supplier management and oversight
in place as this forms part of an integrated and effective QA process.
7.1.7 Staff Competencies
It is recognised within the literature9 that the competencies of those involved in the de-
velopment life-cycle stages, including the QA, is crucial to achieving a satisfactory system.
The competencies are not only linked to education but also the level of experience, espe-
cially if gained on equivalent projects. Considerations should also include any member-
ship of professional organisations, such as chartership status, and the associated code of
ethics/professionalism of members.
9For example, Acuna, Juristo and Moreno (2006), UK MOD (2012), SEBoK (2018a), IEEE (2018), and
UK MOD (2018).
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Confidence in the vendor’s staff competencies can be gained via a number of metrics.
There are the initial qualifications and level of experience expected when staff are recruited by
the organisation. The ongoing training and development activities are other considerations.
These include the prolonged mentoring and ‘buddy’ systems that may be in place. For
the safety-critical software domain relevant staff should have the requisite skills to perform
the life-cycle tasks. In addition, relevant staff should have the right skills to judge the
competencies of other staff members where required, e.g. for QA.
7.1.8 Configuration Management (CM)
CM is an important overarching premise. It is not only relevant to providing confidence in
the life-cycle stages10 but also in allowing confidence to be gained in the evidence related
to in-service use11. The CM process is one that has significance within DO-178C and other
software life-cycle guidelines.
The CM process covers a range of activities within the software development life-cycle.
The process allows the identification and management of artefacts, including documenta-
tion and source code, as well as ensuring that any changes are managed in a consistent
manner. CM also assists with post-development activities with expectations for the archiv-
ing, retrieval, and release of software/documentation. This is in addition to the processes
adopted for the reporting of any errors discovered during the in-service phase of the software,
traditionally via problem reports.
7.1.9 Organisational Competencies
Staff competency assessments are focused on the skills and abilities of those directly involved
in the software/CEH development. Organisational competency processes are focussed on
having suitable methods embedded in the organisation which allow staff to perform their
roles effectively. There is also a need to ensure that any associated activities, e.g. QA, are
performed using rigorous and recognised approaches. Gaining insight into the organisational
processes allows a more holistic view of the capabilities as a range of areas can be assessed,
e.g. procedures to meet customer requirements and overall process improvement methods.
This can increase the confidence in the software being developed.
Organisations should adopt suitable quality management processes, e.g. ISO 9001:2015,
for any activities that may impact on the software/CEH development.
10To ensure suitable software versioning etc. The software version is also a fundamental enabler to demon-
strate that evidence is valid for the version of the software in the safety argument.
11To ensure that any credit for in-service use is attributed to the correct software build.
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An additional factor when assessing evidence for organisational competency is the pedi-
gree and capabilities of the organisation in producing safety-critical software/CEH. A view
on the pedigree and historic capabilities can give additional weight when assessing staff
competencies and their experience.
7.1.10 Existing Certification/Qualification Evidence
Pre-existing qualification evidence from recognised bodies such as EASA or the FAA can
prove useful. The issuing of a TSO for a particular part signifies that the design and produc-
tion has been approved by the FAA. Part of the TSO process is to gain a level of confidence
in any development activities that have been conducted by the equipment vendor.
The MOD has recognised a number of bodies for mutual recognition (see sub-section
6.1.1.3), such as the US Army Airworthiness Authority12. If there is an agreed mutual
recognition then information should be gathered on the TSO, or similar form of approval, to
understand its relevance and suitability to support the item under consideration. A TSO, or
similar form of approval, which confirms full life-cycle conformance may require additional
evidence; however, it may also reduce the level of effort for any direct life-cycle assessment
process.
7.1.11 Product Service History (PSH)
It could be argued that the strongest form of evidence provides confirmation or confidence
in any prior established beliefs, e.g. as stated by McDermid (1998). Current assessments
of life-cycle evidence are a means to establish a prior-belief, e.g. that the software provides
suitable confidence for compliance to a DAL. PSH can act as a method to further support this
premise. By gaining confidence via PSH, e.g. the review of the error reporting processes,
confidence can be established in any prior belief placed in the life-cycle. There must be
continual monitoring of any system to maintain the belief in any prior confidence (McDermid,
1998). This can be achieved by PSH arguments and/or establishment of a method to conduct
error reporting analysis. Figure 7.7 illustrates the relationship between the development and
in-service phases of a system.
The methods to judge the suitability of PSH is subjective; there is a recognised and
adopted guideline: CAST 1 (CAST, 1998). However, the guideline is open to interpretation
with potential variances in the acceptable evidential thresholds. It acts as a means to
establish a common language to assess confidence and to compare PSH assessments. EASA
(2012) attempts to apply a quantitative figure to the level of hours required to support the
12See the following for further information: http://maa.tools.mod.uk/linkedfiles/20140512-maa mutual
recognition amrdec.pdf.
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Figure 7.7: Relationship Between Development and In-Service Phases
DALs of a component. The EASA guidance also illustrates that there is an acceptance to
mix the PSH from a number of domains to support an in-service argument of a specific LRU,
for example. However, the reasoning for the quantitative values is not clear and is open to
debate with SMEs. Table 7.1 provides an EASA opinion on the sufficient PSE required for
DALs A-C.
The applications of use stated within Table 7.1 have the following definitions:
• Aircraft. Aircraft operation in flight or on ground and board/LRU/system/aircraft
tests.
• Safety. Space, airborne military, nuclear, medical, railway, automotive.
• Other. Bank, computer, telecom, etc.
The benefit of any PSH is also dependent on the context of how the software/CEH is
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Design Assurance
Level (DAL)
Product Service Experience (PSE)
DAL A
Sufficient PSE if:
• At least 2 years of use with [hours of aircraft applications `
safety applications] ą 106.
• At least 2 years of use with [hours of aircraft applications




• At least 2 years of use with [hours of aircraft applications `
safety applications] ą 105.
• At least 2 years of use with [hours of aircraft applications




• [hours of aircraft applications ` safety applications ` other
applications] ą 105.
Table 7.1: DAL and Associated PSE Requirements (based upon EASA (2012))
used. Adhering to the design envelope of the system allows data to be collated from an
anticipated set of environment variables. A security context is different due to the evolving
level of sophistication and the types of threats to a system/software. Therefore, PSH would
have more validity in the context of providing safety assurance rather than security. The
frequency of the software/CEH function usage is also important and this is considered within
sub-section 7.2.
7.1.12 Reliability Modelling
The aim of reliability modelling is to predict future performance and it can be determined via
two broad types of modelling. The first is based upon data collected during the development
effort, i.e. before delivery of the software/CEH to the customer. The second method uses
data based upon faults captured once the software/CEH has been provided to the customer.
The collection methods to do this could be via end-users reporting the errors or via routine
reviews of software fault logs. In both instances (post- and pre-delivery of the software) the
aim is to ascertain a prediction of the future behaviour of the software/CEH. The models
can be implemented via a range of methods such as Binomial-Type13, Poisson-Type14, etc.
A number of metrics should be captured before a suitable reliability prediction can be
13Binomial-Type models assume that there is a fixed number of faults remaining in the program at any
given time (Musa, 1987).
14Poisson-Type models do not assume that there is a fixed number of faults remaining in the program at
any given time (Musa, 1987).
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made. Product metrics, e.g. SLOC, would be an input within any model based upon the
software prior to a customer delivery. However, such metrics would still be establishing a
prior-belief in the development effort and may be problematic to obtain from the vendor,
e.g. due to data access limitations. Post-delivery the metrics and models would be more
likely to be captured and would be based upon data which is established by PSH.
It should be noted that the issue of metric collection is contentious as it can influence
system behaviour detrimentally. This can impact other areas within the software domain
such as software sustainment. See sub-section 7.3 for further information on the merits and
dangers of using metrics.
7.1.13 Security Considerations (in Relation to Airworthiness)
The topic of cyber security in relation to airworthiness became a key consideration for
the MOD with the up-issue of the DS 00-970 Part 13 to Issue 11 (UK MOD, 2014a). This
introduced the consideration of cyber assurance to airworthiness. Prior to the DS 00-970 up-
issue the concept of cyber-assurance was conducted via other forms of analysis. In essence,
the up-issue stated that for airworthiness related cyber security the guideline DO-326A15
(RTCA, 2014a) should be adopted as an AMC.
The DO-326A approach aims to embed the consideration and resolution of any security-
related issues through the development of the software/CEH product. The processes adopt
an approach similar to that of ARP 4754A (SAE, 2010) with efforts to identify risks16 to
the verification of the adopted approaches17. The security related elements to airworthiness,
and the subsequent assurance, are highly related to that of safety and therefore this lends
itself to adopting a similar safety and security assessment process. Figure 7.8 shows the link
between the safety and security processes.
Other forms of AMC may be required in-lieu of direct DO-326A evidence due to the differ-
ent methods which vendors adopt to address airworthiness related cyber security. Suitable
levels of confidence can be achieved, for example, by the review of the software architec-
ture for relevant assurance features or direct static analysis of the source code (Hadley and
Standish, 2017). Additional activities could cross-reference the DO-326A objectives to a rep-
resentative Risk Management Framework (RMF) such as the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) standards; e.g. 800-53 (NIST, 2013) and 800-37 (NIST, 2018). The
results of such an approach can be found within Lennon, Standish and Hadley (2018).
15DO-326A. Airworthiness Security Process Specification.
16Via various methods such as preliminary system security risk assessments.
17Within a system security verification context.
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Figure 7.8: Airworthiness Security Process as Part of the Aircraft Certification Process
(adapted from Paul et al. (2016))
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7.2 Underpinning Principles for the use of Evidence
The following sub-sections provide information on a number of fundamental principles which
need to be considered when any diverse evidence is to be used for a software and/or CEH
assurance argument. Figure 7.9 shows the potential underpinning principles to be adhered
to.
Figure 7.9: Underpinning Principles for the use of Evidence
7.2.1 Establishing an Evidence Starting Point and Stopping Point
Evidence starting and stopping points can establish the validity of any evidence, e.g. the evi-
dence which is supported via in-service hours. Any significant software or CEH modifications
to an existing development may result in the in-service starting point being reset. This reset
may occur if key aspects of the software or CEH18 have undergone a change which results
in not being able to justify the continuation of the in-service data calculations. Figure 7.10
shows (a) the continued credit for in-service hours due to insignificant software changes and
(b) the impact of significant software changes with the reduced credit for in-service hours.
There are a number of considerations for the evidential starting and stopping points.
It is not always realistic to expect evidence to be fully compliant to make a full assurance
judgement. The challenge is to understand a sufficient level of evidence and how any potential
primary evidence can be reinforced with other strands. This will support the decision on
18The key aspects may be measured via the amount of change to SLOC or the significance of the software
functionality.
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Figure 7.10: Impact of Significant Software Changes on PSH In-Service Hours
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whether to collect further evidence of the same type or to select alternative evidence to reach
the assurance confidence threshold.
7.2.2 Continual Monitoring to Maintain Prior Belief
Any evidence gathered and assessed prior to the in-service use of the system is, in essence,
establishing a prior belief. This prior belief is based upon process evidence, testing, and
reliability modelling which is focussed on the development activities. However, it is impor-
tant to gather evidence via continual monitoring to maintain and support any prior belief
arguments that have been established. In addition, Hadley and White (2008) claim that sta-
tistical testing allows development test data to be quantified to support a robust argument
for the reliability of the software and hence of the software safety.
The use of PSH, or operational data, is a further method to ‘validate’ the prior-belief,
see Figure 7.7. This validation should be a planned and continuous activity. This premise
is supported by McDermid (1998) and Hadley and White (2008)19. Any monitoring should
be fed back into any reliability modelling which is being conducted for the through-life
assessment of the software.
7.2.3 Relationship Between Evidence and Type/DAL
A number of the evidence types, e.g. PSH, and underpinning principles, e.g. continual
monitoring, are applicable to both software and CEH. This is due to both being developed
via a life-cycle to establish a prior belief with the in-service period being able to validate
the belief. Evidence specific to the software and CEH will need to be established, e.g. the
safety assessment process information. The evidence may have elements which have direct
read-across between the software/CEH, e.g. in-service hours. Alternatively, inferences may
be made from the software/CEH evidence, e.g. system integration testing, (although having
a focus on software confidence could allow CEH failures to be observed).
The evidential types and the underpinning principles are valid for software/CEH for any
DAL or safety impact level. The same types of evidence can be used to gain confidence in
a safety-critical context, i.e. DAL A, and that which has a very limited safety impact, e.g.
DAL D. An example is a SDP with the threshold rigour for the evidence needing to be in
keeping with the safety impact level.
19It is essential that the evidence collected can be shown to be derived from the in-service product rather
than a pre-production model.
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7.2.4 Understanding the Context and Environment of Use
For a ‘brownfield’ development and those subject to periodic refreshes the software may
not have been developed to known processes or have known safety-related properties. This
type of software is known as Software of Unknown Pedigree (SOUP). If the software has
been developed to a known development processes it may meet the new requirements in the
extant guidelines. DO-178C refers to this as Previously Developed Software (PDS) and the
expectation is that the DO-178C guideline would be used to close any gaps between the PDS
and the new assurance requirements. Other evidence may be sufficient to close the shortfall.
Systems, especially at a platform level, are complicated with various supporting sub-
systems. Each have their own development and in-service history. The sub-systems should
be considered independently to understand their own evidential provenance. They must also
be considered as an integrated whole to assess the interfaces and the environments in which
the system will operate.
It is important to understand how the sub-systems operate and the context in which
they are used. As an example, some systems such as a flight management system will
operate on a continual basis as the functionality is required throughout the stages of flight.
Whereas, other systems may only operate on–demand and only during certain flight stages,
e.g. landing. This concept is illustrated simplistically within Figure 7.11 which shows the
phases of flight for (a) Weight-on-Wheels (WOW) functionality and (b) continuous engine
power-on functionality. The theory is that the software in continuous use can claim a greater
level of confidence due to it being exercised more frequently. The on-demand and continuous
use considerations will impact the confidence claimed for the evidence, e.g. the level of PSH.
7.2.5 Evidence Categorisation and Use
There has been a range of literature which has attempted to establish a broad categorisation
of evidence. McDermid (1998) proposed that evidence could be generally described as one
of three forms of evidence:
• Direct. Evidence which is quantified evidence from testing, operational experience or
analysis indicating that the software meets its safety targets.
• Backing. Indirect evidence that shows that the direct evidence is sound (e.g. that
historical data has been kept properly, and that it reflects the future operational envi-
ronment of the software).
• Reinforcement. Indirect evidence which enables arguments to be made to claim failure
rates beyond those which can be evaluated through direct means.
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Figure 7.11: Relevance of Functionality During Different Phases of Flight
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Caseley, Tudor and O’Halloran (2003) proposed that evidence could be one of four forms:
• Process. In essence, process evidence is described as an indirect qualitative measure,
e.g. software developed by a specific technique.
• Historic. Historic evidence is that which is based upon failure date, maintenance
records, or such techniques as reliability modelling.
• Test. Test evidence is based upon a quantitative measure of the product, e.g. qualifi-
cation testing.
• Proof. Proof which is a direct mathematical qualitative measure of the product.
Hadley and White (2008) proposed a modification to the established ‘three pillars’ of
evidence to embed the concept of PSH into the software assurance arguments for an airborne
platform. The ‘three pillars’ were at the time traditionally classed as: (a) process evidence,





Any software safety assurance review, including the use of the underpinning principles,
must establish clear distinctions in the evidential types and must judge the weightings of
such evidence. How the evidence supports or refutes other forms of evidence should also be
considered.
7.2.6 Evidence Roles and Effective Combination
The varying forms of evidence that can be included as part of a diverse assurance argument
have differing relationships. These impact the claims that can be supported or refuted. Each
evidential strand has fundamental elements; e.g. the requirements elicitation/generation
stage is an imperative stage of the development life-cycle. It informs the design and the
measurable criteria for the testing. For in-service data, the CM plays a significant role as it
establishes software baselines which enable in-service flight hours to be validated. Evidential
strands cannot, generally, be considered in isolation. At least two forms of evidence should
be provided in support of any claim (McDermid, 1998). Evidence should be provided that
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the techniques used are diverse, e.g. one is static and the other dynamic, and thus are likely
to identify different limitations in the software and CEH.
As claimed by McDermid (1998) and reinforced within this thesis, there is an argument
that for an assurance argument to be made the process evidence should only be utilised where
the direct product evidence cannot be provided. In practice this means that a combination
of process and product evidence will be required in most cases due to the limitations of
gaining direct product evidence.
7.2.7 Change from Emphasising the Process to the Product
[Sub-section text redacted]
Further support is contained within Hadley and White (2008) which states that to under-
stand the value provided by process evidence the authors “know of only a negative measure:
the highly qualitative sound-bite that [evidence for] good processes cannot guarantee a good
product but [evidence of] bad processes will almost certainly guarantee a bad one”. This led
to Hadley and White (2008) stating that “good processes are necessary but not sufficient”.
Robust processes play an important role as they assist with supporting the premise that a
“stronger argument is that a hazard has been mitigated by being designed out rather than
it has been mitigated by being tested out” (Hadley and White, 2008).
The concept of utilising additional evidence strands is also outlined within a report for an
airborne platform DT co-written by the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor20 (Standish
and Hadley, 2014). The report cited three review components:
• Software processes.
• Product service history.
• Software reliability claims as sources for additional evidence.
7.2.8 Strategy to Reach Evidence Threshold
The assignment of a DAL to a system will result in an evidence threshold being established
to gain a suitable level of confidence. It is not always appropriate to meet the evidence
threshold as it may be sufficient to be aware of the evidential gap and to understand any
risks. If the risk is understood it can be tolerated or mitigated. There may be no further
action if a balanced assessment of the impact determines that the risk can be tolerated. The
challenge is to be aware of the evidential gap and to make an informed decision.
20Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems.
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Technical and procurement avenues will need to be explored to reach the evidence thresh-
old. The evidence would not be solely based upon the cost impact. Where the risk associated
with the evidential gap it too great or cannot be mitigated then there may be a need to buy
knowledge. This provides further evidence to reach an appropriate evidential threshold.
[Sub-section text redacted]
An alternative approach is to ensure that the assurance requirements and the techni-
cal design/solution achieves a balance. This maximises the compliant assurance evidence
available to be judged whilst implementing a feasible technical solution of value for the ca-
pability. Such an approach was proposed by the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor21
with a stepped process for MC processor qualification22.
The concept of assurance/capability balance is simplistically illustrated within Figure
7.12 which shows:
• (a) The assurance requirements limiting the technical solution (and a potential reduc-
tion in capability).
• (b) The technical solution limiting the assurance confidence via design considerations
which are not commensurate with the defined qualification approach.
• (c) An imbalance between the assurance requirements and the technical design/solution
so that an unsatisfactory capability is delivered.
• (d) A balance between the assurance requirements and the technical design/solution
so that an achievable capability can be delivered.
7.2.9 Utilise Opportunities to Gather Evidence Metrics
Throughout the development phases of software or CEH there are opportunities to gather
suitable metrics. These can act to provide confidence in a particular system, or equally
important, to provide counter-evidence. Traditionally, the implemented development stages
are compared to relevant standards to judge compliance and therefore to ascertain the level
of confidence in the development. However, throughout the development stages there are
additional metrics which can bolster the assurance confidence, e.g. results from independent
reviews. As an example, Hadley and White (2008) propose that the number of technical
comments generated from a Technical Interface Meeting (TIM) can be assessed to measure
how many of the comments lead to actual changes. This would ensure that the significance
21Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems.
22As illustrated within the research output titled Multi-Core (MC) Processor Qualification for Safety
Critical Systems.
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Figure 7.12: Trade-off Between Assurance Requirements and Technical Capability
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and validity of the comments are measured rather than the number of comments made. Such
a measure could also be applied at the formal verification stages.
Gaining evidence/confidence throughout the stages of the platforms development and
in-service period is predicated on suitable metrics being identified, justified, and recorded.
See sub-section 7.3 for further information on the merits (and dangers) of the use of metrics.
7.3 Importance and Unintended Consequences of Met-
rics
Metrics can provide valuable information to decision makers and those that wish to draw
conclusions from the data. However, metrics that are not chosen well can have negative
consequences if incorrect decisions are made on the results. They can also lead to incorrect
interpretations which then inform a safety assurance argument.
The research output The Measurement of Software Maintenance and Sustainment: Pos-
itive Influences and Unintended Consequences23 illustrate the unintended consequences of
incorrect metrics in the context of the software supply chain. The particular focus of the out-
put is on Performance Based Logistics (PBL) which is commonly implemented for large and
complex software systems, e.g. F-35 Lightning II (Huff and Novak, 2007). The information
within this section is based upon the journal output.
7.3.1 Potential Unintended Consequences
Smith (1995) is concerned with the unintended consequences of publishing performance
data for UK public sector organisations and the lessons are relevant to a PBL. Smith (1995)
states that the paper’s findings can assist with understanding how performance data can
play a significant part in guiding the activities of an organisation. Smith (1995) highlights a
number of negative unintended consequences of using performance data to influence system
behaviour:
• Tunnel vision. When management focuses on quantified aspects of performance rather
than overall quality.
• Sub-optimisation. Where narrow, local objectives are prioritised over the wider objec-
tives of the organisation as a whole.
• Myopia. Which involves the pursuit of short-term targets at the expense of legitimate
long-term objectives or outcomes.
23Written by the RE and a Dstl colleague: Rob Ashmore - Dstl, Senior Fellow.
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• Measure fixation. Where managers focus on the metric, rather than the objective for
which the metric was developed.
• Misrepresentation. Where the reported metrics do not match the behaviour on the
ground.
• Misinterpretation. Where those to whom the metrics are reported make incorrect or
inappropriate decisions.
• Gaming. Where behaviour is deliberately altered to exploit loopholes in the measure-
ment system.
• Ossification. Where an overly rigid measurement system prevents innovation.
7.3.2 Concept of Technical Debt
Within the research output the concept of technical debt24 is used to illustrate how the mea-
surement of performance data can lead to unintended consequences such as those highlighted
by Smith (1995). There are perceived benefits to incurring technical debt, for example it
allows a new software release to be produced sooner than otherwise would be the case.
However, this usually comes at a longer-term cost, as indicated by the debt metaphor. In
particular, as this level of debt grows, it becomes more difficult to make changes, slowing
down future releases. Ultimately, an unchecked growth in technical debt is likely to shorten
the lifespan of the software, hastening the need for its replacement.
7.3.3 Mitigations to the Risk of Unintended Consequences
There are several strategies that can be used to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences.
However, the most comprehensive mitigation strategy involves gaining a system-level under-
standing of the process that is being measured and using that understanding to identify
likely responses to different measurement choices. The system-level understanding should
also be used to monitor the measurement-induced effects so that, if necessary, corrective
action can be taken.
The key conclusion is that any proposed set of software maintenance and sustainment
metrics should be accompanied by the following:
• A system-level description of the process that is being measured.
24Technical debt refers to code that is known to be “not quite right” but a decision has been made to
postpone making it right.
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• A description of how the metrics are intended to influence the system toward the desired
behaviour, including how they might interact to generate unintended consequences.
• An explanation of how the risk of unintended consequences will be mitigated. This
should include a description of how the effects introduced by the metrics will be mon-
itored and how the selection of metrics will be altered if necessary.
Although the research output has a focus on software maintenance the principle of being
cautious with the use of metrics still holds. Any measure of assurance must take into account
the unintended consequences which could arise. Metrics adopted to make judgements must
be used with an understanding of their limitations25.
7.4 Communicating Evidence with Stakeholders
7.4.1 Principles to Allow Understanding
Whether small or large levels of data are being assessed, there is a need to make sense of it
so that it can be interpreted. As Nussbaumer-Knaflic (2015) states: being able to visualise
data and tell stories with it is key to turning it into information that can be used to drive
better decision making.
The science and philosophy of appropriate visualisations is not within the scope of this
thesis; however, a number of rules have been applied to create a visualisation. Kirk (2016)
provides guidance for getting a balance between various attributes which a visualisation could
possess. Understanding the attributes and the aim of a visualisation allows the message to
stakeholders to be articulated clearly and with purpose.
Kirk (2016) also provides a definition for data visualisation: the representation and
presentation of data to facilitate understanding. This concept is further defined with three
stages of understanding:
• Perceiving. What does it show?
• Interpreting. What does it mean?
• Comprehension. What does it mean to me?
25There may also be unintended consequences of adopting diverse evidence for qualification purposes on
the actual software development processes themselves. An example is with gaming due to a perception that
diverse evidence will mitigate any deficiencies anyway. However, such a study is considered out of scope of
the current research.
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These principles are key and they are enforced via good visualisation design principles,
such that a design should be: trustworthy, accessible, and elegant. With the Kirk (2016) prin-
ciples (and the underpinning attributes) and further guidance obtained from Nussbaumer-
Knaflic (2015) a concept visualisation was created (see next sub-section). The visualisation
was generated by the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor26 to assist with engaging
stakeholders effectively. The visualisation is proportionate in portraying the right level of
information and sufficient to allow stakeholders to be informed to make decisions.
The adoption of diverse evidence provides decision makers with an increased solution
space to inform the assurance confidence. This increased space could lead to issues for
the: (a) perception, interpretation and comprehension of the evidence, (b) the source of the
evidence, and (c) how it relates to specific LRUs. Figure 7.13 illustrates (a) the process-
based review of evidence and then (b) with it being a subset within the increased solution
space containing the wider sets of diverse evidence. However, the increased solution space
can lead to challenges with understanding and comprehending suitable evidence.
Figure 7.13: Adopting Diverse Evidence Expands the Solution Space
26Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems.
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7.4.2 Wheel of Qualification: A Model to Assist Understanding
7.4.2.1 Wheel of Qualification: Overview
A visualisation was created which was termed the ‘Wheel of Qualification’ by the RE and
EngD Industrial Supervisor27. The visualisation aimed to allow informed dialogue with a
number of stakeholders (e.g. MAA, DT etc) who require an insight into the software/CEH
evidence for the individual LRUs of a platform. The ‘Wheel’ consists of a number of tiers
(or layers):
• Tier 1 (the outer layer). Evidence associated with an active ITE which provides
judgements on additional activities which may be undertaken by mutually recognised
bodies (e.g. FAA) or via a Coordinating Design Authority (CDO) (e.g. V&V testing)28.
• Tier 2 (the middle layer). Evidence associated with a DO which undertakes integration
activities or develops software for LRUs29.
• Tier 3 (inner layer). Traditional core elements which would be assessed as part of a
DS 00-970 review process with additional product evidence (PSH) included30.
The ‘Wheel’ consists of sections, e.g. Domain Awareness. Each section contains a number
of segments which represent the associated LRUs for that section, or evidence31. As an
example, each section within Figure 7.14 has 7 segments to represent each of the LRUs (or
sub-systems) of interest for the platform. Those LRUs (or sub-systems) which are relevant
for the evidential item are coloured appropriately, e.g. evidence which is relevant for LRU1
is coloured dark blue . LRUs which are not suitable/valid for the evidence have a segment
coloured light grey .
For example, the ‘Wheel’ within Figure 7.14 shows the availability of the evidence for
LRU3 32 within tier 333.
• PSH: In-service data is available for LRU3 as the PSH section has a pink segment
within it34.
• Software Life-Cycle (Process): Software life-cycle data is available for LRU3 as the
section has a pink segment within it35.
27Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems.
28Tier one is shown as (a) within Figure 7.14. The figure contains the abbreviation: Sub-System (SS).
29Tier two is shown as (b) within Figure 7.14.
30Tier three is shown as (c) within Figure 7.14.
31Segments are shown as (d) and a section shown as (e) within Figure 7.14.
32Coloured pink and shown as (f) within Figure 7.14.
33Traditional core elements - coloured green and shown as (c) within Figure 7.14.
34Shown as (g) within Figure 7.14.
35Shown as (h) within Figure 7.14.
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• CEH Life-Cycle (Process): CEH life-cycle data is not available for LRU3 as the section
has a light grey segment within it to replace that of LRU 3 36.
Figure 7.14: Elements of the ‘Wheel of Qualification’
This representation is repeated throughout the ‘Wheel’ with each section detailing the
LRUs (or sub-system) as segments which the evidence relates to. As a further example,
“Subcontractor Management” (within tier 2 - coloured purple ) is valid for the LRUs (or
sub-systems): LRU1, LRU2, LRU4, and LRU6. “Subcontractor Management” is not valid
evidence for LRU3 (sub-system 1), LRU3 (sub-system 2) or LRU5 as the associated seg-
ments are shown as not valid/available (coloured light grey )37.
The legend to the ‘Wheel of Qualification’ is shown in Figure 7.15 with a full example of
the ‘Wheel’ visualisation within Figure 7.17.
36Shown as (i) within Figure 7.14.
37The example is shown as (j) within Figure 7.14.
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Figure 7.15: Example of a ‘Wheel of Qualification’ - Legend
7.4.2.2 Wheel of Qualification: Benefits of the Visualisation
The adoption of a visualisation model to communicate information has proved to be excep-
tionally useful as part of the REs activities with the sponsoring organisation.
For a diverse and layered software/CEH argument there is a tendency to have a number
of evidential items which have varying degrees of relevance to the system. As an example, a
system integrator using third-parties to develop software would mean that the system inte-
grator’s own development and software testing regime would not be of relevance. Software
developed in-house by the system integrator for specific systems would result in the devel-
opment and software testing regime being of relevance and part of a safety argument. The
‘Wheel’ allows a clear picture to be gained of the important relationships between the sys-
tems and the relevant evidence. This can show which systems are currently weak in evidence
and the particularly important evidence can be made obvious.
The visualisation helps to hide the complexity of the assurance activities to assist en-
gaging with multiple stakeholders who have an interest in the qualification approach. This
allows the Kirk (2016) stages of understanding to be adopted with stakeholders able to gain
a comprehension by determining what the system and evidence relationships mean to them.
The key systems (LRUs) of interest can be viewed by Project Managers (PMs), e.g. for
contracting purposes. Also, key evidence and the sources of the evidence can be ascertained.
This is useful for PMs and also for roles which hold the assurance risk as they can view the
totality of the evidence.
Simplifying the complicated solution space provides the ability to holistically view: the
evidence, the evidence sources, the systems, and the relationships. Stakeholders can make in-
formed decisions on the evidence to be gathered/generated and to interpret the consequences
of any shortfalls. The visualisation has allowed stakeholders to request further evidence in
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support of a particular LRU which has provided additional safety assurance confidence. Fig-
ure 7.16 shows the benefits of the ‘Wheel of Qualification’ moving from (a) a complicated
view of the solution space to (b) an elegant representation of the data.
Figure 7.16: The ‘Wheel’ Simplifies the Visualisation of a Complicated Solution Space
An example of the use of the ‘Wheel’ has been when a lack of process-based evidence
(which supports Tier 3) for a particular LRU required stakeholder engagement to understand
the wider assurance evidence needing to be gathered. For the particular project within this
example the LRU lacked direct evidence to support making a full process evidence based
claim. The ‘Wheel’ was presented (including the project specific LRUs of interest) within a
dedicated software assurance workshop with attendees such as equipment purchasers, SMEs,
and ITEs. The ‘Wheel’ allowed the necessity of the wider evidence to be exposed by high-
lighting the absence of process-based evidence and illustrating what evidence could inform
which LRUs. It showed the direct links that could be established between the LRU and the
Tier 1 and Tier 2 evidence, e.g. platform integration testing and the subsequent oversight
activities. The ‘Wheel’ supported the creation of a dialogue based upon a common under-
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standing of the relationship between the LRU and the wider evidence. Due to the workshop
discussions, supported by the ‘Wheel’, further supporting evidence was contracted for within
the project. The priority and requirements for the evidence, in part, were justified by the
‘Wheel’ visualisation and subsequent informed dialogue.
Within another software assurance project the ‘Wheel’ has been of benefit to highlight
to stakeholders the assurance evidence required to support a future LRU procurement. The
‘Wheel’ visualisation and the discussion allowed firm evidential statements to be placed
within the project contractual requirements. These were to ensure that the supporting
evidence was funded and made available for review by the safety assessors (e.g. formal
platform integration test results). The ‘Wheel’ allowed workshop attendees to have informed
dialogue to understand why and what evidence would support a future assurance judgement
to align separate software assurance stances.
7.5 Summary of the Potential Permissible Evidence,
Underpinning Principles, and Stakeholder Engage-
ment
The reviews of a number of safety-critical domains such as the civil nuclear sector allowed
a range of potential evidence items to be identified. These forms of evidence could inform
a diverse software argument for airborne software. However, the weighting of such evidence
would be subject to SME judgement. The evidence identified has prevalence within other
domains and therefore the inclusion is based upon supported conclusions. The identified
evidence includes:
• Safety assessment process.
• Life-cycle (software and/or CEH).
• Testing.
• Data integrity.
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Figure 7.17: Example of a ‘Wheel of Qualification’
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• Organisation.
• Existing certification/qualification.
• Product Service History (PSH).
• Reliability modelling.
• Security considerations (in relation to airworthiness).
A number of underpinning principles for the use of evidence have also been identified.
The principles were stated as the adoption of diverse evidence cannot be undertaken without
a clear understanding of the context of the evidence. There are a number of factors which
may invalidate or limit the value of the evidence being presented if fundamental principles
are not adhered to. There are also opportunities to strengthen the use of diverse evidence
by undertaking additional activities to gain further confidence. The principles include:
• Establishing an evidence starting point and stopping point.
• Continual monitoring to maintain prior belief.
• Relationship between evidence and type/DAL.
• Understanding the context and environment of use.
• Evidence categorisation and use.
• Evidence roles and effective combination.
• Change from emphasising the process to the product.
• Strategy to reach evidence threshold.
• Utilise opportunities to gather evidence metrics.
One of the principles for gaining further confidence for the software safety assurance
is to exploit opportunities to gather additional metrics during the phases of development
and in-service38. However, although metrics can provide valuable information they can have
negative consequences if the metrics are not chosen and used well39. The concept of technical
debt was used to illustrate these issues. Any measure of assurance must take into account
the unintended consequences which could arise. Metrics adopted to make judgements must
be used with an understanding of their limitations.
38For example, the implemented changes from TIM reviews.
39For example, incorrect interpretations which then informs a safety assurance argument.
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There is a need for data, either large data sets or small, to be made sense of to allow it to
be interpreted. The visualisation of data and the ability to tell stories with it allows the data
to be turned into information to drive enhanced decision making. Based upon this principle
a concept termed the ‘Wheel of Qualification’ was created to allow the relationship between
various forms of evidence to be associated with individual LRUs. The visualisation hides the
complexity of the assurance activities to assist engagement with multiple key stakeholders.
The use of the ‘Wheel’ has been adopted for a number of projects and presented at multiple
workshops and meetings to engage with stakeholders of various roles, e.g. software developers
to safety managers.
Chapter 7 has informed two research sub-questions:
• Sub-sections 7.1 and 7.2 have partly responded to the sub-question: What software
safety assurance evidence is relevant/admissible and what are the underpinning prin-
ciples for the use of such evidence?.
• Sub-sections 7.3 and 7.4 have partly responded to the sub-question: What are the
unintended consequences of adopting incorrect metrics when forming decisions and
how can system/evidence relationships be communicated to stakeholders?.
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The need for further research in the area of software assurance evidence diversity for military
airborne platforms has been established in previous chapters1. Also, from previous chapters
comes the observation that any framework which is implemented should be fit for purpose.
The purpose of the framework in this context is to allow the value of diverse evidence to be
demonstrated and for outputs from the framework to assist SQEP decision makers.
To implement a framework underpinning elements need to be established. The character-
istics of evidence need to be determined with an understanding of how these characteristics
interact to combine. This is a key element to the DSF as understanding the properties of
the evidence and the subsequent combination is a task which is acknowledged to be difficult
(Weaver et al., 2005). Once the evidence characteristics are established a reasoning approach
can be selected to assist with forming judgements based upon the evidence features. There
have been a range of methodologies which have been implemented within previous studies
in this area, e.g. BBN, DST, ER2. The result of this chapter will be a framework which
is to be implemented on a range of cases studies, see Chapter 9 (Case Studies, Exploratory
Testing, and Evaluation of the DSF).
This chapter will examine:
• Framework Design Tenets. The key tenets of the design to produce a framework which
enables informed decisions to be made.
• Framework Implementation Decisions. Implementation details of the framework and
the justifications for the design decisions. The section will include:
1From Chapter 2 (Research Strategy) through to Chapter 6 (Current Permissible Evidence for Safety-
Critical Software Assurance).
2See sub-section 4.2.3.7.
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– Evidence to form the initial framework.
– Attributes to capture judgements on the characteristics of the evidence.
– States of the evidence, e.g. obligatory data within a standard.
– Reasoning under uncertainty approaches.
– Structure of the reasoning approach.
– Visualisation(s) to be adopted.
– Wider characteristics of the evidence to assist decision makers, e.g. change over-
heads3.
– Optimisation approaches to inform decision making for efficient and effective ev-
idence selection.
– Initial data interrogation options to assist decision makers.
• Summary: Framework Design and Implementation Decisions. A summary of the im-
plementation details and the justification for the approach.
8.1 Framework Design Tenets
The design of the framework is one which will include a number of key tenets to enable
informed decisions to be made by stakeholders. The framework will: capture what evidence
is of relevance; determine how judgements can be made; and allow decisions to be made
using optimisation and data interrogation methods.
The approach will capture the following information and provide suitable mechanisms
for the data analysis:
• Evidence under review. Determining what evidence is of relevance to a diverse software
assurance argument. An initial set of evidence will be captured in the framework and,
importantly, the framework will provide the mechanism for additional evidence to be
defined and captured by stakeholders.
• Evidence attributes. Suitable metrics will allow judgements to be formed on the evi-
dence. The choice of attributes will influence how the metrics are combined to inform
the confidence in the evidence.
3When considering a change to an evidential item there are a number of practical considerations such as
time to change, cost of change, and quality as a result of the change. There are more than just the theoretical
benefits of the evidence to consider.
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• Evidence data states. Not all evidence is equal in supporting a qualification argument.
It is important to differentiate between data which is mandated as part of a standard
and that which is supplementary.
• Methods to reason under uncertainty. There are a range of approaches to assess ev-
idence and to allow judgements to be formed. The selected approach should serve a
purpose and be proportionate to the problem.
• Structure of the reasoning approach. Defining the structure and implementing a solu-
tion. The method to implement the reasoning approach is to be proportionate to both
the problem and the role it has within the research.
• Visualisation approach. The framework is to provide informative data to the decision
maker. How this data is presented needs to be considered.
• Evidence characteristics for measurement. Any evidence may have theoretical value
to generate confidence. However, there will be practical aspects to obtaining such evi-
dence, e.g. time taken to generate the evidence, and these elements must be considered.
• Methods for optimisation. There are a number of data optimisation approaches which
help to provide ‘solutions’ to the decision maker. Methods for the optimised improve-
ments must be proportionate.
• Data interrogation options. The decision maker may wish to perform what-if analysis
to understand various scenarios. The options presented must be as varied as possible
but be based upon realistic outcomes to ensure there are viable solutions.
• Optimised evidence / known limitations. Optimised evidence attributes could be a
framework output. These could inform stakeholders of potential next steps to reach a
solution, e.g. to reach a defined DAL target. The output could also include a set of
evidence with known limitations, e.g. where a DAL is not achieved. These limitations
can be reviewed by stakeholders.
Figure 8.1 shows a potential flow of the framework design and the implementation steps.
8.2 Framework Implementation Decisions
The framework design allows a robust and proportionate DSF to be implemented. This
section outlines the justifications for the DSF design decisions.
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Figure 8.1: Key Tenets of the Framework Design
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8.2.1 Evidence for Judgement
The sub-section Potential Permissible Evidence for MOD Airborne Safety-Critical Software
Assurance (7.1) describes a number of evidence strands which may inform a diverse soft-
ware/CEH assurance argument. Not all of the potential evidence may be relevant to all
projects. However, the evidence in sub-section 7.1 is valid for the initial framework.
The framework will provide the ability to amend, add, and remove any evidential strand/item
so that the evidence being assessed represents the project under review. It is important for
stakeholders to represent their worldviews4 within the framework.
The types of evidence to be initially included within the framework is in Appendix C.
Appendix C contains the evidence types, e.g. staff competencies, and the sources which
support the evidence being included within the framework, e.g. Guidance on High-Integrity
Software-Based Systems for Railway Applications (RSSB, 2017). The evidence types have
a one-to-many mapping to the sources; e.g. staff competencies are valid forms of evidence
within a number of guidance documents such as RSSB (2017) and International Nuclear
Regulators (2018).
8.2.2 Attributes to Inform the Judgement
A key element to forming judgements is the ability to capture information on an evidential
item and to allow properties of that item to be expressed. In essence, this is measuring
characteristics of the evidence. Understanding the characteristics of the evidence helps with
establishing the fundamental features of the evidence itself and how the evidence interrelates
with other evidence. The attributes that are chosen to reflect the features of the evidence also
determine how the characteristics are combined. The choice of attributes is in some ways a
more important driver then the choice of the reasoning approach. Once the characteristics of
the evidence are established a reasoning approach can assist with implementing a plausible
solution which captures how the evidence features behave.
Measurement is defined as a decision making process with a defined objective (Church-
man, 1959). The objective is to gain a level of confidence in the software or PEs which will
then inform decisions. The decision may be for further information to be gathered or to
supplement the existing supporting information. It is important to note that the confidence
is an output from the DSF and it is intended to be used within the context of a wider set of
evidence by stakeholders, see Figure 3.5 within Chapter 3.
The attribute descriptions in the next sub-sections make reference to parent and child
evidence. The child evidence feeds and supports the parent evidence. For a number of
4The term worldview is not a standard term but in this context it is a system of beliefs, by a stakeholder,
that are interconnected (DeWitt, 2018).
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the defined attributes the child/parent relationship is a fundamental element to be judged.
Figure 8.2 shows the simple relationship with a single parent node and three child nodes,
the child nodes also have a relationship as siblings.
Figure 8.2: Parent/Child Evidence Relationship
The set of attributes captures the characteristics of the evidence and the relationships,
e.g. child to parent node and child node siblings etc. The attributes are as descriptive as
possible whilst being a manageable number. They also inform how the characteristics of any
evidence are propagated to feed into other evidence5.
A common attribute which spans a number of research papers is one which captures a
measurement of the acceptance or level of belief in a claim or statement. This type of metric
is frequently referred to as the level of confidence. As examples, Grigorova and Maibaum
(2013) refers to needing to measure the truth of a claim with Denney, Pai and Habli (2011)
referring to the level of uncertainty in a claim. Cyra and Gorski (2008) refers to confidence
as being the acceptance or rejection of a statement. This indicates that measuring the degree
of an overall factor is merited and leads to the framework capturing a confidence value.
Whereas confidence can be a measure which considers a number of factors there is also a
requirement to capture the extent to which any evidence fulfils its purpose. This concept is
supported by research such as Hobbs and Lloyd (2012), Nair et al. (2015), and Ayoub et al.
(2012). They refer to the need to capture how false or true any evidence is and the levels
of truth (Hobbs and Lloyd, 2012). There is also reference to measuring the level of trust or
belief that the evidence can be assured to be as specified (Nair et al., 2015). Measuring the
likelihood of freedom from errors is also another definition which is termed trustworthiness
by (Ayoub et al., 2012). The ability to record the extent to which the evidence meets any
specification or the level of truth of the evidence shall be captured by the framework in the
form of a quality attribute.
5Further information on the methods to combine and propagate evidence characteristics is contained in
sub-section 8.2.5.
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Gathering diverse evidence involves collecting data and information from various sources.
However, all evidence is not equal. This concept is captured within a number of research
papers which investigate assurance confidence. A number of evidence items which support
a claim will have varying levels of influence on the ability of the claim to be true. This
approach is captured as the degree of weight (Guiochet, Hoang and Kaâniche, 2015, Cyra
and Gorski, 2008), the level of importance (Hawkins and Kelly, 2009), and also the level of
power to convince (Grigorova and Maibaum, 2013), for example. Within the framework this
characteristic will be captured as a contribution attribute.
The degree to which any evidence meets its specification, for example, will be captured
within the framework as the level of the evidence quality. However, the child evidence may
not be able to allow the parent evidence to fully meet the claim or implied quality if the
supporting evidence does not allow a complete judgement to be made. In essence, it is
important to measure the level to which the parent evidence can be inferred, for example as
stated by Denney, Pai and Habli (2011). This concept can also be described as the level to
which a goal is addressed by the supporting nodes (Ayoub et al., 2013, Yuan et al., 2017).
Hawkins and Kelly (2009) have also stated that there is a need to understand the level of
confidence that can be gained by determining the truth of a safety claim. The research
suggests that there is a requirement to capture the sufficiency of the existing evidence to
meet the intent of the parent evidence. This can indicate the adequacy of evidence when
taking into account any evidence not present; e.g. evidence which would ideally be present
but is not. The framework will capture this concept as a sufficiency attribute.
Related to the characteristic of sufficiency is that of capturing how the supporting ev-
idence interrelates to inform the confidence in the parent evidence. Supporting evidence
can be complimentary or offer an alternative method to derive any confidence, for example.
This concept is referred to by Wang, Guiochet and Motet (2017) as the level of dependency
or redundancy of the supporting data. Indeed, diversity is underpinned by the levels of
dependence (and independence) of any evidence (Bloomfield and Littlewood, 2006). The
characteristic will certainly need to inform how any evidence is combined (Littlewood and
Wright, 2007). Evidence items can also be described as to the extent to which it overlaps
(Cyra and Gorski, 2008). These concepts will be captured as an independence attribute
within the framework.
The attributes are based upon an understanding of how the quantification of confidence
has been implemented within other research papers. The chosen attributes provide an in-
tuitive method to capture evidence confidence. The attributes have also been subject to
SME review and have been judged sound, justified, and workable. The chosen attributes
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are agnostic to the forms of evidence6 (a benefit of the DSF) and allows flexible combi-
national approaches to how the evidence is reasoned upon (again, a benefit of the DSF).
The attributes also allow an adaptable approach to describing the evidence based upon the
subjective assessments of SMEs. The chosen attributes are proposed within this research as
a theory of how evidence can be characterised and are open to be discussed and reviewed
by others – indeed, they are open to falsification (based upon the concepts and vernacular
of Popper (2002)). The reviewed research does not explicitly refute the choice of attributes
adopted within this thesis and, at this stage, there is no evidence to suggest the incorrectness
of the attributes.
The five attributes are listed below, with the following sub-sections describing the at-







The definitions for confidence and confident are as follows:
• Confidence, n. 1. Trust in a person or thing. 2. Belief in one’s own abilities; self-
assurance. 3. Trust or a trustful relationship. 4. Something confided (Collins Dictio-
nary, 1995b).
• Confident, adj. 1. Having or showing certainty; sure: confident of success. 2. Sure of
oneself. 3. Presumptuous. [C16: from L confidens, from confidere to have complete
trust in] (Collins Dictionary, 1995c).
To provide context, confidence in this instance is “trust in a thing” and “showing [a level
of] certainty”.
Some studies in the current research for confidence measurement do not provide a clear
indication of how the outputs should be used by stakeholders to inform decisions. This is
the case for previous studies such as Cyra and Gorski (2008), Duan et al. (2015), Guiochet,
6For example, the attributes can be applied to quantitative evidence (such as the level of test structural
coverage) and qualitative evidence (such as measuring compliance to a standard).
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Hoang and Kaâniche (2015), Yamamoto (2015), and Denney, Pai and Habli (2011). There
is a requirement for the DSF output to be informative and usable for it to feed into a wider
assurance argument.
For the safety assurance of PEs a method to measure confidence can be to determine a
DAL for a system, or the contributing elements such as software or CEH. The term DAL is
one which is commonly understood within the safety domain and is a feature of the safety
assurance ‘language’. Indeed, DO-178C, DO-254, and the FAA guidance on the use of PSH
(CAST, 1998) all result in the final output being in the form of a defined assurance level.
The use of DALs allows a benchmark to be established to act as a target when additional
activities are conducted to gather further evidence or to refine the existing evidence.
A fundamental concept for the DSF is that there is, in reality, degrees of compliance to
a DAL. An example is that a software review in accordance with DO-178C may result in
some objectives not being met for a DAL A system. The impact of the system having non-
compliance to one or more objectives is dependent on the importance of the objective and
the wider evidence which can mitigate any non-compliances. Non-compliance with one or
more objectives can still result in a system being declared as achieving a DAL A status. This
could be the case if there is no significant risk to airworthiness, for example. At present, the
non-binary view of DAL compliance is not sufficiently captured within existing methods. An
output indicating the degree of compliance with a DAL would provide valuable information
to a decision maker.
The framework will provide the DAL as an output for the overall evidence, i.e. the root
node. The evidence sub-strands, i.e. the branches, will be assessed to generate a confidence
value which will inform the parent. Sub-section 8.2.5 contains further information on these
relationships.
8.2.2.2 Quality
The definition of quality is as follows:
• Quality, n. 1. A distinguishing characteristic or attribute. 2. The basic character or
nature of something. 3. A feature or personality. 4. Degree or standard of excellence,
esp, a high standard... 7. (Logic). The characteristic of a proposition that make it
affirmative of negative... (Collins Dictionary, 1995p).
The term quality is interpreted as being the “basic character” (of the evidence) and the
“degree or standard of excellence” which can be attributed to the evidence.
A characteristic such as quality allows a judgement on an evidential item to determine
to what degree the requirements are met or the rigour of the evidence against a benchmark.
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The judgement on the quality can be conducted via various methods, these are dependent
on the type of evidence, for example:
• The quality of a SDP would be based upon a subjective opinion comparing the SDP
against the objectives within a standard/guideline.
• The quality of in-service data could be a measure provided by subjective opinion which
is based upon experience and knowledge of the domain. An example includes the level
of in-service hours and the amount of representative hours, such as within the military
domain rather than civil.
• The quality can be a measure of the success of a quantitative process, e.g. test results,
based upon a subjective judgement.
The framework will allow a SMEs judgement to generate the quality attribute which will
act as an input to the DSF. The judgement will be informed by the context of the evidence.
Figure 8.3 shows the quality attribute concept at a simple level. Each child node has an
associated quality attribute.
Figure 8.3: Quality Attribute Relationship for Child Nodes
8.2.2.3 Contribution
The terms contribute, contribution, and relevant are defined as follows:
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• Contribute, n., pl -ties. 1. To give (support, money, etc.) for a common purpose or
fund. 2. To supply (ideas, opinions, etc.). 3. (intr.) To be partly responsible (for). 4.
To write (articles, etc.) for a publication (Collins Dictionary, 1995d).
• Contribution, n., pl -ties. 1. The act of contributing. 2. Something contributed,
such as money. 3. An article, etc., contributed to a newspaper or other publication...
(Collins Dictionary, 1995e).
• Relevant, adj. Having direct bearing on the matter in hand; pertinent (Collins Dictio-
nary, 1995q).
Contribution is the level of influence, or the level of the direct bearing, that the child
evidence has on the parent evidence. As an example, MC/DC, as child evidence, may feed
into the broader parent category of coverage testing. Although an evidential item may have
a very high level of quality, its relevance may not be as high. Conversely, if the quality of
evidence is very low the influence on the parent evidence could be high, and this would act
as counter-evidence7.
The contribution is a measure which is derived independently of the quality as the con-
tribution is attempting to understand the weighting that the node has on the parent. As
an example, when forming a PSH argument there is a requirement to understand the sig-
nificance of any software changes that have been made, i.e. those that have altered the
core code of the software. The contribution of the ‘significance of software changes’ may
support a parent category to determine the ‘impact of any changes’. The influence of the
child evidence on the parent combines the quality and the contribution of the child node.
Sub-section 8.2.5 contains further information on these concepts.
Contribution is informed by two considerations: the parent which the evidence supports
(i.e. the direct bearing on the parent); and the evidence which also informs the same parent
(i.e. the sibling evidence). Figure 8.4 shows the contribution attribute concept at a simple
level. Each child node has an associated contribution attribute but only one attribute is
shown in the Figure for simplification.
8.2.2.4 Sufficiency
The terms sufficient and sufficiency are defined as follows:
• Sufficient, adj. 1. Enough to meet a need or purpose; adequate. 2. Logic. (of a
condition) assuring the truth of a statement; requiring but not necessarily caused by
some other state of affairs (Collins Dictionary, 1995s).
7Noting that counter-evidence refers to the provision of an item of evidence which has the potential to
undermine a claim (Menon, Hawkins and McDermid, 2009a).
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Figure 8.4: Contribution Attribute Relationship for a Single Child Node
• Sufficiency, n. 1. The quality or condition of being sufficient. 2. An adequate amount
(Collins Dictionary, 1995r).
The framework should allow a judgement to be made on the holistic properties of the
evidence. A key aspect to this is to judge how complete and adequate the evidence is which
underpins a parent node. It is important to judge what evidence is missing, i.e. what could
contribute, and not only the supporting available evidence. As an example, if evidence was
available for the design, implementation, and testing stages of the life-cycle; but not the
requirements stage, then the existing child evidence would not allow a complete perspective
to be gained of the broad life-cycle parent evidence. The sufficiency concept is illustrated
within Figure 8.5.
The sufficiency attribute captures the scenarios in which there may be fundamental
evidence missing to feed into the parent evidence or where wider supporting evidence could
be gathered. The sufficiency of the all child evidence is judged without any prior knowledge
of the quality of the evidence. The judgement of the sufficiency will take into account the
context of the software, e.g. platform configuration, to understand the level of sufficiency
required against the defined scope of the safety assurance claim.
8.2.2.5 Independence
The terms independent, independence, distinct, diverge, and mutual are defined as follows:
• Independent, adj. 1. Free from control in action, judgement etc.; autonomous. 2. Not
dependent on anything else for function, validity, etc.; separate. 3. Not reliant on
the support, esp. financial support, of others... 7. Maths. (of a system of equations)
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Figure 8.5: Sufficiency Attribute Relationship
not linearly dependent. 8. Logic. (of two or more propositions) unrelated... (Collins
Dictionary, 1995n).
• Independence, n. The state or quality of being independent (Collins Dictionary,
1995m).
• Distinct, adj. 1. Easily sensed or understood; clear. 2. (when postpostive, foll. by
from) Not the same (as); separate (from). 3. Not alike; different. 4. Sharp; clear...
(Collins Dictionary, 1995g).
• Diverge, vb. 1. To separate or cause to separate and go in different directions from
a point. 2. (intr.) To be at variance; differ. 3. (intr.) To deviate from a prescribed
course... (Collins Dictionary, 1995h).
• Mutual, vb. 1. Experienced or expressed by each of two or more people about the
other; reciprocal: mutual distrust. 2. Inf. Common to or shared by both: a mutual
friend... (Collins Dictionary, 1995o).
Whilst the sufficiency attribute evaluates the evidence which is not present, the indepen-
dence attribute is focussed on the relationships between the available evidence. The degree
of independence captures the level to which all of the child evidence feeding a parent is
providing different perspectives. This considers the sibling relationships of the child nodes.
The more distinct or divergent the evidence is, it could be argued, the larger the effect
of the evidence. Conversely, evidence may also be mutual to each other. This indicates
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that the evidence may be supported by the sibling evidence and is, in essence, collaborative.
However, in this case the evidence is not providing additional concepts and therefore lacks
independence. The independence value is created by a judgement on the collective set of the
child node evidence.
Figure 8.6 shows the independence attribute concept at a simple level.
Figure 8.6: Independence Attribute Relationship
8.2.2.6 Achieving Diversity via Attribute Selection
The attributes are chosen to capture features of the evidence and its relationships to other
forms of evidence. The attributes can also drive how a level of diversity can be achieved. The
right balance and combination of all attributes can provide a satisfactory level of evidence
diversity.
Independence is a key consideration for achieving diversity, as supported by Bloomfield
and Littlewood (2006) et al. However, evidence which is significantly distinct (and therefore
offers a level of independence) needs to have a relevant weighting for the distinctiveness to be
of value. This is why the contribution of the evidence is important to capture. Likewise, the
quality of the evidence also impacts the overall confidence and therefore the level of impact
that the distinct evidence can have. There should also be a consideration of the collective
sufficiency of the supporting child evidence. This ensures that the evidence which currently
forms part of an assurance argument is not missing supporting items which could assist with
improving the level of diversity.
In essence, there is a trade-off and balance between the attributes to ensure that a suitable
level of diversity is reached, as illustrated simplistically in Figure 8.7. The aim is to gain
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a supporting set of evidence which is comprised of independent evidence which provides a
satisfactory contribution level and is of satisfactory quality. Achieving this balance where
there are varying values for the attributes is reliant on judgement and subjective decisions.
The framework aims to provide a decision support tool which can be adopted by suitable
SQEP SMEs to gather and assess evidence. In order to do this there is a need cognisance of
the types of evidence being applied, the value, and the pedigree of the evidence. The char-
acteristics of the evidence (at a leaf level) need to be suitably captured and the structure
of the evidence needs to be defined. The structure of the tree and the supporting evidence
can be SME defined and does not have to be limited to replicating the structure of a stan-
dard/guideline. Although doing so provides an implicit warrant in the Toulmin vernacular
(Toulmin, 2003)8. Any SME defined evidence structure needs to be based upon evidential
theory and how supporting evidence, for example, can underpin the overall confidence. The
chosen attributes provide a mechanism for the evidence structure creation, for example the
use of sufficiency to indicate the adequacy of evidence when taking into account any evi-
dence not present. This allows for circumstances where the user subjectively decides that
some evidence which would ideally be present is not; i.e. it captures the completeness of the
parent based upon the child evidence.
Whilst constructing the parent/child branches and the evidence combination via the
selection of attributes the SMEs must be aware of any overlaps in evidence (i.e. barriers
to independence) and the limitations that this may have. Again, the evidence attributes
will allow any observations regarding evidence duplication to be captured throughout the
numerous branches of the evidence tree (e.g. by determining the independence attribute
values). Where there are circumstances that a set of parents have common ancestor node(s)
in their subtrees they would not be declared completely independent. However, the SMEs
constructing the tree would need to be aware of such dependencies and make their judgement
on any independence attributes accordingly. The onus is on SMEs to apply judgement and
knowledge to structure the tree appropriately based upon evidence theory principles. There
needs to be an awareness of how lower evidence has been sourced and judged.
If there are any particular queries or information sought regarding the lower level com-
position of the evidence structure (e.g. different techniques adopted for assessments or the
diverse expertise of the SMEs undertaking review tasks etc) then these can be specifically
added as evidence nodes with suitable attributes defined. The DSF allows SMEs to seek
clarity regarding the underlying evidence and to add/amend nodes and attributes which
reflect any areas of concern or clarification. An example is with a number of software V&V
activities which should be conducted by independent SMEs who are SQEP. Evidence nodes
8Further information is contained in sub-section 8.2.5.7.
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can be attached to a V&V parent node with child nodes created to state judgements on the
independence of the SMEs and their pedigree/training. There should be an assessment of
the level of independence between the SMEs and the value which can be gained from such
evidence (e.g. limitations due to similar training/education of assessors). Attribute values
can be defined for such child evidence nodes.
The DSF tool provides a mechanism to support SMEs to conduct such activities but the
structure and the forms of evidence are SME defined. The DSF is deliberately flexible to
allow for varying evidence structures which can be discussed and agreed by SQEP SMEs.
The DSF captures what evidence is important to the SMEs and allows them to define how
the evidence is structured. Those that only make use of an overall confidence value to inform
decisions, for example high-level risk duty holders, will have a reliance on the underpinning
evidence structure/types to have been developed and agreed by SMEs. This is currently
the case within safety domains where there are deviations from extant recognised evidence.
The DSF has the benefit of allowing these judgements to be captured and interrogated if
required.
Figure 8.7: Link Between Attributes to Derive Diverse Evidence
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 177 of 328
8.2.3 Framework Evidence Data States
To act as an effective method to assist with decision making it is important for the frame-
work to take into account the multiple states of the evidence data: (a) part of an existing
software assurance argument; (b) included within an applicable guideline/standard ; or (c)
supplementary to the other two data states. All of the data states are legitimate to inform
a diversity argument.
The data/evidence states can be used when determining the evidence to be gathered,
the value of the evidence, and how persuasive the evidence could be to stakeholders for the
assurance argument. It is envisaged that the evidence which forms a diverse argument will
initially be one of three states:
• Extant Data. Data which is already part of a diverse argument is classed as being
extant. This is to capture the assessment of pre-existing evidence within a brownfield
environment. In these scenarios the evidence will already have been judged and there-
fore the attributes of the evidence, e.g. quality, will be known. Extant data can form a
baseline of the known evidence or act as a foundation for any optimisation processes.
• Obligatory Data. Any assurance argument would normally be assessed against a known
benchmark. In the case of military airborne software this could be DO-178C (RTCA,
2011a) for process-based evidence. At the very least there may be a requirement within
a compulsory standard for the software development activities to adhere to certain
safety properties. Evidence which is cited within guidelines/standards is classed as
being obligatory and this is to allow this evidence to have an increased value when
assessed within the framework. The presence of evidence which adheres to known
guidelines/standards will achieve greater acceptance by the majority of stakeholders,
e.g. regulators9.
• Ancillary Data. A premise is that all evidence has value. The degree of value , i.e. the
weight, will obviously vary but any evidence can support an overall diversity claim.
There are cases where relevant evidence could inform the confidence of a system but
the data may not be currently extant or part of existing guidelines/standards, i.e. not
obligatory. An example is with TSOs as these are strong forms of evidence which are
not supported within the standards as they have no official weight as evidence. It is
important for this type of data to be captured as it allows the data, e.g. quality or
contribution values, to be debated by stakeholders with the agreed result contained in
the framework.
9As indicated within SME workshops.
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8.2.4 Method for Reasoning With Uncertainty
The premise of the DSF is to: gather judgements from stakeholders on evidence attributes;
allow what-if analysis; and to provide an informative output for decision making. The real-
world activities to assure PEs can be part of wicked/messy problems (Mingers, 2011)10.
There is a need to operate with a lack, or vagueness, of data and the activities can be
conducted under uncertainty.
The term uncertainty is not one which has a full and accepted definition, however a
sufficient definition is provided by Zimmermann (2000):
• Uncertainty. Implies that in a certain situation a person does not dispose11 about in-
formation which quantitatively and qualitatively is appropriate to describe, prescribe
or predict deterministically and numerically a system, its behaviour or other charac-
teristic.
It is this concept which the DSF will assist stakeholders with to capture and reason with
judgements on diverse evidence. For the method to reason under certainty to have value
within the DSF the approach is expected to:
• Capture subjective judgements on evidence.
• Represent an evolution in how information is captured to gain stakeholder buy-in.
• Offer a flexible approach to dynamically adjust attributes and the method(s) in which
they are captured.
• Allow beliefs to be captured which are valid for what-if scenarios but may not be
valid for making final judgements, i.e. certain levels of belief are valid for problem
exploration but not final conclusions.
• Tolerant of imprecise data.
• Allow relationships and dependences of nodes to be captured.
8.2.4.1 Causes of Uncertainty
There are a number of views on the causes of uncertainty. In essence, the differing views
are mainly complimentary and refer to such aspects as having to deal with insufficient data
10For example, those problems which can have, for example, no definitive formulation, no stopping rule,
or are considered symptoms of other problems etc (Rittel and Webber, 1973).
11In this context Zimmermann (2000) is referring to the term dispose to “incline (someone) towards a
particular activity or mood” (OED, 2018b).
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and vagueness (Colyvan, 2008). Other sources of uncertainty have been described as being
due to randomness, fuzziness, and incompleteness (Blockley and Godfrey, 2000). When
combined, Zimmermann (2000) and Colyvan (2008) provide a well-defined list of the sources
of uncertainty:
• Lack of Information. There are numerous types: no information to base a possible
state of nature on; the available information is not sufficient to allow the situation to
be described deterministically ; or a situation of needing approximation where sufficient
information is not available (or not wanted) to make an exact description.
• Abundance of Information (Complexity). Humans have a limited ability to perceive
and process large amounts of data simultaneously. However, commonly, there is a need
to communicate about large numbers of features or properties of a system.
• Conflicting Evidence. There may be cases where information about a system may
point to a certain type of system behaviour. Conversely, other information may allude
to a system behaviour of another type. Further information may increase this conflict.
This can occur due to incorrect data or the use of non-relevant features to describe the
system.
• Vagueness. Uncertainty can arise out of vagueness in the language, in particular, from
vague predicates. A vague predicate is one that permits borderline cases ; e.g. the
predicate “is a mature individual” is vague because it permits borderline cases (such
as adolescents, which are borderline between adults and non-adults).
• Ambiguity. Linguistic information, for example, can have different meanings and in a
given context it is not clear which way it is being used. This source of uncertainty is
quite distinct from vagueness. Ambiguity does not give rise to borderline cases in the
way a vague term can, e.g. the term bank is either a financial institution or the edge
of a river.
• Under-specificity. This is where there is unwanted generality with the desired degree
of specificity not provided. As an example, the statement that there will be “rainy
days ahead” is under-specific as there are numerous questions to this, such as: Which
days will be rainy? How many of them will be rainy? The term “rainy days” is also
vague: Does a day with light mist count as a rainy day?
• Measurement. The term measurement also has very different interpretations in differ-
ent contexts. As an example, engineering measurement is concerned with measuring
devices for physical features such as weight, temperature, and length etc. An imagined
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property cannot be measured perfectly, therefore there is only an indicated measure
with uncertainty of the real value.
The method to reason under uncertainly within the problem of interest will consider: a
lack of information; conflicting evidence; vagueness; ambiguity; and measurement.
8.2.4.2 Types of Information
Judgements will be formed on information from numerous sources. Understanding the forms
of information may influence the solutions which are put in place and how the outputs will
be interpreted. Zimmermann (2000) provides a well-defined list of information types:
• Numerical Information. Numerical information can come from a variety of sources and
there is a need to determine the scale on which the information is provided.
• Interval Information. Information is available in this instance but is not as precise in
the sense of a real-valued number. This information is exact or dichotomous in the
sense that the boundaries of the intervals, no matter how they have been determined,
are crisp.
• Linguistic Information. Information can be provided in a natural language and not in
a formal language. Natural languages develop over time and there is also the need to
distinguish between a word as a label and the meaning of a word.
• Symbolic Information. Information can be provided in the form of symbols. This can
be numbers, letters, or pictures but they will not be as obvious as when words are
being used as symbols.
The method to reason under uncertainly within the problem of interest will be subject
to considering numerical and linguistic information.
8.2.4.3 Information Required by the Observer
The outputs of the DSF will have a specific purpose to serve a human observer. For human
observers the outputs need to be readable. The outputs can be represented to the observer
in differing ways depending on the evaluation methods. The information required to be
provided to the human observer is described further within Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) and
Structure Implementation (sub-section 8.2.5), Visualisation Approach (sub-section 8.2.6),
and Options to Assist Decision Making (sub-section 8.2.9).
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8.2.4.4 Uncertainty Reasoning Approaches
There are numerous methods to reason under uncertainty and these methods can be un-
derpinned by a range of measures, such as probability or possibility theories. None of the
methods/measures are infallible with each having their advantages and disadvantages (Brito,
2009). Indeed a probabilistic measure is popular when designing under uncertainty but it is
not omnipotent (Chen, Nikolaidis and Cudney, 1999). Other approaches, e.g. Fuzzy Logic
and imprecise probability, are subject to research to ascertain their suitability for related
areas, such as reliability analysis (Baraldi et al., 2015).
As outlined in the Scope for Further Investigation (section 4.2.3) there are a number of
methods, e.g. BBN, which have been adopted for previous studies in the field of software
safety assurance. None have resulted in a clear and definitive approach being fully adopted. It
is legitimate to adopt a method which is fit for purpose for the problem being addressed. The
method will also allow the identified causes of uncertainty to be considered, e.g. vagueness,
as well as the types of information, e.g. linguistic. The methods which may be appropriate
for the problem of interest; include, but are not limited to:
• Bayesian Theory. A common approach to address uncertainty is that of Bayesian
Theory which is based upon probability. The probability is interpreted as a degree
of belief based upon the available evidence (prior) with the current knowledge repre-
sented by a probability distribution (posterior) on a proposition space (Pearl, 1988).
New knowledge is learnt via conditionalisation, how beliefs are updated in light of
new evidence (Meacham, 2015). BBN uses the fundamentals of probability theory
and causal graphical representations via Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The BBN
network representation is visual and easy to understand with probability theory being
a well-defined method for dealing with knowledge of unknown certainty (Pearl, 1988).
BBN can also allow numerous sources of information to be incorporated within the rep-
resentation (Liu et al., 2003). However, issues with BBNs include: the reinforcement
of the belief in one state would be associated with a decrease of belief in other states as
the sum of all possible states must equal 1; assumptions regarding the independence of
information/events may lead to counter intuitive and possibly incorrect results; a large
number of prior probabilities are required which leads to needing to simplify assump-
tions; and BBN offers little opportunity to express incomplete information (Liu et al.,
2003). Also, probabilities used in BBNs need to be precise. This is not fully compatible
with data derived by expert information which tend to be indications (Mertens, 2004).
• Dempster´Shafer Theory (DST). DST is concerned with representing and reasoning
with uncertain, imprecise, and incomplete information. A key component of DST is
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to have the ability to represent ignorance. DST avoids the negation of belief from one
form of evidence when another increases its belief, elements which are not sufficiently
implemented with probability theory. Uncertainty is modelled by the degree of be-
lief with ignorance represented by assigning belief to larger subsets (i.e. given more
knowledge, the belief would be assigned to a smaller subset, or even a singleton). DST
does have advantages: no prior is required for each elements in a set; ignorance can
be captured due to lack of information and this value is altered as more information
becomes available; and there is no law of additivity for the beliefs (Liu et al., 2003).
Disadvantages of DST are that: it assumes that evidence is independent, which is not
always the case; and it only works on exclusive and exhaustive sets of hypotheses,
which is not always the case due to insufficient knowledge/resources (Liu et al., 2003).
• Hierarchical Process Modelling (HPM). Within HPM a belief is that a system can be
represented by a network of ‘blobs’ and ‘links’ with hierarchy offering a way to manage
complexity. Each level of the hierarchy expresses more detail, i.e. a decomposition
(Yearworth, 2014a). HPM consists of conceptual models that contain processes which
are structured into a hierarchical arrangement. These represent the minimum processes
in a system required to achieve a purpose. HPM attempts to allow group decision
making on how and the why information can support a purpose. HPM captures levels
of belief in a proposition via a probability that it is: (a) false; (b) true; (c) unknown12
(Yearworth, 2014b). HPM data can be captured within a tool called PeriMeta which
captures the attributes required for the HPM calculations. Examples of the attributes
include, but is not limited to, necessity13 and dependency14. There are advantages to
the HPM approach: there is an adopted tool for assisting with the problem structuring
(i.e. PeriMeta), elements of a process which are unknown can be explicitly captured,
and HPM via PeriMeta can capture the performance of a system quite rapidly. There
are disadvantages to the approach: it is recognised that making judgements on the
defined attributes is very hard with the attributes15 and their relationships16 being
fixed17; there is a limit to the number of processes per level („ 5˘ 2); and the aim of
HPM is for intervention and not prediction (Yearworth, 2014b).
12This concept is visualised via the notation of the Italian Flag with the green representing how true the
measure is; red representing false; and white representing unknown.
13Will the parent fail if the sub-process fails?
14How much overlap of evidence is there between the sub-processes?
15Such as necessity.
16Such as the direct mapping between the parent and child to capture sufficiency
17An intent of the research is determine relevant attributes and their relationships.
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• Fuzzy Logic (FL). FL systems and FISs18 allow the mapping of fuzzy inputs into a
number of fuzzy outputs19. FL measures the degree to which a proposition is correct
rather than how likely the proposition is to be correct, which is the case with proba-
bility theory (Scientific American, 2018). This mapping between inputs and outputs is
conducted via sets of fuzzy rules, stated in an IF...THEN format, which relate the in-
puts/outputs. In cases where a FIS receives a crisp input then this would be fuzzified20
by input membership functions (Liu et al., 2003). There are a number of advantages
to the FL approach: there are low requirements on the precision of information; it
is a good solution for some problems which arise due to language interpretation; an
alternative method to map input spaces to outputs spaces; tolerant of imprecise data;
and it is capable of dealing with incomplete data. However, there are also a number
of disadvantages to the approach: it is not always clear how to construct membership
functions and the inherent flexibility in the methods can be seen as an advantage but
there is little guidance on the most suitable approach (Liu et al., 2003).
The main aim for the problem of interest is not centred upon the choice of method to
reason under uncertainty but on the value of a method in assisting with understanding and
using diverse evidence. This is a subtle yet important point as this work will not advocate a
particular method to represent and reason with diverse evidence. This allows the concepts
of the DSF to be applied to a range of reasoning approaches if the principles of the DSF are
revised (e.g. acceptance of the law of additivity such as with BBN).
Further information on the advantages/disadvantages to each of the reasoning methods
can be found within Pearl (1988), Sowa (1999), and Klir (2005). It is not the intention of this
thesis to provide significant information on methods to reason under uncertainty. In terms
of adopting a method to be implemented within the DSF the use of FL is a proportionate
and suitable approach. There are a number of characteristics which confirm this (Liu et al.,
2003):
• Suited where evidence is itself fuzzy in nature.
• Suitable for uncertain or approximate reasoning, especially for systems where mathe-
matical models are difficult to derive.
• Allows decision making with estimated values under incomplete or uncertain informa-
tion.
18Originated from the work of Zadeh (1965) with further research on fuzzy inference based upon Zadeh
(1973).
19The fuzzy inputs/outputs are based on the premise that they are non-binary and they therefore resemble
human reasoning.
20The process of converting data to a fuzzy set.
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• Inherently accounts for noise in the data21 because it extracts trends, not precise values.
In addition, FL and the use of FISs has been adopted for a range of risk assessment and
decision support applications. Promising results can be found related to the cyber security
domain (Sallum, 2015), security risks (Alnafjan et al., 2012) and security audits (Kozhakhmet
et al., 2012). FISs have also been adopted for failure analysis purposes (Geramian et al.,
2017) with FL deemed a suitable method within some areas of research to conduct analysis
within complex decision making (Naseem et al., 2017).
8.2.5 Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) and Structure Implementa-
tion
The FIS implementation is one which follows a recognised approach with combinations and
comparisons of data conducted in pairs. The analysis via pairs allows for a more simplified
and structured assessment. This has benefits in terms of allowing stakeholders to traverse
the data tree and the node values using logical sets of inference systems.
The reasoning approach will be formed of three sets of FISs. These will use the attributes
which have been determined to provide the most descriptive and informative data22. This
data will, in essence, be the judgements on the evidence nodes.
The creation of the FISs for the framework will use the frbs Comprehensive R Archive
Network (CRAN) package (Rize et al., 2015) which is focussed on creating Fuzzy Rule-
Based Systems (FRBSs)23. The following arguments have been adopted for the creation
of the FISs with the choices guided by related FIS implementations and via the use, and
subsequent observations, of the framework itself.
• Defuzzifier 24: Weighted Average Method (WAM). WAM was adopted, in part, due to
it being less computationally intensive (Ross, 2004) with the design of the framework
possibly involving a FIS propagating iteratively over large evidence sets. WAM is also
widely used in hierarchical evaluation problems (Guh, Po and Lee, 2008).
• Inference25. Intersections (t-norm26): Standard t-norm - minpx1, x2q (Rize et al.,
21The term noise refers to the additional meaningless information within a larger data set.
22The attributes are: Confidence, Quality, Contribution, Sufficiency, and Independence.
23FRBSs are also known as FISs and Fuzzy Models (FMs).
24Defuzzification is a transformation that extracts the crisp values from the linguistic terms (MathWorks,
2018b).
25Inference refers to the process of fuzzy reasoning.
26A two-input function that describes a superset of fuzzy intersection (AND) operators, including mini-
mum, algebraic product, and any of several parameterised t-norms (MathWorks, 2018b).
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2015). Unions (s-norm27): Standard s-norm - maxpx1, x2q (Rize et al., 2015). The
operators were selected as the standard t-norm (min operator) produces the largest
membership value of all the t-norms and the standard s-norm (max operator) produces
the smallest membership value of all the t-conorms. It is these features of the standard
operators which are significant as they both prevent the compounding of errors in the
input/output values (Klir and Yuan, 1995). Most of the alternative norms lack such
significance (Ross, 2004).
• Implication Function28: Zadeh - pa ă 0.5 || 1 ´ a ą b?1 ´ a : pa ă b?a : bqq29
(Rize et al., 2015). The Zadeh implication operation method was deemed suitable due
to the acceptable close degree values confirmed within Botzoris, Papadopoulos and
Papadopoulos (2015) and Zhu et al. (2007)30
• Model31: Mamdani. Advantages of Mamdani systems include being intuitive, having
widespread acceptance, and being well-suited to human input (MathWorks, 2018a).
8.2.5.1 Child Node Confidence FIS
The confidence of the child nodes will be determined via the quality of the evidence and
the contribution which that node makes towards its parent. This combination results in
a confidence value which can be used to determine the evaluation level. The evaluation
level is used as an interim process to calculate the combined outputs of multiple child node
confidence values. Figure 8.8 shows this relationship.
8.2.5.2 Sibling Nodes Assessment FIS
The FIS is generated by combining: (a) the independence of the nodes feeding evidence to a
parent and (b) the sufficiency of the current nodes feeding evidence to a parent in relation
to other relevant evidence. The result of this combination is an assessment of the sibling
nodes. Figure 8.9 shows this relationship.
27T-conorm (also known as s-norm) - A two-input function that describes a superset of fuzzy union (OR)
operators, including maximum, algebraic sum, and any of several parameterised t-conorms (MathWorks,
2018b).
28The process of shaping the fuzzy set in the consequent based on the results of the antecedent in a
Mamdani FIS (MathWorks, 2018b).
29When the rule a Ñ b is considered.
30Both Euclidean and Hamming close degree values.
31The type of fuzzy inference method - broadly classified as direct or indirect.
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Figure 8.8: Quality and Contribution Relationship
Figure 8.9: Sufficiency and Independence Relationship
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8.2.5.3 Parent Node Quality FIS
The child node evaluation level is the combination of the child’s quality and contribution.
An assessment of the sibling nodes can be combined with the child node evaluation level to
derive the quality value for the parent node, i.e. the parent being fed from other forms of
evidence. For the root node the quality value is used to determine the overall DAL for the
evidence. Figure 8.10 shows this relationship.
Figure 8.10: Child Node Evaluation Level and Sibling Nodes Assessment Relationship
8.2.5.4 Parent Confidence
The confidence of the parent evidence node is, in essence, a reuse of the FIS to calculate the
child node confidence. The parent quality is combined with the parent’s contribution that it
makes to its own parent. Figure 8.11 shows this relationship.
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Figure 8.11: Parent Node Quality and Contribution Relationship
8.2.5.5 Overall FIS Structure
The sets of FISs are combined for each evidence family. This acts as a pattern which can
then be repeated on all of the evidence to provide a root value which represents the DAL
for the overall evidence.
Using the pattern across a range of evidence allows the nodes to be judged in a consistent
manner using the same language. This allows stakeholders to have a common assessment
method. Figure 8.12 shows the overall relationships for an evidence family.
8.2.5.6 Fuzzy Inference System’s (FISs) Membership Functions (MFs)
MFs within FISs represent the degrees of truth for a given value. This degree of the mem-
bership is a value between 0 and 1 and is associated with each point in the input space,
termed the universe of discourse. The purpose of the MF is to articulate that a system, or
a characteristic, may belong to a MF to a degree.
There are a number of types of MFs. A degree of membership must be between 0 and
1 but the actual type of the membership function can be based on the need for simplicity,
convenience, speed, and efficiency (MathWorks, 2018b). MF types are based upon a number
of basic functions: piece-wise linear functions, Gaussian distribution function, sigmoid curve,
and quadratic/cubic polynomial curves. However, the simplest MFs are formed using straight
lines, e.g. triangular and trapezoidal, and it is these MF types which are to be adopted within
the FISs. It is the intersections of the MFs which feed the FIS values.
An example of MFs to capture the quality of any given evidence is represented by Figure
8.13. The MFs to represent quality use the following linguistic terms (and numeric values):
very low (0-30), low (30-50), medium (30-70), high (50-90), and very high (70-100). The
degree of membership is represented on the y-axis.
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Figure 8.12: Overall FIS Relationships for an Evidence Family
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Figure 8.13: MFs for Evidence Quality
The degree to which the overall evidence relates to the DALs is determined via the degree
of MF to a particular DAL value. The MFs for DALs A-E (and none) are shown in Figure
8.14. Again, the degree of membership is represented on the y-axis.
Figure 8.14: MFs for Overall Evidence DALs
The use of the MFs for the DALs allows complete compliance to be achieved for a
particular DAL. These scenarios would be based upon the overall confidence values for the
evidence tree. Table 8.1 shows the degree of membership for each DAL and the calculated
overall confidence value of the evidence via the FIS.
Table 8.1 shows specific minimum overall confidence values required to achieve a par-
ticular DAL. The examples within Table 8.2 show the degrees of membership for the DALs
based upon other overall confidence values. These examples are more typical of the results
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DAL E DAL D DAL C DAL B DAL A
80 0 0 0 0 1
70 0 0 0 1 0
60 0 0 1 0 0
50 0 1 0 0 0
30 1 0 0 0 0
Table 8.1: MFs for Precise DALs
which are expected to be obtained from the case studies as they indicate that the overall
evidence will have degrees of compliance to one or more DALs. The degree of membership
will then allow stakeholders (the decision makers) to determine the suitable next steps to




DAL E DAL D DAL C DAL B DAL A
76 0 0 0 0.4 0.6
63 0 0 0.7 0.3 0
58 0 0.2 0.8 0 0
Table 8.2: MFs for DALs
8.2.5.7 Structure Definition and Roles/Forms of Evidence
There are a number of patterns which can be applied to the creation of evidence structures
within the main threads. These approaches can reflect the key evidential areas of interest
for the SMEs. A common pattern for the generation of the parent/child linkages is to base
it on a top-down composition which defines the child nodes as acting as the total (or near
total) sufficiency of the parent evidence. In this pattern the evidence structure is providing
a framework to be populated and is separate to the actual evidence judgements which will
be captured later. As an example, if the software development life-cycle is deemed to be a
suitable parent evidence node then the child nodes will be selected by their ability to de-
termine the confidence of the life-cycle. Confidence of any parent is calculated, in part, by
the sufficiency of its child nodes. For a software development life-cycle parent node it can
be argued that an assessment of the child nodes such as customer query analysis, require-
ments, design, implementation, V&V, and through-life maintenance development would all
collectively be sufficient to inform the confidence of the parent node32.
32The premise of the attributes’ relationships is outlined within sub-section 8.2.5.5.
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Another possible pattern is one which captures the activities needed to create the evidence
and to also measure the confidence in the evidence output itself. This is related to the
evidence common characteristics concept by Ayoub et al. (2012). Child nodes associated
with any parent may reflect one of two concepts: (a) the activities required to create the
parent evidence and the (b) evidence needed to provide direct confidence in the parent. This
is a subtle distinction. For example, software requirements development should be conducted
by suitably skilled staff adopting suitable requirement standards. These activities are needed
to create the requirements. Evidence needed to provide direct confidence in the requirements
could be based upon suitable requirement specifications. The evidence creation activities
can be associated directly with the evidence it relates to or it can be included in a separate
assessment of the wider tools and skill-sets, for example. These may cover all software
development life-cycle steps. The DSF is flexible to allow a range of patterns to be adopted
based upon such SME judgements.
These patterns are theories for the creation of evidence structures and are open to debate
and discussion. However, patterns such as these proved useful for the DSF case studies and
exploratory testing.
The creation of any new branches within the structure is dependent on the type of ar-
gument which is being proposed and if there are existing standards/guidelines which can
support the structure of the evidence. As an example, a suitable approach is to reflect the
objectives contained within a recognised or extant standard, such as the objectives within
Annex A of DO-178C. Such an approach provides a warrant using the Toulmin vernacular
(Toulmin, 2003). A standard has acceptance by the relevant regulator that following the
requirements/objectives will achieve the stated aims of the standard. Using the require-
ments/objectives of the standards in effect forms the argument of the safety claim with the
artefacts forming the evidence. Wider research suggests that standards such as DO-178C
can explicitly meet the narrowly defined safety goals (Holloway and Graydon, 2018)33 and
therefore safety arguments being formed from the requirements/objectives of standards is a
suitable approach. There are also suggestions that safety standards should be stated in the
form of assurance cases to make the link to safety arguments more explicit (Rushby, 2015).
Where a standard/guideline does not exist (or is not deemed to be the most effective
structure by the SMEs) then an approach could be applied which reflects the philosophy of
the SMEs generating the structure and the important intrinsic properties which are to be
captured. For example, the parent to child node decomposition could be based on deriving
what would provide total (or near total) sufficiency of the parent node or potentially the
activities required to create the parent node evidence (e.g. suitable tools and skill-sets). Ex-
33Related to software development.
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amples of patterns have been described in this sub-section; however, the process of evidence
construction contains a level of intrinsic intellectual activity, it is not a mechanistic process
for which a complete set of rules can be provided.
Evidence structure can also be constructed from a bottom-up or top-down perspective.
The chosen approach is dependent on the available evidence and the premise being generated.
A bottom-up approach is one which may be required if there is a need to determine what the
evidence can inform with no fully developed pre-defined evidence structure. The parent/child
branches are created based upon the available evidence with the attributes used to determine
the sufficiency of the evidence, for example. This approach builds the evidence structure, in
theory, from the bottom-up although there is always a need for the SME to be aware of what
evidence would fully support the available evidence to provide a full picture of the evidence
confidence. This approach was not generally adopted for the case studies as the preferred
approach is to use a pre-defined structure with stated sufficiency and contribution values for
example. This pre-defined structure reduces the risk and perception of gaming (e.g. that
SMEs would place more positive judgements only on what is available). However, the DSF
can accommodate such an approach if deemed suitable by SMEs. The top-down approach is
the more standard method which is based upon determining patterns from parent to child.
The DSF is purposefully flexible to take into account a range of evidence gathering
scenarios. This includes, the creation of a safety assurance framework from a greenfield per-
spective, i.e. that which does not have an existing safety argument in place with evidence
being predominantly based upon process evidence. Brownfield34 developments are also ac-
counted for with the ability to include evidence which supports the in-service confidence -
the DSF is evidence agnostic. The evidence attributes can capture any such scenario.
As outlined within sub-section 3.1.3 the outputs generated from any framework imple-
mented from this research35 can inform an overall system safety claim by acting as a sub-
claim. The method to generate the sub-claim is deliberately able to be defined by the stake-
holders and decision-makers. The structure of the evidence can be formed to present: (a)
sufficient confidence gained via satisfying (in part or in full) a defined standard/regulation36;
(b) sufficient confidence to be gained via a claim, argument, evidence approach37 which does
not have a reliance on a standard/regulation; or (c) a combination of standard/regulation
satisfaction and a claim, argument, evidence approach.
34‘Brownfield’ projects, in this instance, are defined as those which were previously created (Baley and
Belcham, 2010).
35Specifically the outputs such as evidence confidence and the degrees of memberships to the DALs; see
Tables 8.1 and 8.2.
36As outlined within this sub-section.
37As outline within sub-section 3.1.3.
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8.2.6 Visualisation Approach
A visualisation for decision making and evidence comprehension has been proposed earlier
in this thesis to allow tiers of diverse evidence to be displayed and managed via a single
‘dashboard’. Further information on the Wheel of Qualification can be found within sub-
section 7.4.
To create the Wheel of Qualification visualisation the principles and guidance from
Nussbaumer-Knaflic (2015) and Kirk (2016) were adopted. These principles and guidelines
informed the method to display the evidence attributes values. They also informed how the
evidence structure is to be presented to assist with decision making. The main purpose of
the visualisation is that it assists decision makers to make informed judgements based upon
potentially complicated evidence sets.
There is a need to ensure the accuracy of the data visualisations by cross-referencing the
results. Data visualisation errors, e.g. via unintentional mistakes, can lead to misinformation
or incorrect decision making (Evergreen, 2017).
8.2.6.1 Visualisation Structure
To assist with the decision making process the representation of the data needs to be clear
and unambiguous. There are a range of chart types, e.g. plots and tables etc, with each
having a number of chart methods, e.g. Bubble Chart and Kagi Chart etc. The visualisation
is to assist with decision making and not to perform formal analysis on the supporting data.
There are a number of visualisation packages on CRAN38 to support R39.
For the visualisation of the relationships between evidence nodes there are a number of
options available (Data Visualisation Catalogue, 2017):
• Parallel Coordinates Plot. Used for comparing a number of variables together and
viewing the relationships between them. Each variable is given its own axis and all
axes are placed in parallel to each other. However, the order in which the axes are
arranged can impact the way in which the information is understood. Also, the plots
can become over-cluttered, although this can be mitigated via the use of interactive
plots.
• Network Diagram. Used to show how entities are interconnected. The nodes and links
can be used to visualise additional information such as a node size being in proportion
to an assigned value. Diagrams can be used to interpret structure. However, they have
a limited data capacity and can be difficult to read with a large number of nodes.
38See the following for further information: https://cran.r-project.org/.
39R is a free software environment for statistical computing and graphics. See the following for further
information: https://www.r-project.org/.
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• Arc Diagram. Used as an alternative to Network Diagrams (via a 2D visualisation).
Arc diagrams can be used to find co-occurrence within data. However, Arc Diagrams
do not show structure between nodes and too many links can make the diagram difficult
to understand.
• Chord Diagram. Used to visualise inter-relationships between entities. Ideal for com-
paring similarities within a dataset. Colour can be used to group data into different
categories. This can assist in making comparisons and distinguishing groups. However,
over-cluttering can become an issue.
• Non-Ribbon Chord Diagram. Used to emphasise the connections within the data.
In essence, it is a stripped-down version of the Chord Diagram as only nodes and
connections are shown.
• Linkage Diagram. Used as a visual representation of hierarchies via nodes and links/
connections. Branches represent relationships and connections between members. Can
be used to show large data sets.
• Venn Diagram. Used to display all logical relationships between a collection of sets.
Each set is a collection of entities that have commonality. Overlapping sets result in an
intersection area. Large volumes of data would result in a very complicated diagram.
• Treemap. Used as an alternative to show a Linkage Diagram and can show quantities
for each category via area size. The area is in proportion to the quantity. Treemaps are
a compact method of displaying Linkage Diagrams and provide a method to provide
an overview of data.
• Circle Packing. Used as an alternative to a Treemap. Circles used instead of rectangles.
Containment within each circle represents a level in the hierarchy. Circle-Packing
Diagrams are not as space-efficient as Treemaps.
• Sunburst Diagram. Used to show linkages through a series of rings. Each ring corre-
sponds to a level in a hierarchy. The segment sizes can be proportional to a value.
Based upon a review of the above visualisation methods the approach which is the most
appropriate for the DSF is that of the Linkage Diagram. The diagram type is suitable
to allow stakeholders to capture and structure evidence in a logical and straightforward
manner. There is a trade-off between the richness of any linkage/visualisation approach and
that which allows data to be managed and considered by stakeholders via uncomplicated
methods. Linkage diagrams will allow methodical analysis of the data by stakeholders.
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The Linkage Diagrams have similarity to GSN structures, which will be familiar to the
stakeholders who will interact with the DSF. Also, the Linkage Diagrams allow a substantial
level of information to be viewed allowing a holistic perspective to be gained when the
supporting assurance evidence is being assessed. Initial feedback is also supportive of the
use of Linkage Diagrams40. Linkage Diagrams are also known as Linkage Trees; Figure 8.15
shows the ‘anatomy’ of a Linkage Tree.
Figure 8.15: ‘Anatomy’ of a Linkage Tree
8.2.6.2 Visual Indicators
Consideration is needed into how variations in data are to be represented. Each node may
have multiple attributes and values so there is a need to allow the decision maker to select
the attribute of interest for a particular scenario being reviewed. The structure should be
able to display the relevant values of the nodes, e.g. confidence level. Also, when what-if
analysis is conducted there will be a need to understand the differences between scenarios
40From SME group discussions.
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and the values of the same node attributes. The colour gradients for the evidence attribute
values would be in relation to the MFs values. The colour gradients for the what-if analysis
would indicate the degree of change of a node attribute value between scenarios.
Figure 8.16 shows the potential colour gradients to present node attribute value/differences,
red indicates a low value through to blue indicating a high value. As with the FISs MFs this
allows degrees of compliance to an attribute, such as quality, to be represented.
Figure 8.16: Colour Grades for Nodes
The colour grades for the nodes will allow a visual representation of the overall tree to
show varying levels of attribute values and/or potential optimisation differences, e.g. delta
views between scenarios. This method allows particular evidence strands/nodes to be re-
viewed quickly and efficiently. Figure 8.17 shows: (a) an example of a tree with appropriately
coloured (graded) nodes and (b) a representative example of how the colour grades can be
associated with the degrees of membership for one or more DALs41.
The advantage of the data structure visualisation is that it shows the level of confidence
in the evidence at the leaf nodes and the subsequent parents. Evidence and parent nodes
with weak levels of confidence (and will be of more of concern) are closer to the red colour
gradient. Evidence and parent nodes with strong levels of confidence are closer to the blue
colour gradient. The data tree shows how evidence attributes propagate through the tree to
ascertain particular causes of concern or areas of strength. The propagation also indicates
41It should be noted that it is not the intention for the node text to be readable within Figure 8.17 as it
is the node colour gradings being illustrated. However, decision makers using the framework will have the
ability to search and review the individual nodes of the tree.
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the contributions that the nodes make to their parent. The FISs are repeatedly implemented
throughout the tree at each parent/child(ren) structure to derive the values.
8.2.6.3 Traversal Order
The traversal path of the structure is also important as this will drive the order of the
FISs and other calculations. The leaf nodes will be determined first with the child node
calculations feeding the parent nodes. The root node will be determined by its child nodes.
This is known as a post-order traversal (left, right, root). For Figure 8.18 the traversal order
of the nodes would be as follows: A Ñ B Ñ F Ñ H Ñ C Ñ D Ñ E Ñ G Ñ I Ñ J .
The important aspect is that the evidence tree calculations need to be from the bottom-up
with nodes at the same level being able to be calculated in any order. The parent-to-
children relationships are fundamental with the DSF being agnostic to the ordering of a
node’s siblings.
8.2.7 Capturing Related Evidence Characteristics
There is a need to look wider than the attributes which are initially placed on the evidence,
e.g. quality and contribution, to ascertain if changes can increase confidence in the diverse
argument. Understanding the immediate attributes to inform confidence are, in reality, only
one consideration for any practical implementation of the framework. This acceptance and
ability to consider the wider evidence factors is an additional element missing from existing
methods in this domain.
When considering a change to an evidential item (be it extant, obligatory, or ancillary)
there are a number of practical considerations which will provide a view on the evidence
realities rather than the theoretical benefits of the evidence. Considerations mainly include
those which feature as key project management constraints (Atkinson, 1999) for when there
is a requirement to potentially purchase knowledge (McDermid, 1998). The project which is
the subject to the software assurance activities will have its own defined timelines and budget
constraints and therefore the ability to enhance any evidence should take these factors into
account.
• Time. Changes to extant data within an assurance argument have time implications,
e.g. the development of more formal design documentation to be more in-line with
defined DAL requirements. There are also timing considerations for the addition of
evidence, e.g. conducting further testing. These implications should also include the
time to create relevant business cases and to contract with vendors for the changes
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Figure 8.17: Example of Colour Grades for Nodes and Properties of the Linkage Tree
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Figure 8.18: Tree to Illustrate Traversal Order
to be implemented. There are varying time implications for all evidential amend-
ments/additions and therefore any decision or optimisation should take these into
account.
• Cost. There is the cost to consider, in monetary terms, when making evidence amend-
ments/additions. Traditionally, a task which takes an increased period of time will
have correlating increased costs. However, this is not always the case as short-term
activities can be relatively costly, e.g. performing MC/DC activities.
• Quality. For any evidential item there will be a limit to the quality which can be
achieved and the risks associated with the evidence which may become apparent if
further exploration is conducted. There needs to be recognition that with any activity
counter-evidence may be discovered. The likelihood of counter-evidence being discov-
ered will vary, e.g. development of planning artefacts to be in keeping with a DAL is
a lower risk than additional testing activities being encountered.
These characteristics are to be captured within the framework as an overhead associated
with each evidential item at the leaf nodes, see Figure 8.19. The framework will not ex-
plore the concept of evidence overheads further than the ability to define the overall value.
This approach allows the framework to be fed the relevant values from external tools, e.g.
Microsoft Project, whilst not limiting the factors to be considered. The topic of eviden-
tial overheads is one which would be worthy of further study, see the Recommendations to
Enhance Current Software Safety Assurance Processes chapter.
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Figure 8.19: Change Overhead Associated with Child Nodes
8.2.8 Approach for Optimisation
A method to reason under uncertainty, e.g. to determine the overall degree of membership
to the DALs, is only one element to the DSF. Another key feature of the DSF is to help
decision makers to determine a target DAL for a system and to assist with decisions made
to reach the target. This approach is to guide decision makers to use the differing states of
evidence, e.g. ancillary, and to adjust the evidence attributes when deemed to reflect the
‘real-world’.
To be of value to the DSF and the premise of the thesis, the approach chosen to perform
the optimisation is expected to:
• Derive sufficient answers to assist with decision making.
• Allow the inclusion of a number of variables/factors to determine the ‘strength’ of a
potential solution.
• Demonstrate the ability to determine more valuable results via convergence on options
based upon globally available data.
• Allow refinements of the optimisation based upon inputs into the system.
• Allow useful and informative data to be extracted.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 202 of 328
8.2.8.1 System Components of an Optimisation Problem
In essence, the process of optimisation is to select the best element, or set of elements, from
a set of available alternatives. The concept of optimisation is part of a wider theory of
evolutionary computing. The evolutionary approach is applied to automating the problem
solving for a system. A system, in this context, consists of three components: inputs, outputs,
and an internal model connecting the two (Eiben and Smith, 2003). The type of problem is
determined by the system components which are known: optimisation, modelling (or system
identification), and simulation (Eiben and Smith, 2003).
Within an optimisation problem the internal model and the desired output are known.
The task is to determine a suitable input. Figure 8.20 illustrates the system components
states for an optimisation problem.
Figure 8.20: System Component States Within an Optimisation Problem (Eiben and Smith,
2003)
8.2.8.2 Optimisation Within Its Context
Once a suitable strategy has been devised by the decision makers on the types of evidence
and the potential values of the evidence attributes to achieve a DAL then there is a need
for the DSF to optimise. The optimisation can be applied to some or all of the evidence
attributes, these act as the inputs to the optimisation problem. Optimisation will allow
the decision makers to implement a minimum of changes and the most effective changes to
achieve the target DAL.
8.2.8.3 Methods to Conduct Optimisation
As with the method to reason under uncertainty for the DSF the choice of the optimisation
technique also needs to be fit for purpose and proportionate. The main tenet of the thesis
is not to make clear recommendations on the most suitable search/optimisation techniques
but to utilise an optimisation method which is appropriate for the problem.
There are a range of search/optimisation techniques which broadly fall within three
categories:
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• Calculus Based. Direct and indirect.
• Random. Guided and non-guided.
• Enumeratives. Guided and non-guided.
There are a great number of techniques and algorithms which fall under the three broad
categories stated above; e.g. there are numerous “nature-inspired” algorithms such as ant
and bee, firefly, bat, and flower pollination (Yang, 2018). Due to the DSF requiring to
implement a sufficient optimisation technique it is not intended to conduct an exhaustive
analysis of the techniques. A number of potential techniques are outlined below.
• Genetic Algorithm (GA). GA42 are inspired by the principles of genetics and evolution.
They attempt to mimic the reproduction behaviour observed in biological populations.
The principal of survival of the fittest is adopted to select and generate individuals (de-
sign solutions) which are adapted to their environment (design objectives/constraints)
(Haasan, Cohanim and De Week, 2005). Over a number of generations (iterations) the
desirable traits (design characteristics) will evolve and remain in the genome compo-
sition of the population (set of design solutions generated each iteration) over traits
with weaker undesirable characteristics (Haasan, Cohanim and De Week, 2005). Ad-
vantages of GAs include: greater success of finding global optimal43; do not require
derivatives44; can be applied with both discrete and continuous parameters45; can be
applied to complex and not well defined problems; bad solutions do not negatively
affect the end solutions; and is very well established within the domain (Abdmouleh
et al., 2017). Disadvantages include: can be time consuming for large and complex
problems (repeated fitness function evaluation46); can suggest bad solutions; can be
trapped into local optima47; and they can be inaccurate (Abdmouleh et al., 2017).
• Simulated Annealing (SA). SA48 emulates the physical process of annealing; that of
submitting a solid to high temperature, with subsequent cooling, to obtain high-quality
42Introduced in the mid-1970s by John Holland (Mitchell, 1996).
43A solution which is as good (or better) than all possible solutions.
44Derivative-based algorithms do not take into account multiple optima as they go to a local optimum
near to where they started (Burns Statistics, 2018).
45Discrete data is that which can be counted and continuous data is that which can be measured.
46The concept of a fitness function is to determine how close a given design solution is to achieving the
set aims.
47The relative best solution within a given neighbouring solution set.
48Originally proposed in the early 1950s as a method to model the natural process of solidification and
formation of crystals (Lee and El-Sharkawi, 2008). Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vacchi (1983) and Cerny (1985)
noted the physical process of annealing could be associated with some combinatorial optimisation problems
(Lee and El-Sharkawi, 2008).
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crystals. Defect-free crystals (solids with minimum energy) are more likely to be formed
under a slow cooling process. The two main features of SA are: the transition mech-
anism between states and the cooling schedule (Lee and El-Sharkawi, 2008). Within
combinatorial optimisation of complex problems, SA aims to find an optimal configura-
tion (or state with minimum ‘energy’). Advantages of SA: can be simple to implement;
can provide good solutions for many combinational problems; and it can be robust (Ab-
dmouleh et al., 2017). SA disadvantages include: may terminate in local minimum49;
can have large computing time; cannot provide information on the level by which the
local minimum deviates from the global minimum50; local minimum can depend on
the initial configuration; and cannot given an upper bound for the computation time
(Abdmouleh et al., 2017).
• Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). PSO is initialised with a population of random
solutions (called particles). With each particle having a velocity as they travel through
the search space. The velocities are dynamically adjusted based upon their behaviours.
A combination is made of the history of the particles own current, and best, locations
with those of one or more members of the swarm. This process repeats to move closer to
an optimum of the fitness function (Sarkar, Roy and Purkayastha, 2013). Advantages
of PSOs include: being simple to implement; few parameters to adjust; parallel com-
putation; robust; have higher probability and efficiency in finding the global optima;
fast convergence; do not overlap and mutate; and can have short computational times
(Abdmouleh et al., 2017). Disadvantages include: difficult to define initial design pa-
rameters; cannot work out the problems of scattering; can converge prematurely; and
be trapped into a local minimum (especially within complex problems) (Abdmouleh
et al., 2017).
• Harmony Search. Harmony Search is inspired from harmony improvisation with various
pitches (inputs) being combined to reach a perfect harmony (output). The technique
makes use of a Harmony Memory Considering Rate (HMCR) and Pitch Adjusting
Rate (PAR) which are used to generate and further mutate a solution (Wang, Gao
and Zenger, 2015). Advantages of the approach includes: no initial value settings are
required (Wang, Gao and Zenger, 2015); can use discrete and continuous variables;
cannot diverge; and may escape local optima (Abdmouleh et al., 2017). Disadvantages
include: ability to search for local optima is weak (Wang, Gao and Zenger, 2015);
49A local minimum, also called a relative minimum, is a minimum within a neighbourhood (Weisstein,
2018b).
50A global minimum, also known as an absolute minimum, is the smallest overall value of a set, function,
etc., over its entire range (Weisstein, 2018a).
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can reach a high number of iterations; may encounter unproductive iterations without
improving the solution; and can have a high dimensional multimodal problem (Abd-
mouleh et al., 2017).
• Greedy Algorithm. This approach is a problem solving heuristic which makes the local
optimal choice at each stage with the aim of finding the global optimum. The algorithm
chooses what appears to be the best option at any one step. There are advantages to
this approach: finding a solution is easy and straightforward with a run time which is
significantly reduced (Choudhary, 2018). However, there are numerous disadvantages:
no possible alternatives are selected which means that if a wrong segmentation is
reached the algorithm gets “stuck” in it (Ibanez, Santos and Berreira, 2006). Also,
there is a need to work much harder to understand correctness issues and it is hard to
prove why any given solution is correct (Choudhary, 2018).
As stated, the aim of the optimisation process within the framework is for it to be fit for
purpose and proportionate. The thesis is not based upon generating a perfected or endorsed
optimisation approach rather it is to determine and illustrate the value which optimisation
can play in the adoption of a diverse evidence software safety assurance process. Within
the software engineering and safety domain the GA optimisation approach has a level of
pedigree. It is being implemented within areas for software/system reliability modelling
(Hsu and Huang, 2010, Tian et al., 2009); software quality assurance (Suresh, 2015) and
modelling (Drown, Khoshgoftaar and Seliya, 2009); test case/data generation (Dong and
Peng, 2011, Lijuan, Yue and Hongfeng, 2012), testing efficiency (Khan and Amjad, 2016);
software cost estimation (Li, Xie and Goh, 2007, Gharehchopogh, Rezaii and Arasteh, 2015);
and security assurance (Dong et al., 2010). The use of GAs has provided value in each of
these research areas.
It is clear that the use of GAs is not suitable for all instances of optimisation, e.g. there
are benefits of Breeding Algorithms (BAs) over GAs (Xiao-ping, Shi-zhao and Xin-wei, 2008).
However, GAs are deemed to be very effective and the research and application has been
popular in the past (Yue et al., 2009) and continues to be so with a range of recent research
adopting GAs. It is classed as being a useful piece in the puzzle (Cronin and Butka, 2018)
with it comparing favourably to other optimisation approaches (Hristakeva and Shrestha,
2005, Kaewyotha and Songpan, 2018). GAs are also being adopted for modern novel research
areas, e.g. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) deployment (Cho and Kim, 2018).
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8.2.9 Options to Assist Decision Making
A key element to the DSF is the requirement to allow decision makers to conduct what-if
analysis and to explore scenarios. A rich set of options to perform such analysis will allow
for a more varied and inclusive solution space. There is a need to ensure that the decision
options are suitable and proportionate. Therefore, the options presented to the decision
makers will be based upon logical steps to achieve potential outcomes.
It is envisaged that the following options will be provided to assist the decision makers.
The options are not listed in a particular order; they represent a flow of decisions that will
be user-determined. The options to assist with decision making can be formed into broad
categories:
1. Counter-Evidence.
(a) Determine if the current evidence contains counter-evidence once the node at-
tributes (e.g. confidence) are calculated.
(b) Allow the counter-evidence threshold to be user-defined (i.e. the quality level
which constitutes negative evidence).
(c) Allow the counter-evidence values to be displayed on the visualisation.
(d) Allow nodes identified as being counter-evidence to be selected by the user with
attributes refined with subsequent optimisation.
2. Attribute selection.
(a) Allow attributes of valid nodes to be user-defined. Attributes of certain nodes are
calculated by the FISs and cannot be user-defined. An example is the child node
confidence which is calculated from the user defined quality and contribution.
(b) Allow attributes to be selected for the various states of the evidence; e.g. setting
the quality attributes for the nodes of interest for extant data.
(c) Allow attributes to be chosen for one or more nodes/strands at any one time.
3. DAL selection/output.
(a) Allow the target DAL to be user-defined for the evidence. The target DAL can
subsequently be aimed for via the optimisation processes.
(b) Show the DAL which is achieved with the current evidence.
(c) Show the DAL which could be achieved via changes to node attributes.
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(d) DAL display will show level of compliance to each DAL, i.e. the degree of MF for
each DAL.
4. Optimisation.
(a) Allow attributes to be selected for any valid node/strand and to optimise based
upon user-defined attributes.
(b) Allow overhead values for the nodes (e.g. time to implement any change) to
be taken into account when the optimisation of the tree/nodes is performed.
Overhead acts as a penalty for the node.
(c) Method will derive a suitable value for the node attributes (if defined for consider-
ation) which is between the existing attribute value and that which is user-defined.
Optimisation will limit the level of change, i.e. minimal changes to be made to
the existing value.
5. Visualisation.
(a) Allow differences between the existing attributes of the evidence and the what-if
calculations to be displayed. Will also show the calculated reasoning values based
upon the attributes on the nodes.
(b) Show the impact that a node attribute change has and the propagation this has
within the tree structure.
(c) Show all evidence contained within the tree and the current or status, e.g. extant
etc.
(d) Colour grade the tree nodes based upon the node confidence values.
(e) Root node for the tree will display the DAL output values and the level of mem-
bership of each DAL.
(f) Show the difference between current and potential node attribute values, indicated
via percentage values.
(g) Show overhead values for all nodes in the tree.
8.3 End-to-End DSF Process
The design decisions for the DSF results in an end-to-end implementation which allows SMEs
to follow a structured flow in order to arrive at an informed qualification decision. Figure
8.21 shows the user flow.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 208 of 328
Figure 8.21: End-to-End DSF Process
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8.4 Summary: Framework Design and Implementation
Decisions
A design flow was devised which took into account a number of underpinning principles
and features for the DSF. A set of characteristics of assurance evidence were devised which
described the features of the evidence and how the evidence attributes were combined. The
underpinning principles also related to the method to conduct the reasoning and the op-
timisation process. The features of the DSF allows stakeholders to explore scenarios and
alternative solutions based upon the use of diverse evidence.
The states of the evidence are also defined to allow the differing values which may be
placed on such data to be accounted for, e.g. regulators may place greater weight on evidence
which supports a standard/guideline. Informative visualisations have been developed with
a range of configurations to allow stakeholders to comprehend and make decisions in an
efficient manner. A varied set of initial options have been devised to allow stakeholders to
explore evidence sets and to amend/add/remove the nodes. This is in addition to the variety
of evidence attribute value alterations.
The underpinning methods to calculate the diverse evidence values, i.e. the reasoning
and optimisation approaches, are determined to be fit for purpose for the DSF. They assist
with demonstrating the value of diverse evidence and allow judgements on evidence to be
defined. The structure of the FIS and the subsequent MFs are also proportional and suitable
for the problem.
The creation of the DSF allows for a number of case studies to be implemented to
demonstrate the value of the DSF and the benefits which diverse evidence can have to
support a PEs safety assurance argument.
Chapter 8 has partly responded to the research sub-question: What is a suitable structure for
software safety assurance evidence and can mathematically derived approaches inform how
judgements are made on the evidence and for proposing alternative/optimised solutions?.
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Chapter 9
Case Studies, Exploratory Testing,
and Evaluation of the DSF
The previous chapters outlined the justification for why there is a need for the DSF and
provided the justification for the design decisions. The previous chapters provided the foun-
dations to develop the framework itself.
The statements and decisions made in previous chapters1 regarding the value and use
of diverse evidence need to be placed under practical review. Findings can be derived via
suitable case studies and by the use of exploratory testing. Importantly case studies can ex-
plore a research topic within its context (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). Exploratory
testing also allows deductive reasoning to be adopted based upon previous findings which
informs future tests (Mitrea, 2011). Case studies and exploratory testing are methods which
are stated to have clear benefits to research and theory testing (Saunders, Lewis and Thorn-
hill, 2012, Whittaker, 2009, Gerrard and Thompson, 2002). This chapter outlines the case
studies (and additional activities), the results, and the observations from these exercises. An
evalution of the DSF is also provided.
This chapter will examine:
• Purpose and Aims of the Case Studies and Exploratory Testing. The purpose of what
the case studies will achieve and how they will assist with eliciting information for
relevant observations.
• Caveats and Scenario Selection. Descriptions of the case studies which will be adopted
to demonstrate the value of the DSF and the use of diverse evidence.
1From Chapter 2 (Research Strategy) through to Chapter 6 (Current Permissible Evidence for Safety-
Critical Software Assurance).
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• Variable Types Changed as a Result of Case Studies and Exploratory Testing. Informa-
tion on the types of variables to be manipulated via the case studies and exploratory
testing.
• Potential Evidence Assessment Flow. Information on a proposed evidence assessment
flow intended to allow for the initial review and assessment to gather diverse evidence.
• Case Study Results. Information on the outcomes achieved when diverse evidence
is adopted via the DSF. Also, how the DSF was utilised to inform the gathering of
additional evidence.
• Observations from Case Studies and Exploratory Testing. Information on the observa-
tions from the case studies and exploratory testing. Observations are focussed on the
relationships between the attributes of the evidence and how changes were propagated.
• Evaluation of the DSF. An evaluation of the DSF with observations from the expected
findings and the actual case studies and exploratory testing results. As assessment
is made of the DSF in relation to the research in the area of quantitive confidence
judgements.
• Summary: Case Studies and Exploratory Testing. Salient points from the chapter’s
findings.
9.1 Purpose and Aims of the Case Studies and Ex-
ploratory Testing
Despite the misconceptions regarding the purpose and value of case studies2 it is accepted
that case studies are valid for exploring wider research phases and for testing propositions
(Yin, 2003). In addition to conducting case studies, exploratory testing is also to be imple-
mented to understand the relationships between the node attributes. Exploratory testing is
a recognised technique within the software testing domain. The process generates tests of
interest whilst being cognisant of the action taken and the subsequent impact (Kaner, Falk
and Nguyen, 1999)3.
The case studies and the exploratory tests have been chosen to investigate the utility
of the DSF and the benefit of adopting diverse evidence for a range of prototype/research
2From a social science perspective research approaches should be adopted hierarchically and this thinking
translates to other research domains. As an example, there is a misconception that case studies should be
adopted for the early exploratory phase of research (Yin, 2003).
3Further information is contained within sub-section 9.5.5.
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equipment. In essence, the choice of case studies is to explore the systems within the wider
solution space contained within Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1. The case studies and exploratory
tests are generated with the aim to:
• Respond partially or in full to a number of the findings within Background and the
Problem of Interest (chapter 3) which highlighted why further work was required in
the area of diverse software qualification evidence. The findings included, but were not
limited to, the lack of ability to optimise results and the myriad of attributes which
could be utilised within a quantitative confidence argument.
• Utilise the DSF options to propose and generate alternative diverse evidence argu-
ments. The DSF provides the tool for the decision maker. Options to explore diverse
evidence options include, but are not limited to, the selection of one or many evidence
attributes4 and for the provision to provide values with subsequent optimisation5.
• Demonstrate the value of the overall reasoning under uncertainty approach and that
the chosen method is fit for purpose.
• Demonstrate the value of optimisation within any decision making process and that
the chosen method is fit for purpose.
It should be noted that the purpose of the case studies and exploratory testing (and the
DSF itself) is not to optimise a perceived ideal scenario, e.g. to gain compliance to standards.
It is to optimise the evidence which exists or can be obtained via the most efficient and/or
effective changes whilst taking into account the overheads associated with any node/attribute
alterations. A key principle is that the results are achieved via optimising, and not gaming6.
9.2 Caveats and Scenario Selection
To meet the stated purpose and aims for the case studies a number of scenarios have been
selected to allow suitable DSF features to be explored. They demonstrate the value and
benefit to a measured diverse evidence approach via the use of suitable attributes.
The following should be noted regarding the pre-existing systems which have been subject
to assessment via the DSF. What follows is a reasonably comprehensive list of caveats - they
4For example, sufficiency.
5For example, allow decision makers to propose values for attributes, such as quality. This will also allow
decision makers to ascertain the amount of quality improvement to achieve a sufficient level of confidence in
the evidence.
6See sub-section 7.3.1 for further information on the concept of gaming.
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are important to ensure that there are no misconceptions about the information which is used
for the research case studies.
• The pre-existing systems have been chosen as case studies to allow the principles of
the DSF to be explored and for interesting observations to be gained. The systems are
suitable for investigation as part of the defined research strategy.
• The inclusion of a system within the case studies should not be taken as an indication
that the system is being considered as part of a current or future platform.
• The evidence gathered for the systems and the decisions which are informed by the DSF
provides, in some instances, a hypothetical perspective on the evidence which could be
expected for a qualification argument. This has been based upon SME feedback7.
• The evidence reviewed and provided for the case studies has been gained in the context
of conducting research to ascertain the utility of the DSF and the use of diverse evidence
generally.
• The expected DALs for the systems are based on assessments which reviewed the
hypothetical safety integrity levels of the systems. The DALs reflect the potential func-
tionality which the system could provide within a hypothetical platform architecture.
• None of the pre-existing systems included within the case studies are within any UK
in-service platforms and have been selected for research purposes. Any PSH associ-
ated with a system has been gained via fielded prototype testing and/or initial trials
conducted by one or more nations.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the process adopted to identify suitable systems and the related
evidence which can inform the case studies and explortory testing.
Despite the pre-existing systems not being considered for any current or future platforms
there are further caveats to the data used in this chapter. Due to commercial sensitivities
the following should be noted regarding the case studies and the examples:
• The names of any pre-existing systems have not been provided.
• The types of hypothetical platforms which the systems may be valid for have not been
provided.
7SMEs were selected on their experience and knowledge of representative systems. Information was
gained from those that had conducted a range of 5 software assurance assessments as this would allow their
knowledge to be gained from a sample of systems and associated evidence.
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Figure 9.1: Process for the Identification of Pre-Existing Systems and the Related Evidence
for Case Studies and Exploratory Testing
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• No information is provided on why a particular initial evidence threshold was reached,
e.g. software developed to differing standards.
• No information is provided on why only particular evidence would be available for the
review, e.g. access control.
• The names and details of nations which own the systems are not provided. Where
relevant they will be referred to as nation X, Y, etc.
The following case studies and exploratory tests are to be implemented:
1. System A. The system has been identified as being hypothetically DAL A LRU. The
software was developed to DAL C. There is no CEH evidence available for review
and there is a limited level of PSH which could be utilised within a diverse evidence
argument.
2. System B. The system has been identified as being hypothetically DAL A LRU. The
software and CEH were developed to suitable levels of rigour. There is additional
evidence which could be utilised within a diverse evidence argument.
3. System C. The system has been identified as being hypothetically DAL B LRU. The
software was developed to DAL D. CEH design logic information and CEH testing
process evidence is available for review. There is a limited level of PSH which could
be utilised within a diverse evidence argument.
4. System D. The system has been identified as being hypothetically DAL C LRU. The
software was developed to a suitable level of rigour. There is no access to the software
or CEH process information. There is a level of PSH from the use of the system within
other contexts which could be utilised within a diverse evidence argument.
5. Exploratory Testing. In order to fully exploit the features of the DSF and to max-
imise the observations from the study it is intended for a number of further mod-
elling/experiments to be conducted. These will focus on understanding the relation-
ships between nodes within the structure and how changes to the attributes are propa-
gated. A number of hypotheses are to be devised to act as initial ideas for experimen-
tation/observation. The modelling is to inform the case study ‘solutions’ which aim to
reach the perceived hypothetical target DAL of the system. Hypotheses include, but
are not limited to, understanding such aspects as if small incremental improvements
to evidence attribute values can have greater benefit than large improvements to fewer
nodes, e.g. based upon change overheads associated with the evidence.
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9.3 Variable Types Changed as a Result of Case Stud-
ies and Exploratory Testing
From a research perspective the case studies and exploratory tests are performed via a
manipulation of variables, for example via the number of nodes (i.e. the evidence) or the
attribute values (e.g. quality). In essence, the findings are as a result of a comparison or a
correlational view of two types of variables (Salkind, 2010):
• Independent Variable8. Variables that are directly changed by the researcher or SME.
In essence, the cause of any change(s).
• Dependent Variable. Variable that is changed due to the manipulation of the indepen-
dent variables by the researcher or SME. In essence, the effect of any change(s) and
what is being measured.
The structure of the evidence allows the variables to be identified at a local level so that
changes can be made to an evidence family and the linked immediate nodes (subtrees and
ancestor). Changes to these nodes can then allow observations to be made on the wider
diverse evidence. There are a number of attributes which can be manipulated within an
evidence family and the immediate nodes in order to measure changes.
There are a range of methods to instigate changes within a DSFs evidence tree. Within
this chapter the variables for change are stated in relation to a particular evidence (leaf) node
under review - this is termed the Node of Interest (NoI). This terminology allows consistent
comparisons. It is this relationship which was adopted in order to derive the hypotheses for
further evaluation. The evidence structure and attributes (both independent and dependent)
are in relation to the NoI.
Table 9.1 contains a sample of the nodes which are within a standard evidence tree. The
Table states the nodes and the associated attributes which can be altered to influence the
overall confidence (and DAL membership) of the ancestor node. It is these nodes/attributes
which were reviewed and assessed as part of the case studies and modelling/experiments.
This is in addition to the data category types (e.g. extant and ancillary) which form part
of any ‘solution’.
Figure 9.2 illustrates this concept further. The concept also acts as a pattern for the
wider variable comparison/correlation observations within the diverse evidence structure.
8Note that the term independent in this context is different to that defined for an evidence attribute such
as quality.
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Table 9.1: Variables for Change - Identified Nodes and Associated Attributes
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Figure 9.2: Independent and Dependent Variables in Relation to a NoI
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9.4 Potential Evidence Assessment Flow
In order to devise a consistent approach to gathering and assessing evidence, a structured
flow was created. This ‘flow’ was to purely act as an initial method to determine and assess
the steps within the process to gather diverse evidence. Therefore, the case studies and
exploratory tests purposefully did not fully adhere to the initially determined ‘flow’.
Figure 9.3 shows the extent of the process flow to devise alternative evidence approaches.
It includes directions to fully utilise the visualisation and optimisation options as part of the
DSF approach. In essence, the initial proposed process flow states the following:
1. Guidance on the data population, i.e. the nodes and their attributes for extant, oblig-
atory, and ancillary data. Population of Comma-Separated Values (CSV) files for
import into the DSF.
2. Execution of the DSF to obtain initial confidence and DAL membership values, via
the FISs.
3. Perform a Counter-Evidence (CE) check and direction for removal via quality attribute
change(s), use of visualisation techniques for impact comparison, and assessment of
CE for subsequent reduction. If the target DAL is not achieved then further steps are
required. If the target DAL is reached then perform optimisation (see item 6).
4. The nodes and attributes are then reviewed for their impact and subsequently amended.
For each of the steps within Table 9.2 the following activities are conducted:
(a) The execution of the DSF.
(b) Pre- and post-change comparison via visualisation methods.
(c) Review of the revised overall confidence level.
(d) If the target DAL is not achieved then further steps are required, i.e. the next
step stated in Table 9.2.
(e) If the target is reached then perform optimisation (see item 6).
The steps within Table 9.2 are undertaken for the node/attribute reviews. The activi-
ties in the list above are conducted for each step within Table 9.2 to assess the impact
of any changes.
5. If the target DAL is not achieved then direction is provided to assess additional evidence
and for risk assessments to be conducted to address or tolerate evidence shortfalls.
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No. Node Attribute(s) Data
1 Leaf Quality Extant
2 Parent Sufficiency Extant
3 Parent Sufficiency and Independence Extant
4 Leaf Quality Obligatory
5 Leaf Quality Ancillary
6 Parent Sufficiency Obligatory and Ancillary
7 Parent Sufficiency and Independence Obligatory and Ancillary
Table 9.2: Steps for Node/Attribute Reviews
6. If the target DAL can be achieved for any of the above stages then direction is provided
to set if evidence change overheads are to be considered, execution of DSF, potential
pre- and post-change comparison via visualisation, perform optimisation (via GA) and
review optimised data to determine suitable evidence to gather/contract. Reassess the
node contributions if required.
It is recognised that for each branch within the structure, e.g. life-cycle, there will be a
significant number of leaf and parent nodes to assign attribute values to. As an example,
within the case studies there are over 100 nodes just for the life-cycle branch9. This is
illustrated within Figure 9.4 which shows (a) the supporting life-cycle evidence which has
been assessed by SMEs and has suitable values assigned to the node attributes (e.g. leaf-
node quality); (b) the FISs which are implemented and repeated for the life-cycle branch to
derive the branch FIS output values; (c) the life-cycle branch total which is an output to
inform a case study and is based upon the supporting activities within the previous steps;
and (d) the context of the branch output and supporting evidence of the FISs in relation
to the data tree. Steps (a), (b), and (c) are repeated for each of the evidence branches,
e.g. Delivery Support (DSP), PSH, etc. This illustrates the scale of producing the evidence
values.
9.5 Case Study Results
The established principles, devised case studies, and the accepted exploratory testing allowed
a range of interesting results to the obtained. The following sub-sections state the evidence
initially established for the hypothetical systems and the subsequent additional evidence
gathered. The evidence stated and the confidence gained to reach a threshold are developed
incrementally. The overall evidence confidence is used to derive the DAL membership via
9In addition to, for example: ą140 nodes for the security-related airworthiness branch; ą90 nodes for the
delivery support branch; ą40 nodes for the testing branch; and ą40 nodes for the PSH branch.
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Figure 9.3: Potential Evidence Assessment Flow
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Figure 9.4: Activities to Generate a Single Evidence Branch for a Case Study
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the root node which may be used to compare against any hypothetical target DAL for the
system. In the tables which follow the values indicate the level of confidence for the specific
evidence strands (e.g. Life-Cycle (LC)) and the overall confidence level (i.e. OC) which
takes into account all of the evidence strand values for that instance.
It should be noted that although the information has been gathered for research purposes
for hypothetical systems and DALs there are still commercial sensitivities associated with
the data. Therefore, the precise data related to each of the individual evidence nodes cannot
be provided. However, information is provided on the confidence gained for each of the
branches, e.g. life-cycle information and PSH if relevant. The inability to disclose this
information still allows the concepts and DSF implementation to be illustrated for context
to the findings/observations.
It is not intended for each of the case studies to provide an action-by-action account
of the activities undertaken to increment the evidence confidence. The sub-sections which
follow provide the incremental results and a narrative of salient points from the exercises.
Within the case study results the branch names are abbreviated to the following. It should
be noted that the branches include evidence sub-types which were discussed in previous
chapters (e.g. data integrity).
• Life-Cycle: LC.
• Delivery Support: DSP.
• Existing Certification: ECT.
• Product Service History: PSH.
• Security Related Airworthiness: SRA.
• System Complexity: SC.
• Testing: TST.
The results also include a number of further abbreviations for readability purposes:
• Overall Confidence: OC.
• Not Known: N/K.
• Design Assurance Level: DAL.
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9.5.1 Case Study 1: System A
System A was assigned as a hypothetical DAL A. Table 9.3 contains the initial evidence
confidence (in row No. 1). The subsequent additional evidence which was gathered is stated
(in row No. 2 onwards) and the associated confidence levels for the branch and the overall
confidence. The initial branch confidence values and the subsequent changes to the evidence
branches are shown as red and bold.






































































Table 9.3: System A - Incremental Evidence Results
Salient points from the generation of the case study are as follows:
1. The initial available evidence for the system related to the software Life-Cycle (LC),
DSP, and Testing (TST). This was pre-existing evidence which had been reviewed
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previously as part of wider research activities. The evidence obtained for the initial
assessment was from previous reports written by SMEs. A review of the pre-existing
evidence was conducted to determine attribute values for each of the evidential types.
The process involved stating leaf node contribution, quality, and change overhead. The
parent nodes were reviewed to state the sufficiency, independence, and contribution
values. The review was recorded for import into DSF.
2. Due to wider research efforts for the system of interest a number of security related
airworthiness activities were being reviewed. The activities were at an aircraft (plat-
form) level and not specific to the system of interest. Evidence from these activities
were leveraged for inclusion within the incremental diverse evidence argument. The
proposed nodes and attributes were generated and assessed for import into the DSF.
An activity was conducted to ascertain the benefit of conducting system level security
related airworthiness reviews in addition to that performed at the aircraft level. This
exploratory assessment was conducted via the use of the visualisation approaches and
optimisation as part of the DSF. Any addition of evidence for the Security Related
Airworthiness (SRA) at the system level would require further activities.
3. Due to the change overheads associated with any SRA alterations a more efficient and
effective method to gain overall confidence (in comparison) was to make use of the
PSH evidence which would exist for the system. This would involve the gathering of
evidence rather than the generation of evidence10. The PSH information was captured
for nation X which the system is being trialled by. This information was imported
into the DSF.
4. The system of interest is being trialled by more than one nation (i.e. not just nation
X ). Another nation (nation Y ) was approached to ascertain the level of information
which they hold which could inform an additional PSH. This approach was considered
as there was an awareness of the experience hours gained by nation Y and the change
overheads that would be associated with capturing this information. The addition
of PSH from nation Y was considered due to the stated contribution that PSH had
within the framework and the perceived support of PSH by the stakeholders. The
framework output and knowledge of the perceived benefits of gaining nation Y PSH
allowed stakeholders to have awareness of the level of confidence that would be gained
by such information gathering. The information to be captured as part of the nation
Y PSH was visualised and optimised to guide the data to be requested.
10The distinction being in this context that evidence that already exists needs to be gathered, whereas
evidence that could be obtained (but does not exist) needs to be generated - a subtle but important point
when change overheads are considered.
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5. At this stage the system evidence consists of LC, SRA, and PSH from two nations (X
and Y ). This provided a reasonable level of confidence but the overall DAL membership
was still towards DAL B (acknowledging that the DSF outputs are to be used as a
guide and not to be a substitute for expert judgement). Further what-if analysis was
conducted based upon perceived change overheads for node attribute alterations. An
incremental increase in confidence was discovered to be possible via the addition of
Existing Certification (ECT) evidence. Due to the qualification status of the system
within nation Y it was determined that ECT data could be gathered. The value and
availability of the ECT information prompted the use of the evidence type as part of
the wider research and to mitigate a number of systems within the research.
6. Dialogue with stakeholders resulted in the existing evidence being proposed and in
principle deemed sufficient. However, a stakeholder expectation was for safety assess-
ment information to be generated to provide further confidence in the LC information
which was gathered. The benefit of gaining the evidence was determined via the DSF
with the perceived incremental confidence level established. The perceived confidence
level informed the proportionate effort to gather the SAP information.
9.5.2 Case Study 2: System B
System B was assigned as a hypothetical DAL A. Table 9.4 contains the initial evidence
confidence and the subsequent additional evidence gathered.





















Table 9.4: System B - Incremental Evidence Results
Salient points from the generation of the case study are as follows:
1. This is an interesting case study from the perspective that the system already had a
software and CEH development status which was deemed to be suitable in relation
to the defined hypothetical DAL. A detailed assessment had been conducted on the
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system software and CEH activities as part of ongoing research efforts. The detailed
assessments and subsequent reports were written by SMEs. The reports were reviewed
and assessed in order to generate imports to the DSF. The process involved stating leaf
node contribution, quality, and change overhead values. Parent nodes were reviewed
to state sufficiency, independence, and contribution values. The pre-existing reports
outlined that minor shortfalls existed in the system evidence and this was reflected in
the imported data into the DSF.
2. Due to wider activities associated with the research there were a number of SRA reviews
being completed at an aircraft level (not system level specific). To take into account
these activities and to gain consistency with other systems the SRA information was
included within the DSF.
3. A form of what-if analysis was conducted using visualisation and optimisation ap-
proaches offered by the DSF. This was to establish the benefit of additional evidence
with the perceived knowledge of the change overheads associated with the obligatory
and ancillary data. An initial CBA established that there would be limited benefit to
conducting these further activities.
4. Due to the perceived LC and TST compliance to the hypothetical target DAL a rela-
tively high initial confidence level and DAL membership was established. However, the
addition of wider diverse evidence does have the ability to incrementally improve the
overall confidence level. The impact of which is dependent on the attributes that the
additional evidence has, e.g. contribution. Wider research activities which relate to the
system level can have benefits which the DSF can capture to incrementally increase
the overall confidence level. At a system level the benefits may be minimal if perceived
hypothetical target DALs are already met. However the adoption of such approaches
would allow a consistent qualification approach to be achieved.
9.5.3 Case Study 3: System C
System C was assigned as a hypothetical DAL B. Table 9.5 contains the initial evidence
confidence and the subsequent additional evidence gathered.
Salient points from the generation of the case study are as follows:
1. For this system there was a relatively reduced level of available information for review.
For this research the SMEs were required to conduct interviews with commercial SMEs
and to have a number of follow-up queries to establish suitable evidence. The reports
generated by the SMEs were reviewed and assessed to generate imports to the DSF. The
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Table 9.5: System C - Incremental Evidence Results
process involved stating leaf node contribution, quality, and change overhead values.
The parent nodes were reviewed to state sufficiency, independence, and contribution
values. A number of shortfalls were identified in the reports which were captured
within the DSF. This concluded that a hypothetical DAL E/D could be established for
the initial evidence.
2. The system had been trialled for a known period of time within nation Z so the reduced
change overheads associated with such data allowed PSH information to be gathered.
However, the level of information available for the PSH evidence was limited and this
is reflected in the DSF.
3. Due to the level of evidence available to establish confidence there would be limitations
placed on the system. The DSF was used to attempt to establish additional diverse ev-
idence to not require these limitations. A number of what-if scenarios were conducted
to visualise and optimise any findings which could be used to inform recommenda-
tions. However, it was established that evidence would need to be generated (rather
than gathered) and therefore, there would be significant change overheads to consider.
The inability to gain any further information confirmed there would be limitations
with the evidence (and the system). This exercise confirmed that are limits to what
the evidence can provide in terms of building confidence in a given system. A system
such as this, if hypothetically brought into service, may operate with CLE.
9.5.4 Case Study 4: System D
System D was assigned as a hypothetical DAL C. Table 9.6 contains the initial evidence
confidence and the subsequent additional evidence gathered.
Salient points from the generation of the case study are as follows:
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Table 9.6: System D - Incremental Evidence Results
1. The system had a set of initial evidence related to the LC and DSP. This assessment
was based upon evidence which was not fully compliant with the extant standards.
An assessment of the available LC and DSP evidence allowed imports to be generated
for the DSF. This process involved stating leaf node contribution, quality, and change
overhead values. Parent nodes were reviewed to state sufficiency, independence, and
contribution values. The initial evidence did offer a level of confidence which was
captured within the DSF.
2. The system of interest was being trialled within a related domain by nation W. Due
to the level of hours gained via related experience there were relatively low change
overheads associated with the ECT evidence. This evidence was captured within the
DSF. The analysis showed that further evidence was required to reach the hypothetical
target DAL.
3. Further evidence was gathered in the form of PSH due to the associated change over-
heads linked to the fact that existing certification had been gained (captured within the
ECT). A robust PSH evidence assessment allowed a reasonable DAL C membership to
be gained. CBA showed that additional activities to increase the confidence and the
DAL membership were not warranted.
9.5.5 Purpose of Exploratory Testing
In addition to the structured case studies it was very beneficial to conduct a number of
smaller and less structured models/experiments to understand further the behaviour of the
DSF. The case studies provided a rich set of results which adopted key features of the
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DSF with the use of the visualisation techniques to assist with analysing the evidence.
The optimisation features were also utilised to assist with what-if analysis to determine
evidence to gather/generate. Exploratory testing allowed deductive reasoning to be applied
to understand the evidence attributes and the node relationships in greater detail.
The aim of the exploratory testing was to establish how alterations to certain variables
(stated within Variable Types Changed as a Result of Case Studies and Exploratory Testing -
subsection 9.3) reacted within formulated scenarios. There were a large number of variables
to explore and to ascertain how any alterations impacted the immediate evidence family,
subtree/ancestor, and also the wider evidence within the structure.
Exploratory tests investigated, but were not limited to, the following:
• Is it less of an overhead to correct the counter-evidence of a node or to improve the
quality, independence, or sufficiency of the sibling nodes?
• Is there a direct correlation between an increase in overhead ‘budget’ and the overall
quality which can be achieved?
• Are there cases where it is better to add evidence rather than improve the quality,
independence, or sufficiency of the existing evidence, i.e. less overhead?
• Is it best to add nodes to improve sufficiency (but not improve quality) or to add nodes
which are not independent (with no quality improvements)?
This proved a very useful activity with observations captured which were, importantly,
repeatable.
9.6 Observations from Case Studies and Exploratory
Testing
This section contains a number of observations made during the implementation of the
case studies and the exploratory testing exercises. They result in actions that need to be
considered when SMEs are devising diverse evidence strategies. The observations are made
on the relationships between the attributes of nodes and how alterations/addition of attribute
values can impact the immediate and wider evidence set values.
1. If there is an improvement in the ability to manage node overheads (i.e. there is an
increase in the change overhead value which can be included within any calculations)
this does not automatically equate to an increase in the child/parent confidence.
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(a) Improving the quality of nodes or the addition of nodes to increase parent node
sufficiency/independence can lead to ‘expensive’ change overheads. Lower change
overheads, but with larger benefits, can be made via the correct node selection,
e.g. contribution based.
(b) Improvements to any nodes need to be targeted to ensure that it is aimed at
the appropriate evidence, e.g. the node has high contribution and/or addition of
sufficiency/independence.
(c) An improvement in the ability to process greater change overhead values, e.g. ad-
ditional funds, is valid for counter-evidence or areas which need specific attention
for localised improvements rather than overall confidence building.
2. Stakeholders may require a balanced set of evidence which contains a range of evidential
types, i.e. a set of evidence which has independence.
(a) If the parent nodes are of low confidence then improve their sufficiency and in-
dependence values. This also improves the overall evidence confidence, i.e. the
DAL.
(b) If the contribution of the child and parent is high then it is preferential to improve
the quality of the existing evidence rather than add evidence, i.e. that with less
change overheads.
(c) If the existing evidence has a low contribution then it is preferential to add ev-
idence rather than improve the quality of the existing evidence; if additional
evidence improves the sufficiency/independence of the parent node.
3. Improving the sufficiency/independence of a parent node can have greater impact than
the addition of higher quality child nodes.
(a) If the existing evidence is maximised by improving the parent/child nodes that
have high contributions, e.g. improved child node quality, then further improve-
ments can be achieved via the addition of evidence.
(b) The addition of child node evidence does not need to increase the average con-
fidence of the existing child nodes; i.e. the additional evidence quality does not
have to be as high as the existing evidence. However, the child evidence does need
to improve the sufficiency/independence of the parent.
(c) An increase in the average quality of the child nodes can increase the parent
confidence; however, the level of the quality increase needs to be significant to
have any substantial impact.
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(d) Table 9.7 shows a very simplified set of attribute relationships with a single parent
node with four leaf nodes. The examples result in very modest increases to
the confidence value; however the example serves the purpose to illustrate the
observation. Deviations from observation (a) within Table 9.7 in the subsequent
observations, (b) and (c), are shown as red and bold.
i. Observation (a) within Table 9.7 shows the confidence value (54) for a simple
structure with medium/moderate quality/contribution values.
ii. Observation (b) shows an increase in confidence (by nearly 2%) if the leaf
nodes improve the quality from medium to high.
iii. However, it is shown within Observation (c) that medium quality with high
contribution11 evidence which improves the sufficiency/independence of the
parent (e.g. from medium to high) has a greater impact on the confidence
improvement (by over 9%). Any change overheads would also need to be
taken into account.
4. The contribution of any evidence (child or parent) is paramount.
(a) Child nodes may have high values for quality and parents may have high values
for sufficiency/independence, however for the parent node it is the contribution
which can have a significant impact on the confidence value.
(b) Increases in node confidence are observed for those nodes with high values for
sufficiency/independence attributes. However, in these instances the sibling nodes
of the parent will also have to increase to gain benefit; i.e. there is a need to
increase child nodes and parent node attributes (but not the contributions) to
observe increases.
(c) For a parent with high sufficiency/independence it is still the contribution which
impacts the confidence the most.
5. It can be more effective to make small improvements to a larger number of evidence
quality and/or parent sufficiency/independence values than to make significant changes
to fewer items of evidence.
(a) A key element to consider for node improvement is that of contribution and change
overhead values.
11Noting that there is a correlation between supporting evidence being deemed sufficient and the contri-
bution levels of the supporting evidence.
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Attribute1
QLT CTR IND SFY CNF
Observation (a)
















































































































Note(s): 1. Quality=QLT; Contribution=CNT; Independence=IND; Sufficiency=SFY;
Confidence=CNF.
Table 9.7: Observations - (b) Improving the Quality of Existing Child Nodes vs (c) Addition
of Evidence to Improve Independence/Sufficiency of Parent Node
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(b) It is more effective to target evidence of higher contribution with low overheads
than evidence which appears to be requiring substantial improvement.
(c) The observations within Table 9.8 shows a very simplified set of attribute relation-
ships with a single parent node with four leaf nodes. The examples result in very
modest increases to the confidence value; however the example serves the purpose
to illustrate the observation. Deviations from observation (a) within Table 9.8 in
the subsequent observations, (b) and (c), are shown as red and bold.
i. Observation (a) within Table 9.8 shows the confidence value (42) for a simple
structure with four nodes with low quality and high contribution with one
node having low quality and low contribution values.
ii. Observation (b) shows an increase in confidence (by over 2%) if the evidence
with low contribution has the quality increased from low to high.
iii. However, it is shown within Observation (c) that low/medium evidence which
improves the evidence with high contribution (e.g. from low to low/medium)
has a greater impact on the confidence improvement (by over 14%). Any
change overheads would also need be taken into account.
6. Improvements made to evidence with low/medium quality values need to be undertaken
if there is benefit to the wider system confidence.
(a) Due to the change overheads associated with all evidence there is a requirement
for changes to be made only if they improve confidence.
(b) There is little benefit to making improvements if it only allows greater perceived
conformance to a standard. The objective itself and the benefit of compliance
should be considered.
(c) The use of overhead values and the measurement of impact on node confidence
allows for the observation that all additions/amendments to the body of evidence
needs to play an active part in the confidence building.
7. High quality and high contribution values for evidence should have sibling nodes which
provide context to the node’s evidence.
(a) Parent nodes of child nodes with high quality and high contribution values should
have commensurate sufficiency (if possible) to allow the benefit of the evidence
to be exploited.
(b) A commensurate sufficiency will also allow the context of the high performing
child node to be understood so that it is not in isolation.
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Attribute1
QLT CTR IND SFY CNF
Observation (a)























Endorsed Processes Low (30) Low (30) - - -
Observation (b)




























Low (30) - - -
Observation (c)



































Endorsed Processes Low (30) Low (30) - - -
Note(s): 1. Quality=QLT; Contribution=CNT; Independence=IND; Sufficiency=SFY;
Confidence=CNF.
Table 9.8: Observations - (b) Improving the Quality of a Single Existing Child Node vs (c)
Improving the Quality of Multiple Existing Child Nodes
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(c) The benefit of a higher sufficiency parent node is not so much a requirement for
medium confidence child nodes as the impact on the parent confidence will be
limited.
8. It is legitimate to add child node evidence to a parent where the child node does not in-
crease the average child node confidence as long as the parent sufficiency/independence
is increased.
(a) A key element to confidence improvement is ensuring that the evidence is helping
to build confidence.
(b) Average child node confidence is valid if it is informing the confidence in the
parent node.
9. Possible to improve independence but not improve sufficiency.
(a) By definition an improvement in the sufficiency of a parent node is due to addi-
tional evidence being added which provides further information to support any
confidence value. Therefore, sufficiency should increase the independence.
(b) However, improving independence does not necessarily improve sufficiency as the
additional evidence may be informing evidence which already exists within the
framework.
(c) Care needs to be taken when additional evidence is being chosen so that the change
overheads are minimised and that the most benefit can be realised. Improving
the diversity with additional evidence can gain more benefits than adding further
evidence to what exists (even if it is independent).
10. It is legitimate to influence the world-view of stakeholder(s) to amend the perceived
evidence contribution.
(a) As established, evidence contribution is key.
(b) If all avenues have been explored to improve evidence confidence via the addition
of evidence, and/or quality, independence, sufficiency improvements then the only
other attribute for modification is that of contribution.
(c) It is legitimate to influence the world-view of stakeholder(s) to amend node con-
tribution values if there is significant scientific/research evidence to warrant such
action.
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(d) It may be more cost effective to commission research to alter a world-view (legit-
imately) than to amend other evidence attributes or to add evidence.
(e) Great care should be taken with such an approach to ensure that there are no
accusations of gaming.
11. Actions to consider in the event of Counter-Evidence existing.
(a) The impact on any counter-evidence is dependent on the contribution of the node
of interest, and that of its parent node.
(b) In the first instance, efforts should be made to improve the quality of the node
of interest. This will be based upon the ability to gain improved quality and the
associated overhead of any changes to the node.
(c) Secondly, independence and sufficiency improvements should be made to the par-
ent node of the node of interest. This is achieved via the addition of sibling nodes
to the node of interest. The sibling nodes quality and contribution will have to
be commensurate with the level of counter-evidence and the average confidence
of the pre-existing sibling nodes.
(d) A third approach is the addition or improvement of evidence within the evidence
family so that the counter-evidence can be mitigated. This can be within the
same subtree or preceding subtrees.
(e) It should be noted that an increase in the quality of the siblings of the node
of interest can improve the parent node confidence but there would need to be
substantial quality improvements which may not be feasible due to associated
change overheads.
12. Any amendments to node attributes or the addition of actual nodes, i.e. evidence,
should model reality and therefore the perceived targets for the system/software may
not be reached.
(a) There are a range of actions that can take advantage of diverse evidence to spread
confidence. However, any modelling of the evidence and the attributes should be
based on the known and perceived evidence.
(b) It is very possible that changes to the evidence may not result in the target for
the system/software being reached as the evidence may not support the required
DAL.
(c) It is important for this to be recognised so that continual adjustments of the model
are not made to arrive at the desired result. There is a need to avoid gaming.
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(d) Knowing that a system and/or its supporting software cannot achieve a target
DAL is informative in itself. Action can be taken with this knowledge to conduct
risk acceptance or to apply limited clearances/approval of the system, for example.
9.7 Evaluation of the DSF
9.7.1 DSF: Assessment of the Implementation
The observations which have been made on the DSF case study outputs and the exploratory
testing have been extremely valuable in gaining an understanding of how evidence can be
gathered and assessed.
There have been some interesting and surprising results; e.g. it was envisaged that
the addition of high quality evidence would provide significant improvements to the overall
evidence confidence. However, the main factor was the contribution of the evidence which
played a greater role in gaining evidence confidence. This observation can influence decisions
in the scenarios where efforts could be made to improve existing evidence attributes (e.g.
improve the quality) or to gather further suitable evidence (e.g. that which contributes
significantly). This is also illustrated with the observation that there is greater benefit to
making small incremental changes to highly contributing evidence rather than large changes
to lesser contributing evidence. These observations are important as they contradict the
traditional methods to gain evidence for process compliance. There has been a perceived
necessity within guidelines to gather evidence for all objectives as they are all traditionally
treated equally. The DSF assists with illustrating that they are not all equal.
The concept of backing and reinforcing evidence should also be a consideration12. With
low levels of evidence confidence the addition of suitable evidence initially provides more
significant gains in the overall confidence values. This rate of improvement slows as the level
of confidence increases with there being a requirement on the stakeholders to make more
discerning choices for the evidence amendments. However, the rate of growth and subsequent
improvements was of interest with high confidence evidence making small improvements; e.g.
ECT evidence confidence of 66 improving the Overall Confidence (OC) from 74 to 75 which
can be explained by the agreed contribution of the ECT.
Another notable observation is that additional child node evidence does not necessarily
need to increase the average confidence of the existing child nodes; i.e. the additional
evidence quality does not have to be as high as the existing evidence. However, the child
evidence does need to improve the sufficiency/independence of the parent. As with other
observations, this contradicts the premise that all objectives are to be met with little regard
12See sub-section 8.2.5.7.
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to the wider influence on the evidence siblings or parents as not all evidence is equal. In
reality, the evidence needs to be evaluated on what it provides within an evidence family,
e.g. the increase to the sufficiency/independence of the evidence and the contribution it
makes.
The DSF is centred upon SME judgements which are based upon education and experi-
ence. As evidence contribution is now understood more fully, providing evidence to influence
SMEs can be cost effective. Therefore, commissioning of research to influence a stakeholder’s
world-view becomes a legitimate and useful approach.
The evidence selected for the case studies and exploratory testing was not exhaustive. Nor
was the permissible evidence within Chapter 7. However, the case studies and exploratory
testing did illustrate that the differing types of evidence can be judged consistently. This
included process-based evidence, e.g. SDPs, and in-service considerations, e.g. quality of
error reporting process, etc. This spanned a range of evidential types which provided quan-
titative and qualitative results. The DSF allowed them to be judged in a consistent manner.
Additional appropriate evidence can be accepted by the DSF, e.g. simulation, to include
further evidence. The DSF can expand on the evidence which was included within the case
studies outlined in this chapter.
The chosen attributes, e.g. confidence etc., had the aim of allowing the influence of
evidence to be captured. Importantly, the attributes allowed an assessment on if the evidence
confidence needed to be reduced due to potential missing evidence. The DSF also provided
the facility to potentially remedy any reduced confidence via the addition or amendment of
suitable evidence attributes.
The attributes and their formats were devised to allow DSF decision makers to generate
a large quantity of assessments on the evidence in an intuitive manner. The attributes
balanced the practicalities of extensive evidence assessments and the level of detail required
to derive proposed optimised solutions. SME feedback was received regarding the granularity
of the attributes chosen. The potential to further refine attributes such as independence
to explicitly state convergence or mutuality factors was raised. As was the potential for
the attributes to consider the form of evidence, e.g. backing evidence, which would allow
metrics and decision support to strengthen the evidence which is gathered. These are valid
observations which may possibly tip the balance of the DSF to being more complicated to
implement, and therefore to derive lessons from. However, implementing such observations
may increase the perceived rigour of the approach.
Evidence states can be either obligatory13 or ancillary14. Extant evidence is either oblig-
atory or ancillary. Separating the contribution of any evidence and its state proved useful to
13Recognised by regulators as part of guidelines/standards.
14Supporting evidence which can inform confidence but is not part of existing guidelines/standards.
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ensure that the SME judgement on evidence contribution was not influenced by the defined
guidelines/standards. It was important for the evidence to be judged on its merits and not
by the content of particular standards, which SQEP SMEs may disagree with. However,
the ability to weight evidence to favour obligatory data had benefits. It allowed the DSF to
optimise evidence which favoured an overall solution which had the intent and persuasion to
meet regulatory requirements. This allows the DSF to not reflect a ‘pick and mix’ approach
to evidence but one which is considered and optimised appropriately. The assignment of
suitable contributions in the DSF helps to alleviate risks of evidence ‘cherry-picking’. How-
ever, it should be noted, that a diverse spread of evidence is not a negative approach as long
as it is assessed consistently.
The ability to apply penalties to the GA answers15, and hence influence the optimised
and appropriate evidential solutions, proved to be of greater value than expected. The
application of change overheads to the evidence acted as a differentiator for the potential
evidence choices. The overheadconcept allowed practical evidence shortfall mitigations to be
devised, e.g. risks due to timeliness of information. The decision makers can also consider the
perceived value of the evidence from a theoretical position. The change overhead influenced
the choices made within the case studies and the exploratory testing. At present the change
overheads do not have the facility to apply priorities to the risks associated to time, cost,
and quality. If the true benefit of the change overhead was envisaged during the design of
the DSF then a more comprehensive facility may have been implemented. The facility would
have been subject to greater analysis within the case studies and exploratory testing.
Key feedback from SME input was for the DSF to allow visual indicators to assist with
the decision making. The SME feedback recognised that evidence sources would become
relatively complicated quite quickly with the premise being that all evidence is of relevance.
The selection process for the visualisation approaches within the DSF was considered and
based upon SME input. The level of visual indicators and assistance proved valuable to
the decision makers; however, there are subtle changes to the visualisations which could
provide greater comprehension and drive better decision making. As an example, the ability
to provide visualisations such as Bubble Charts to assist with stakeholder communication.
There is however, a balance to be gained with the visualisations. There is a risk that data
represented in certain formats provides a false impression of precision and therefore the data
drives the decision making to a greater extent. Visualisations to convey a message about
the data is valid as this can assist decision making. Data presented via visualisations which
controls decision making is to be avoided. This is a key tenet to the DSF which provides
visualisation approaches of value.
15Implemented via penalty functions.
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The use of the DSF to implement the case studies and exploratory testing allowed the
end-to-end process and the outputs to be validated. The DSF is, as stated, to act as a
tool to assist with gathering and judging diverse forms of evidence. The factors which are
considered for these activities are subjective and based upon SME considerations. However,
the results and outputs from the tool are reasonable based upon the analysis and SMEs
judgements which have been fed into the DSF. In addition, based upon SME feedback the
DSF evidence relationship outputs and the overall outputs are sufficiently accurate and valid
to provide decision-support information. The aphorism “all models are wrong, but some are
useful” (Box, 1979) is useful in the context of the DSF as the framework is to provide
decision-support to judge evidence attributes to inform a level of confidence. The framework
advances the current approach as it structures subjective assessments; however, there will
always be expert judgement required to interpret the DSF outputs.
The approach defined in this thesis, with the use of such approaches as the DSF, can assist
stakeholders in achieving a defensible position. This is accomplished by the DSF capturing
explicit expert consensus-agreed values for the intrinsic attributes of the evidence16. This
is for the underpinning leaf node evidence and also the SMEs judgements on the branches
of the overall evidence structure. This allows SMEs to show their belief in certain evidence
types. The subjectivity of SMEs is captured and exposed within the DSF allowing SME
judgements to be open for scrutiny. In essence, SMEs are ‘showing their workings’ which
allows others to understand how the confidence levels were reached and acts as a mechanism
for the subjective judgements to be defended.
9.7.2 DSF: Comparison to Related Work
The limitations of the current methods discussed in Chapter 3 focussed the design of the DSF
and the wider research activities with the identified shortfalls addressed by the DSF. The
DSF uses the evidence attributes in a very specific and non-trivial way with the attributes
informing the method to combine the evidence. This sub-section compares the treatment of
the attributes and evidence by the DSF to the existing research in this area.
A number of the case studies associated with the existing confidence quantification meth-
ods are based upon simplified and idealised examples, e.g. Littlewood and Wright (2007),
with a deliberate simplifications of real situations. In addition, some of the concepts were
subject to incomplete treatment (Delic, Mazzanti and Strigini, 1995) or a simplification of
the captured attributes (Bouissou, Martin and Ourghanlian, 1999). Bloomfield and Little-
wood (2006) use special examples of diverse argument legs for their review with Yamamoto
16The attributes are: confidence, quality, contribution, sufficiency, and independence. See sub-section
8.2.2.
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(2015) using very small sample sets. The case studies implemented in support of the DSF
were based upon scenarios adopting evidence sets which were relevant to given systems. The
implemented case studies were not idealised and based upon real scenarios. Therefore, the
observations from the DSF were based on learning from reality, i.e. via case studies, and
by envisaged scenarios, i.e. via exploratory testing. The exploratory testing allowed further
investigations of the node/attribute relationships within the DSF. The examination of the
attribute relationships was a key reason for the development of the DSF. Understanding the
relationships has allowed observations to be made to guide future diverse evidence gathering
approaches.
Some existing methods for the quantification of qualification evidence propose that the
more formal notation to capture confidence, based upon mathematical principles, results
in a degree of SME judgement being removed. The removal of SME judgement is based
upon allowing quantified results to act as the decision making driver. This thesis suggests
that quantitative (and even qualitative) representations of confidence should act to support
SMEs judgements. The support can take the form of a structured approach, as with the
DSF, but there is a reliance on expert judgement. A full formalised approach for developing
judgements on confidence is not feasible given the current shortfalls in existing methods.
The activities within this thesis have provided guidelines and tools to assist with the form-
ing of judgements. This philosophical underpinning, in relation to the role/level of expert
judgement, was explored. The thesis supports the need to embrace SME judgements and to
facilitate its capture rather than to replace it.
It can be argued that any data generated as part of a tool should assist with the SMEs
comprehension (Kirk, 2016). A number of the existing methods provide structures to form
arguments, e.g. use of GSN by Ayoub et al. (2013), Duan et al. (2015), and Zeng, Lu
and Zhong (2013). However, with these studies there is no correlation between (a) the
values generated due to the quantification of the assurance confidence and (b) the visual
representations provided to the SMEs. This results in there being no link between the data
and the representation. The DSF provides a clear link between the visual representation,
e.g. via graded tree structures, and the underpinning data. This is important to allow expert
judgement comprehension and to assist the expert with forming further analysis decisions,
e.g. via what-if scenarios.
Existing methods were identified which do not specify how the results should be used to
determine if a system is sufficiently safe, nor how attributes should be measured, e.g. Cyra
and Gorski (2008), Duan et al. (2015), Guiochet, Hoang and Kaâniche (2015), Yamamoto
(2015), and Denney, Pai and Habli (2011). The DSF provides an output which can allow
judgements to be based upon it directly, i.e. a DAL, or for the output from the DSF to feed
into a wider safety argument. The output is to assist decision making and is not to remove
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the expert judgement which is associated with assessing the validity of a DAL.
A number of the existing approaches assign confidence values to outcomes but the meth-
ods to capture the supporting information requires interpretation with differing levels of
abstraction to assign suitable values. The proposed methods in some existing approaches
(e.g. Guo (2003), Nair, Walkinshaw and Kelly (2014), and Duan et al. (2015)) would require
SMEs to restructure how evidence is traditionally captured. The DSF adopts an approach
which is purposefully closely related to current practice. The aim is to put forward an
approach, in the first instance, which is usable to allow a gradual change in process and
stakeholder mindset.
Some of the existing methods have complicated structures in terms of the attributes
which are captured, the level of attribute association, and the argument formation, e.g.
Wang, Guiochet and Motet (2017). In practice there would be difficulties in repeating these
structures for a larger set of evidence. The DSF contains patterns to allow the attribute
relationships to be repeated within the structure based upon a parent-child(ren) relationship.
This allows evidence strands to be added/amended intuitively and it is agnostic to the form
of evidence to allow a greater diversity of sources. The method in which confidence values
are propagated within the DSF is also scalable. The patterns introduced in the DSF are
repeatable and provide consistency.
A key element to a decision making process is to assess a number of alternative solutions
(Turban, Sharda and Delen, 2010). Allowing judgements to be captured is only one element
of a wider decision making process. Alternative forms of evidence should be devised and
assessed. This is a key concept for any approach to measure confidence and capture diverse
evidence. The approaches which currently attempt to allow confidence to be quantitatively
measured using diverse evidence do not provide such rich tools. The DSF provides a method
to compare and measure differences in alternatives. The DSF also allows decisions to be
based upon efficient changes via optimisation. The approach allows an end-to-end decision
making process to be adopted, as outlined in Figure 8.21.
The decisions made, or any optimisation being performed, should be based upon known
or perceived risks. To conduct any evidence gathering activities there are a number of factors
to consider which are not solely based upon the availability of data. The use of additional
diverse evidence would require considerations such as the time to generate/perform the
evidence and the financial costs, for example. The DSF associates overhead values with
evidence so that the cost of change can be factored into any decisions. Cost in this context
refers to time, quality, and financial factors. Again, such a rich consideration is not part of
any existing methods.
There are numerous approaches to reason under uncertainty via the quantification of
assurance confidence, e.g. ER by Nair, Walkinshaw and Kelly (2014), BBN by Hobbs and
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Lloyd (2012), DST by Ayoub et al. (2013), etc. There are no overriding arguments to fully
support one approach. The DSF has implemented a number of FISs due to the intuitive
method to create membership functions and the ability to generate a structure which will
scale and allow the propagation of values. The DSF does not propose fuzzy logic or the use
of FISs as a preferential approach but these are used to illustrate that diverse evidence can
be captured and reasoned upon. Fuzzy logic and FISs within the DSF has allowed valid
observations to be gained from the attribute relationships and to capture lessons regarding
the visualisation of data and the change overheads, for example17.
Many of the approaches for the quantification of evidence are focussed on providing an
overall numerical value for the confidence in a safety claim being met. Wang, Guiochet and
Motet (2017) also use DST to generate the trustworthiness of a claim via belief, uncertainty,
and disbelief. Contributing weights of the supporting nodes is the degree that the nodes
independently contribute (the appropriateness of the goals). Wang, Guiochet and Motet
(2017) propose two argument types: dependent and redundant, to propagate the trustwor-
thiness. However, the arguments for the propagation have to be manually specified for each
instance. Also, the arguments types are binary in terms of their selection as the type is
either dependent or redundant. Therefore, so are the consequences of the value propagation.
The DSF uses the evidence attribute values to signify the node relationships rather than the
need to determine them explicitly for each parent-children instance. Thus, providing a more
practical implementation.
Ayoub et al. (2013) looks at the degree of belief on the sufficiency and insufficiency of the
evidence to support the conclusion. However, the adoption of DST by Ayoub et al. (2013)
means that evidence nodes are assumed to be independent, an acknowledged weakness of the
approach. Ayoub et al. (2012) is not based on the quantification of confidence as it has a
focus on common areas of concern to consider for hazards, e.g. the tool used to provide an
output. The Ayoub et al. (2012) process is to arrive at at a level of trustworthiness in the
evidence. There is no consideration of the evidence relationships and priorities. The Ayoub
et al. (2012) research is more an extension to justifying confidence in a top-level safety claim
within a GSN approach. The DSF provides a more rigorous assessment of the fundamental
node relationships compared to Ayoub et al. (2012), for example.
Nair et al. (2015) base the main criteria for assessing confidence upon trustworthiness (i.e.
capturing an assurance that the evidence is as specified) and appropriateness (i.e. capturing
the satisfaction of the claim). The Nair et al. (2015) ER approach involves no comparison to
the siblings of the evidence, i.e. no measure of sufficiency or independence - unlike the DSF.
Nair et al. (2015) claim to provide a “systematic guided process that considers an exhaustive
17See sub-section 9.7 for further information.
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list of confidence factors” which are linked to hazards rather than evidence confidence. What
Nair et al. (2015) claims is an exhaustive approach for each hazard could be unsustainable if
attempted to be implemented in practice. This is due to the volume of the analysis required
for the Nair et al. (2015) approach.
Hobbs and Lloyd (2012) introduce a BBN approach which adopts the concept of a leaky
noisy-OR to account for the level of confidence that the provided evidence represents all of
the evidence required to support the conclusion. This leads to a conclusion being true even
if all evidence is false. The use of a leaky noisy-OR by Hobbs and Lloyd (2012) takes an
optimistic measurement of evidence which, in terms of safety, should take a more cautious
approach. Any positive confidence in evidence must be based upon a determined set of
evidence with defined judgements. The leakage concept adopted by Hobbs and Lloyd (2012)
acts as an unsubstantiated method to gain evidence confidence with no defined limits to
the leakage value stated in the paper. Any positive claim to confidence within the DSF is
based upon the supporting evidence attributes. In addition, the BBN approach results in
one or more forms of evidence being based upon the law of additivity. The DSF avoids this
limitation via the use of fuzzy logic and FISs18.
Cyra and Gorski (2008) have a method to judge the trust in a claim based upon the
stated arguments which are supported by warrants, assumptions, and facts. The evidence
to support these attributes are judgements on the quality and validity of the arguments.
However, there is no concept of judging the evidence in relation to the level of mutuality
it represents to other evidence (the DSF does consider such an attribute). In addition, the
rules of aggregation need to be user-defined for each claim. This would be a very intensive
process in practice and, as stated previously in this section, this is simplified by the DSF
implementation via consideration of such properties during the construction of the evidence
tree. Cyra and Gorski (2008) also make no direct link between the visual representation and
the procedures to capture and calculate the confidence values - however, this is provided by
the DSF. Cyra and Gorski (2008) do not specify how to use the results to determine if a
system is sufficiently safe, nor do they state which attributes should be measured. They do
not provide a clear indication of how the outputs should be used by stakeholders to inform
decisions. The DSF differs in that a degree of membership to one or more DALs is provided.
Also, the thesis research has provided a flow of the activities needed to gather/generate
evidence, e.g. via the flow illustrated in Figure 9.3 and the case study and exploratory
testing observations outlined in sub-section 9.6.
Denney, Pai and Habli (2011) aim to calculate uncertainty in safety claims via the use
of BBNs. The confidence in a given leaf node is represented by assigning values to multiple
18See sub-section 8.2.4.4 for further information.
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scales (very low to very high) with the values for all scales combined being 100%. However,
the values are subjectively provided for a single scale. There is no ability to assess multiple
confidence factors. This is also the case for Duan et al. (2015) which provide a concept to
capture expert judgements via subjective logic but does not detail any method to combine
these confidence values. A fundamental element to the DSF is the combination of evidence
with lessons/observations captured from the research activities19.
Yamamoto (2015) provides indicators to GSN nodes but the approach is to further refine
the GSN notation. Unlike the DSF, the Yamamoto (2015) approach does not review the
relationship between nodes and does not provide a method to measure the evidence, e.g.
there is no concept of quality. Zhao et al. (2012) provides an approach which is based upon
BBN and Toulmin arguments, however the quantitative results from the Zhao et al. (2012)
case studies indicates that quality and contribution factors are not sufficiently considered20.
Whereas, the DSF uses these attributes as a fundamental method to derive the confidence
values.
Littlewood and Wright (2007) has a very specific BBN model which has simplified vari-
ables to capture observations from multi-legged arguments. The Littlewood and Wright
(2007) approach has a focus on gaining greater insight to the multiple legs of evidence rather
than how BBN is normally adopted for confidence assessment. Due to this the approach does
not have the richness to explicitly consider the sufficiency or independence of the variables,
unlike the DSF.
Other research contains attributes of relevance to the DSF, e.g. considering independence
(Yuan and Kelly, 2011); however, many are based upon qualitative judgements, e.g. Hawkins
and Kelly (2009). There is an inability to combine such evidence which is captured using
a qualitative approach. Such research lack the richness that the DSF provides in adopting
numerical confidence values which can consider factors such as change overheads.
The DSF offers a unique perspective as it provides a mechanism to capture a range of
confidence factors via attributes which span a number of evidence relationships, e.g. to the
parent and siblings (both extant and potential21). Patterns are devised for the DSF to build
the structure which is repeatable for complicated evidence sets which will be encountered
for the wider system solution spaces22. The captured judgements can be suitably reasoned
upon with the DSF providing the facility to determine feasible steps based upon a perceived
stakeholder reality, e.g. via change overheads, and the ability to arrive at an optimised and
satisfactory set of evidence.
19See sub-section 9.6 for further information.
20See sub-section 4.2 for further information.
21See sub-section 8.2.3 for further information.
22As illustrated simplistically within Figure 1.1.
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9.8 Summary: Case Studies and Exploratory Testing
A number of case studies and exploratory tests were devised which aimed to exploit the
features of the DSF to understand the relationship of the evidence attributes.
The case studies and exploratory tests were devised in order to respond partially (or in
full) to a number of findings within the Background and the Problem of Interest (chapter
3) which highlighted why further work was required in this area. In addition, the exercises
assisted in exploring the benefits of the DSF features (e.g. visualisation and optimisation) to
assist in achieving suitable diverse evidence ‘solutions’. Linked to this is the demonstration
of the value of optimisation itself and the reasoning under uncertainty approach being fit for
purpose.
A range of DALs were selected for the systems under review as part of the case studies
and the exploratory testing. This highlighted the levels of confidence that are required for
the various system criticality values and also the expectations for the evidence for these
systems.
The exercises centred on the notion of: altering independent and dependent variables
(nodes and attributes); and understanding the relationships between the highlighted node
attributes values (e.g. siblings quality). A potential initial flow for the assessment was
devised to assist in the early exploration of approaches to any given diverse evidence prob-
lem. The case studies and exploratory testing purposefully deviated from the initial flow to
understand the attribute relationships in greater detail.
The results of the exercises were extremely positive with lessons identified from each of
the case studies and the exploratory tests. The exercises indicated that there is value in the
incremental adoption of diverse evidence; however it was shown that there are limits to the
confidence ‘which can be gained if the evidence is not supportive.
A range of observations have been made with regard to the relationships between the
attributes of the evidence. These results have been interesting and surprising to a degree in
that attributes can have a greater impact on confidence than originally devised, e.g. contri-
bution. An understanding has been gained on how any attributes changes are propagated to
impact the confidence of other nodes (and therefore the overall DAL claimed for an eviden-
tial set23). Also, there have been observations which can influence scenarios where evidence
shortfalls need to be mitigated. In essence, the observations can act to guide stakeholders in
potential next steps to mitigate or accept evidential shortfalls, i.e. the lessons and the DSF
can target interventions.
23The representation of confidence in this way also assists with outlining the value of the evidence and
assists with identifying a stopping point for evidence gathering/generation.
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Chapter 9 has informed two research sub-questions:
• Sub-sections 9.4 and 9.5 have partly responded to the sub-question: What is a suit-
able structure for software safety assurance evidence and can mathematically derived
approaches inform how judgements are made on the evidence and for proposing alter-
native/optimised solutions?.
• Sub-section 9.6 has partly responded to the sub-question: What observations and rec-
ommendations can be made on how to implement a software safety assurance evidence
argument and how to inform a UK defence software safety assurance strategy?.
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Chapter 10
Recommendations to Enhance
Current Software Safety Assurance
Processes
Due to the range and breadth of research activities conducted a number of enhancements
have been identified to current MOD practice. These enhancements may allow the MOD
to move towards an environment which allows diverse evidence to be captured and judged.
This can be conducted in a more efficient and effective manner for systems which reside
within the expanded solution space1.
The purpose of the EngD is to produce “industry value-adding research” with an “appli-
cation in an industrial or commercial context” (IDC in Systems, 2013). The enhancements
described in this chapter help to meet the requirements stated within IDC in Systems (2013).
This chapter will examine:
• Methods to Enhance MOD Software Assurance. Details of a number of enhancements
that could be made to the currently defined permissible software-related evidence and
the subsequent safety assessment process for MOD.
• Suggested Approach to Adopt Diverse Evidence within a Software Assurance Qualifi-
cation Strategy. Summary of the guidance written2 for DE&S DT Desk Officers which
can assist DTs with their procurement approaches to gain diverse evidence.
• Challenges to the Adoption of the Methods. For the enhancements to be implemented
there will need to be changes to current assurance practice. With any change there
1See Figure 1.1.
2Written by the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor (Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl Senior Principal Scientist
in Software Systems).
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will be barriers encountered.
10.1 Methods to Enhance MOD Software Assurance
The activities within this thesis have allowed the RE to construct a set of robust and defen-
sible enhancements to the methods in which the MOD conducts software safety assurance.
The enhancements are based upon findings from all elements of the thesis from Chapter 3
(Background and the Problem of Interest) through to Chapter 9 (Case Studies, Exploratory
Testing, and Evaluation of the DSF). The enhancements have a number of themes, as shown
in Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1: Themes to the Enhancements to MOD Software Safety Assurance
1. Knowledge and Skills of Stakeholders.
(a) SQEP requirements and skill sets to alter to adopt diverse evidence3. The ability
to review and judge a wider range of diverse evidence requires a revised skill set
3Within an safety assurance domain which is not focussed on process-based evidence the potential sup-
porting evidence will be wider and more complicated. This reflects the fact that the solution space is
comprised of a wider set of systems and procurement types. In an assurance environment which embraces
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compared to a pure process-based approach. These include, but are not limited to:
the procurement environment, system and platform interaction (including SoS),
and effective industry/customer engagement4.
(b) Principles of evidence theory need to be restated. The enhanced approach requires
evidence shortfalls to be mitigated and holistically assessed and an understanding
gained into how evidence can be structured and supported. There is a need to
(re-)educate stakeholders in the construction of diverse evidence arguments, how
to structure evidence, the steps to improve existing data5, and also the theory of
evidence. The ability to apply, for example, backing or reinforcement evidence for
software needs to be commonly adopted.
2. Through-Life Appraisal.
(a) Judgements should be captured for the life of the software/system. There are
distinct phases of any LRU such as the development and in-service periods. De-
pending on the phase at which the initial judgements were captured there will,
most likely, be opportunities to provide regular updates on judgements of the
software. Standards and guidelines evolve, albeit slowly, but the attributes asso-
ciated with any evidence can remain constant. Therefore, a framework such as
the DSF can act to capture judgements through-life as ‘snap-shots’ to reflect the
evidence characteristics. This is particularly relevant as a LRU and its software
moves towards being classed as legacy6. The DSF can be a consistent method
used throughout the distinct phases of a system.
(b) Capture the confidence being built rather than only ongoing problems. In-service
evidence should be a method to build confidence rather than to question it. Tra-
ditionally, any in-service data for a system is used to gain feedback on problem
reports to query the belief in the process evidence (indeed, counter-evidence is an
important property to capture). However, to actively validate the prior-belief in
any process evidence could maintain, or improve, confidence7.
(c) Actively gather metrics to inform diverse evidence. A premise for diverse evidence
is that all evidence is of relevance but the contributions vary. In addition to
diverse evidence there is a need to gain and comprehend evidence which is pre-existing and in varying
formats.
4Understanding system interactions and behaviours can also be assisted via adopting such techniques as
the SLF as outlined in sub-section 3.3.2 and the SLF conference paper research outputs
5Such as understanding the observations of attributes/relationships outlined within sub-section 9.6.
6As outlined in the tenets within sub-section 7.2, for example.
7As illustrated within sub-section 7.1.11.
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capturing evidence to validate any prior-belief in the process evidence, e.g. in-
service data, there is a need to actively seek metrics and evidence throughout the
complete life-cycle of the software. This includes during the development stage.
There are a myriad of metrics which can be obtained to support or refute the
confidence in a system, e.g. technical suggestions raised in TIMs which lead to
actual changes. Opportunities to gather such data should be encouraged. It
should be noted that any quantification of confidence and the metrics gathered
are to inform SME judgement and not to replace it8.
(d) Ensure the right metrics are informing the right judgements. There is a need to
be mindful of the use of metrics and how they shape the safety arguments and
how they alter the confidence which is being gained. Measuring the ‘wrong’ thing
can have unintended consequences, for example via future decisions taken or by
the introduction of inherent weaknesses in the confidence argument9. There are
other dangers with metrics such as gaming10 a quantification-based approach and
the difficulties with SMEs agreeing metric values.
3. Managing Evidence Complexity11.
(a) Gain proportionate information via system interfaces. There is merit to adopting
an approach which allows the behaviour of systems and the underpinning software
to be understood via interfaces. This approach allows behaviour to be understood
at a system level with deeper analysis being instigated at the sub-system and
software level. This understanding can be gained via models. The use of such
frameworks as the SLF can assist with gaining proportionate information and
assist with stakeholder dialogue12.
(b) Management and stakeholder comprehension of an increased range and depth of
underpinning evidence. Process-based compliance which is benchmarked against
standards/guidelines results in sets of structured findings against defined objec-
tives. However, a diverse evidence approach will make use of a depth and range
of evidence with no pre-defined benchmarks. Therefore, the wider evidence needs
to have the structure managed/captured in a consistent manner. There is also a
greater reliance on the judgements made by the SMEs. Due to this there is a
8As outlined in the tenets within sub-section 7.2, for example.
9As outlined within sub-section 7.3.
10See sub-section 7.3.1 for further information on the concept of gaming.
11The complexity in this instance is that created due to the increased level of relevant admissible evidence
to inform a software assurance argument. The issue of software complexity is a separate topic but there is
overlap as diverse evidence can mitigate the lack of non-traditional evidence sources.
12As outlined via the SLF in sub-section 3.3.2 and the SLF conference paper research outputs.
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requirement to have the judgements managed/captured13. A framework such as
the DSF can assist with this14.
(c) Growth in the potential solution space requires assistance for decision makers. A
correlation may exist between the diversity of the evidence and the quantity of
evidence which is under review and will come under potential review. Stakehold-
ers can select a myriad of evidence strands and therefore the potential solution
space grows significantly. This larger solution space would be complicated for
stakeholders to assess and determine actions. There is a need to establish a
method/framework to allow next steps to be considered via what-if analysis and
to optimise potential solutions. A framework such as the DSF can assist with
this15.
(d) Communication of evidence to stakeholders is key. Allowing direct stakehold-
ers to comprehend the evidence and the confidence which can be placed in it is
obviously an important element. This allows judgements to be debated and un-
derstood. There is also a requirement to allow wider stakeholders to comprehend
the decisions evidence status at a more abstract level. Not all stakeholders with
a vested interest in the outcomes need to have visibility of all of the evidence
judgements. An abstraction of the information would be of use to gain buy-in
and to assist with stakeholder discussions. An approach such as the Wheel of
Qualification devised as part of this thesis could assist with this16. In essence, the
complexity of the qualification approach is simplified into an elegant representa-
tion17.
4. Treatment of Evidence.
(a) Not all objectives are equal. Within any standard/guideline, particularly those
which are focussed on process conformance, there are unstated degrees of im-
portance to each of the objectives. At present, a number of the standards and
guidelines which are adopted for software assurance do not provide information
on the weighting of the objectives and therefore give no indication of the prior-
ities or consequences of any shortfalls. Any assurance regime should allow for
the priorities or weightings of the objectives to be stated within the extant stan-
dards/guidelines. A preferred option which embraces the use of diverse evidence
13The judgements will state the acceptability of the evidence, for example.
14As outlined within sub-sections 8.2.5 and 8.2.6, for example.
15As outlined within sub-sections 8.2.8 and 8.2.9, for example.
16As outlined within sub-section 7.4 and Standish and Hadley (2018).
17This is akin to the brontosaurus of complexity (Holt, 2007) where rather than producing an elegant
solution to a complex problem the communication allows an elegant representation of a complex problem.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 254 of 328
is to allow weightings, e.g. contribution, to be formally established for objectives
and to allow these to be managed and reasoned upon18.
(b) Evidence should be collated to be judged rather than it occurring at distributed
stages. Presently, a range of evidence is captured as part of the assurance process
and evidence is captured via a staged review process rather than making holistic
judgements on all relevant evidence19. The range and depth of evidence can be
significantly increased. Collating evidence will allow it to be judged consistently
and to establish the level of influence which one set of evidence has over another.
(c) What does ‘good’ look like? With the adoption of diverse evidence there are a
number of standards/guidelines which can inform a view of what an ideal sce-
nario would look like for any given evidence strand. An example is Capability
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) for process improvement. The metric for
the success may not be full compliance with a standard/guideline but allow a
measure to be gained of the shortfalls and therefore, the confidence which can be
assigned to such evidence. A framework such as the DSF can allow these types
of standards/guidelines to be included and judged20. However, diverse and radi-
cal evidence which does not have a precedence will lack a supporting framework.
Such evidence will be significantly reliant on SME judgement.
(d) Need to build evidence from the bottom-up. Due to the novelty of a diverse evidence
approach there is a need for SMEs to understand the reasoning for the choice of
evidence and the place it has within the assurance argument. The relevance and
weight of the underpinning evidence needs to be ascertained. The current guide-
lines/standards lack benchmarks to build a consistently judged diverse evidence
assurance argument. Therefore, the assurance confidence needs to be gained from
the available evidence and this requires a bottom-up approach. Evidence and its
confidence should be driven from the context of the system/software and not just
necessarily from a process-based approach21.
(e) Diverse evidence associated with a LRU will be unique and should be treated as
such. In essence, each system has unique characteristics; e.g. a level of process-
based conformance, a level of in-service data, a level of third-party oversight,
etc. This is a change from the process-based approach which applies labels to the
18Using such attributes as those defined within sub-section 8.2.2.
19As described within sub-section 6.1.1.
20As stated within Chapter 8, the research output seminar presentation titled The Cake of Alternative
Software Safety Evidence: Getting the Ingredients Right and Modifying the Recipe, and illustrated within
the DSF case studies in Chapter 9.
21As outlined within sub-sections 8.2.5, 8.2.6, and the safety-critical systems club seminar research output
titled Use of Service History and Field Data - In Support of Safety Justifications.
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software, e.g. “DO-178B DAL B compliant”, which doesn’t account for the wider
supporting evidence. Therefore, there is a requirement to treat LRUs as bespoke
items with judgements on the evidence being captured22.
(f) Elements of a system, e.g. software, will not be as easily labelled as being stan-
dard/guideline compliant. As the solution space opens up the confidence which
is assigned to systems will be derived from non-process evidence. Therefore, the
systems and software may not receive a label which succinctly states a process-
based standard compliance. This is due to there being a wider and diverse set
of evidence providing the confidence. Therefore, there should be consideration to
remove the labels which are attributed to software, such as “DO-178C DAL B
compliant”. The concept of ‘assurance confidence’ would be a valid approach to
reflect the range of underpinning evidence supporting the target measurement23.
5. Judgement of Evidence.
(a) Judgements must be captured with consistent attributes. An assurance approach
which uses wider evidence must have the ability to allow priorities and the purpose
of evidence to be managed/captured. Attributes of evidence are essential to allow
the detail of the judgements to be captured and to maintain a consistent review
of the evidence. If a quantitative approach is not adopted the evidence attributes
can still drive the judgements and act as prompts for any qualitative arguments.
A consideration is to also capture the overheads (e.g. time, cost, or quality im-
plications) associated with gathering/generating any evidence to achieve a target
level of confidence. The DSF has proposed a number of potential attributes to
assist with evidence judgement24.
(b) A more dynamic evidence landscape requires a defensible position rather than a
repeatable one. A move from process-based evidence assessment to one which
uses a wider set of evidence means there is a need to accept and place value
on the subjective opinion of SMEs. This approach is, arguably, more difficult
to measure. The concept of being reliant on SME judgement is common within
other domains and there is acceptance that there will be a variance of opinion and
judgement. The MOD assurance stance in relation to software should also take
an approach to provide credence to SME judgement. This would allow judgement
to be made from a defensible position rather than one which is based upon known
22As outlined within sub-section 8.2.5.
23As supported by sub-sections 7.1 and 8.2.5.
24As outlined within sub-sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.7, for example.
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and accepted benchmarks, i.e. that which is repeatable25. A defensible claim
by a stakeholder would be one which is justified with an opinion which can be
argued to be good26 (Collins Dictionary, 1995f). This would be a change to the
current safety assurance paradigm and may have legal ramifications in relation
to individual liabilities. There would need to be a shift in the world-views of the
stakeholders for any increased risk that would need to be accepted.
6. Debate and Consensus.
(a) Collective judgements need to be captured. An approach underpinned by judge-
ment rather than process conformance requires a number of stakeholders to alter
the approaches adopted for evidence measurement. A number of subjective stake-
holder opinions and their statements of evidence acceptance needs to be captured.
This information should be able to be debated and reasoned upon via a suitable
structure and method (such as the DSF)27.
(b) Move to a more consensus based approach for evidence judgement and acceptance.
There would be greater emphasis on stakeholder judgement if a DSF is adopted.
To remove any issues regarding single SME judgement a more consensus driven
approach with stakeholder cooperation and approval of the evidence and judge-
ments is needed. As a result there would be a joint acceptance by the stakeholders
of the diverse evidence. This could then inform any decisions to taken by Duty
Holders, for example. The DSF can act as as method to allow reasoning and con-
tested matters to be stated and to assist with the generation of formal outputs28.
(c) Move to a more consensus based approach for evidence judgement and acceptance.
There would be greater emphasis on stakeholder judgement if a DSF is adopted.
To remove any issues regarding single SME judgement a more consensus driven
approach with stakeholder cooperation and approval of the evidence and judge-
ments is needed. As a result there would be a joint acceptance by the stakeholders
of the diverse evidence. This could then inform any decisions to taken by Duty
Holders, for example. The DSF can act as as method to allow reasoning and con-
tested matters to be stated and to assist with the generation of formal outputs29.
25As supported by sub-section 6.2.
26Based upon the decisions made to structure and judge the supporting evidence. See sub-section 9.7.1
for a perspective on why the DSF can provide a defensible claim.
27As that outlined within sub-section 8.2.
28Akin to joint reports/submissions regarding differing expert witness perspectives within the criminal
justice domain. Also, as supported by sub-sections 6.2 and 8.2.
29Akin to joint reports/submissions regarding differing expert witness perspectives within the criminal
justice domain. Also, as supported by sub-sections 6.2 and 8.2.
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7. Procurement and Contracting.
(a) Procurement types and stages influence the diverse evidence adopted. There are a
number of procurement options for delivering capability with each having merits
and demerits. Which option is chosen has consequences in terms of the avail-
ability and type of evidence which will be received as part of any procurement.
In addition, the stage of the life-cycle, e.g. design, will influence the evidence
available and can act as an opportunity to influence any future evidence to be
received30.
(b) Method to contract for software assurance evidence will need to reflect diverse
evidence approach. If LRUs are treated as unique entities then the method to
gain evidence will also have to be bespoke. With a process-based approach the
evidence requested is very much artefact-driven, e.g. provision of a SDP. However,
with the approach devised by the RE the relevant and available evidence and its
context needs to be understood. Requests to suppliers for the provision of evidence
will need to be informed via conversations and an understanding of the software.
Suppliers will need to be engaged in a revised manner31.
10.1.1 Timeframes for Implementing the Methods
Due to the nature of the safety assurance domain any changes to an established method
requires a robust and patient approach to fully adopt the benefits which diverse evidence
can provide. Changes to MOD strategy will require a prolonged period to gain traction and
acceptance; therefore, there is a need to have a staged approach to influencing MOD policy.
In the near term the MOD policy regarding the use of diverse evidence can be influenced,
and has been as a result of this thesis, to enable a wider range of evidence to form part of a
robust assurance approach. This extends to the methods to communicate evidence shortfalls
and plans with stakeholders, e.g. via the Wheel of Qualification. Another near-term aim is
to influence the knowledge and skills of stakeholders who reason with and form judgements
on the diverse evidence. Enhancements of the methods for the judgement of evidence can
also be near-term aspirations, even from a qualitative basis.
The adoption of the enhancements which relate to through-life appraisal can also be im-
plemented in the near/medium term. Enhancements regarding procurement and contracting
are also near/medium-term aims.
30As outlined within sub-section 7.1.
31As outlined within the research output titled Use of Diverse Software Evidence within a Safety-Critical
Software Airborne Qualification Strategy.
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In the medium/long-term the introduction of methods to manage complexity can allow
the techniques and processing to be reviewed and embedded. This will allow the wider
benefits of a method such as the DSF to be adopted. The DSF can capture the information
generated as a result of debate and consensus amongst stakeholders.
10.2 Suggested Approach to Adopt Diverse Evidence
within a Software Assurance Qualification Strat-
egy
To utilise diverse evidence within a MOD platform/system qualification strategy there are a
number of key points that should be understood. There is a requirement to comprehend why
diverse evidence is suitable for certain mitigations and there is a requirement to articulate a
justification for such an approach.
The information that follows is an extract from guidance for DT Desk Officers written
by the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor32. The guidance has been published within
DE&S to assist DTs with their diverse evidence approaches. The full guidance document
can be found within the research output white paper titled Use of Diverse Software Evidence
within a Safety-Critical Software Airborne Qualification Strategy.
The points below are not exhaustive but may act as a method to inform a qualification
strategy. Relevant to all of the following points is that support and/or direction should
be gained from suitable SMEs to assist the DT to understand and/or deliver the diverse
evidence strategy. SME input should be sought for any of the following points if there is
insufficient knowledge within the DT.
1. Engage with LRU vendors (and/or sub-vendors) to articulate the MOD evidential
requirements and to understand the level of conformity (and the ability for MOD to
access such data).
2. Explore options/feasibility of closing any process evidence divergences (if they exist).
3. Gather information on the availability of wider, diverse, evidence to support a particu-
lar safety claim. Again, gather an understanding of the ability for the MOD to access
such data.
4. Understand what level of confidence can be gained from the available process and
non-process evidence. Understand how the wider evidence mitigates, either partially
32Dr Mark Hadley - Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems.
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or fully, the shortfalls with the process evidence and how such an approach would be
reasoned.
5. Engage with the ITE and MAA in order to articulate and justify the approach which
uses diverse evidence. Generate the relevant documentation which formalises the
planned method, e.g. Type Certificate Baseline (TCB), MCRI, or Special Condition.
6. Gather the evidence in support of the planned method, e.g. TCB, MCRI, or Special
Condition. Contracting for evidence with relevant vendors will need careful manage-
ment if the type of evidence being requested is not part of the regular information
exchange between the MOD and the vendor. In addition, a Request For Informa-
tion (RFI) with lead procurement nations will potentially need to be articulated for
in-service information.
Assistance should be sought from SMEs if there is not the necessary awareness within the
DT to perform any of the above points and/or to construct the diverse evidence argument.
The use of diverse evidence is certainly not an easier route than the use of process-
based claims. However, it does provide an alternative means to gaining a suitable level of
confidence, allows an understanding to be gained of associated risks, and assists with the
delivery of capability.
10.3 Challenges to the Adoption of the Methods
It is recognised that the enhancements which have been defined will require amendments to
the way in which assurance is currently adopted from a policy and technique perspective.
Therefore, there are naturally going to be challenges in the adoption of the enhancements
due to the breadth and depth of the findings. Not all of the challenges will be equal in terms
of the level of disruption to the current approaches and some advocate a more evolutionary
change rather than revolutionary.
• At present SMEs make judgements against a set of pre-defined process objectives.
If diverse evidence is adopted then the judgements will be based upon the SMEs
own opinions and the ‘objectives’ which are to be reached are formed by the SME
themselves. This may place additional risk on the SME and so a collective responsibility
from the stakeholders could share the judgements, and therefore the risks. There will
also be costs associated with any activities needed to train and up-skill staff to be able
to provide defensible opinions.
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• Traditionally the safety assurance domain is very much risk averse and places confi-
dence in pedigree and known evidence. There is a need for further research to devise
further robust arguments to adopt a wider diverse approach to ensure that suitable
confidence and momentum can be built within the software safety communities.
• There are understandably standard/guideline and policy considerations when instigat-
ing changes. However, there are also the less tangible factors. e.g. influencing the
mindsets of individuals to be more favourable to the diverse evidence concept. The
further implementation of the findings within this thesis will assist with this activity.
• At present the process-based approach to assessment is the default position for the
standards/guidelines which are adopted. There needs to be a change to adopting di-
verse evidence as a first port of call via continued use of the thesis outcomes within
a wider range of contexts. There is an industry based upon supporting the objec-
tives within guidelines such as DO-178C (e.g. training, consultancy, tools etc) and
there would need to be a change in how the concepts of software safety assurance are
articulated to those within the industry.
Chapter 10 has partly responded to the research sub-question: What observations and recom-
mendations can be made on how to implement a software safety assurance evidence argument
and how to inform a UK defence software safety assurance strategy?.
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Chapter 11
Research Review and Contributions
to Knowledge
This chapter will revisit the research questions, assess progress against these questions, state
the contributions to knowledge of the research, the impact, and reflect on the efficacy of the
research approach. This chapter contains three broad sections:
• Research Requirements: A Review. States the original argument for why the research
was needed (i.e. why the intervention was required). Also, provides the progress made
against the research questions.
• Contributions to Knowledge and Research Impact. States the variety of research out-
puts which have provided novel contributions to knowledge in the software safety as-
surance academic domain and states the industrial impact of the research.
• Research Legitimacy and Reflections. Examines the quality and validity of the work,
limitations and potential further work to the research, and autobiographical reflections.
11.1 Research Requirements: A Review
11.1.1 Restatement of the Argument for Intervention
As safety-related systems will contain increasingly more software and are to become ever more
reliant on this software, it is imperative that the software can be assured. This allows those
that regulate, procure, and operate the software to have confidence that any software failures
which lead to damage only occur at an acceptable rate. What different types of evidence
support this confidence and how should this evidence be structured, judged, and combined?
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If suitable approaches are defined then how should any identified military software assurance
domain enhancements be implemented?
11.1.2 Research Grand Tour and Sub-Questions: Progress
The thesis has been founded upon a robust research strategy which allowed a set of research
questions to be devised. These add value to the software safety assurance domain. The
structure of the research strategy has allowed the questions to be responded to in a systematic
way using a variety of research paradigms. The activities answered the research grand tour
question:
What enhancements can be made to the current UK defence domain’s software safety
assurance approaches for capturing and judging supporting evidence?
For each of the research sub-questions there has been significant progress made1:
1. What is the current approach to system safety assurance within the UK defence domain
and are there alternative system-level approaches? 2 The current MOD approach to
safety management has been explored by the RE with an understanding gained of the
context and adoption of safety case practice within MOD. The RE has also explored
the current practice to how PEs are assessed. A new framework was developed, termed
the SLF, which provided a potential solution to constructing safety arguments from a
SoS approach.
2. What is the current permissible software safety assurance evidence within the UK de-
fence domain and related domains? 3 Lessons were identified from the methods adopted
by safety-critical (e.g. civil nuclear) and non-safety critical (e.g. criminal justice) do-
mains which make decisions strongly underpinned by evidence. These lessons were used
by the RE to inform the implementation of the DSF. The REs work partly identified
a potential solution to a staged adoption of MC processors within the safety-critical
domain. The solution implements technical design features which are favourable in
terms of obtaining wider diverse evidence.
3. What software safety assurance evidence is relevant/admissible and what are the un-
derpinning principles for the use of such evidence? 4 Potential permissible evidence
1Sub-section 11.2 within this chapter contains more detailed information on the contributions to knowledge
in relation to the research sub-questions.
2Sub-question responded to within Chapter 3.
3Sub-question responded to within sub-sections 4.2, 5.2, 5.3, and Chapter 6.
4Sub-question responded to within sub-sections 7.1 and 7.2.
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was identified which could inform a software safety assurance argument in the con-
text of military airborne platforms. Underpinning principles were determined5 for the
permissible evidence which state how such evidence should be gathered and used.
4. What are the unintended consequences of adopting incorrect metrics when forming de-
cisions and how can system/evidence relationships be communicated to stakeholders? 6
The measurement of data leads to the generation and management of metrics. Lessons
were stated regarding the unintended consequences of metrics. In addition, a model
was devised to conceptualise elements within an assurance approach; i.e. the systems,
the evidence, and the relationships between the two. This is captured in a Wheel of
Qualification7.
5. What is a suitable structure for software safety assurance evidence and can mathe-
matically derived approaches inform how judgements are made on the evidence and
for proposing alternative/optimised solutions? 8 A framework was developed, termed
the DSF. This provided a means to structure the evidence under review and to allow
judgements on confidence to be formed on the evidence. This was achieved via the se-
lection of a number of key attributes, e.g. contribution9, which can be assessed within
a number of mathematically calculated FISs. Visualisations of the evidence and the
subsequent judgements were also implemented. The DSF also allowed judgements to
be explored via the use of what-if analysis10. It ensured efficient evidence collection
via mathmatical optimisation techniques, i.e. GAs. An initial process flow was devised
to prompt action for the gathering of evidence.
6. What observations and recommendations can be made on how to implement a soft-
ware safety assurance evidence argument and how to inform a UK defence software
5For example, the need to conduct continual monitoring of a system through-life to maintain or improve
the prior belief gained in the process-based evidence.
6Sub-question responded to within sub-sections 7.3 and 7.4.
7The Wheel of Qualification is a visualisation/model which allows stakeholders to comprehend and debate
a varied set of evidential data/sources with a view to drive improved decision making.
8Sub-question responded to within sub-section 4.3, Chapter 8, sub-sections 9.4 and 9.5.
9The notion of contribution captures the level of influence, or the level of the direct bearing, that the
specific evidence has on its broader evidence; e.g. MC/DC as child evidence may feed into the broader parent
category of coverage testing.
10There are a range of definitions for the terms what-if and sensitivity analysis with some sources using
the terms interchangeably, e.g. Bujoreanu (2011). However, for the purpose of this research what-if analysis
is defined as changing variable values and/or changing the relationships among the variables to allow the
results to be observed (Bagad, 2009). Sensitivity analysis is defined as a special case of what-if analysis
in that with sensitivity analysis only one variable is to be changed at any time to observe the impact of
small changes (Bagad, 2009). The research adopted what-if analysis methods as this allowed greater scope
to assess changes to multiple forms of evidence and the supporting variables.
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safety assurance strategy? 11 As a result of the DSF development, case studies, and
exploratory testing a number of observations were made on the relationships between
the attributes. The observations can also act as guidance for deriving software safety
assurance from diverse evidence. From the overall set of research activities a set of
evidence-based enhancements were generated for the military software safety assur-
ance domain. The research outcomes were informed by the creation of a range of
supporting concepts, such as frameworks (e.g. SLF and DSF) and models (e.g. Wheel
of Qualification).
Figure 11.1 shows the mapping between the research sub-questions and the relevant
Chapters and sub-sections of this thesis.
11.2 Contributions to Knowledge and Research Im-
pact
The thesis has provided methods and success factors to enhance the safety assurance pro-
cess12. This concept is important to note as the context of any suggested enhancements
are to expand upon an existing safety assurance process13. The research has investigated
how diverse evidence can be gathered, judged, and implemented within the military software
assurance domain.
The variety of research outputs has provided novel contributions to knowledge in the
software safety assurance academic domain. They have also been implemented in an indus-
trial setting within a military software assurance context. They have led to realisable and
tangible benefits and in the immediate term the concepts from the research have already di-
rectly informed the procurement strategy for a number of military systems and the research
has provided confidence to those that adopt such a diverse approach14.
The research findings advocate quite fundamental changes to how evidence is treated
and judged. These changes may require a more gradual introduction, most likely supported
by further studies and research. The research has not only clearly articulated why there
is a need to change but has also provided solutions on how to enact such change with the
tools to support the adoption of diverse evidence. A key impact of the research is that the
premise of adopting diverse evidence can be taken forward to inform customer qualification
assessments.
11Sub-question responded to within sub-section 9.6 and Chapter 10.
12The use of the term enhance is defined as to “further improve” (OED, 2018c).
13Although the current research on the quantification of assurance confidence has a number of identified
weaknesses. See sub-sections 4.2 and 9.7.2.
14Supported by technical reports such as Standish, Hadley and Lennon (2017).
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Figure 11.1: Research Sub-Questions Mapped to Thesis Chapters and Sub-Sections
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The types of contributions that the research has generated are shown in Figure 11.215.
Figure 11.2: Types of Contributions to Knowledge Generated by the Research
All of the contributions to knowledge that the research has generated have value, however
they do not all have an equal impact. The key contributions from the research are:
• A pattern, or blueprint, has been developed with a set of attributes (e.g. sufficiency)
which captures the key properties of any evidence that forms part of a software safety
assurance approach. The choice of attributes and the method of combination has not
been adopted within the software safety assurance domain prior to this research.
• A DSF has been implemented which provides a usable and practical tool for decision
makers to construct diverse assurance arguments based upon quantitative judgements
on the evidence characteristics. Such a tool with such a richness of features has not
been implemented within the software safety assurance domain prior to this research.
• All of the research activities have allowed the RE to develop a set of clear and concise
recommendations. These will allow MOD and other safety-critical domains to adopt
diverse software evidence in order to implement systems which reside within a non-
process based solution space16. Such a breadth of considered recommendations have
not been developed for the software safety assurance domain prior to this research.
15The types of contributions have been derived from Presthus and Munkvold (2016).
16See sub-section 1.1 for further information.
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11.2.1 Frameworks: Decision Support Framework (DSF) and Safety
three-Layered Framework (SLF)
A framework can act as a conceptual entity to serve to support analysis or discussion
(Presthus and Munkvold, 2016). The frameworks developed for this thesis17 have enabled
observations to be made which has generated enhancements to the use of diverse evidence
to support software safety arguments.
11.2.1.1 DSF
The DSF contains a range of features to allow stakeholders to gather and judge evidence. It
provides support to allow the solution space to be explored. The DSF contributions include
the non-trivial attribute selection and relationships process, methods to structure and reason
with the evidence, and to allow what-if analysis and optimisation to be conducted. A key
aspect of the DSF is that it provides an intuitive method to capture evidence judgements
and the approach allows confidence to be propagated in a consistent way. The DSF was
implemented by the RE and has a number of key stages.
1. Evidence identification. A review of how evidence is adopted within related safety
domains and non-safety domains18 allowed an initial set of permissible evidence19 to
be included within the DSF. Importantly the framework then also allows for additional
evidence to be defined and captured by stakeholders.
2. Evidence attributes. Suitable metrics were determined20 which allowed judgements
to be formed on the evidence. The chosen attributes reflected the features of the
evidence and also determined how the attributes are combined to derive the confidence
in multiple and diverse evidence. The chosen attributes were also a driver to how
diversity can be achieved21. The right balance and combination of all attributes can
provide a satisfactory level of evidence diversity.
3. Evidence data states. Not all evidence is equal in supporting a qualification argument
and different data states22 were devised. The data/evidence states were successfully
17See sub-section 3.3.2 and Chapter 8.
18See sub-sections 5.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.
19Evidence included, but was not limited to: PSH, staff competencies, and software architecture complex-
ity. See sub-section 7.1.
20The attributes are: confidence, quality, contribution, sufficiency, and independence. See sub-section
8.2.2.
21See sub-section 8.2.2.6.
22The data states are: extant, obligatory, and ancillary. See sub-section 8.2.3.
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used within the DSF to determine the evidence to be gathered, the value of the ev-
idence, and how persuasive the evidence could be to stakeholders for the assurance
argument.
4. Methods to reason under uncertainty. There are a range of approaches to assess evi-
dence and to allow judgements to be formed. The causes of uncertainty were investi-
gated by the research23. The DSF adopts an approach based upon Fuzzy Logic and
FISs which are proportionate to the problem. They are suited in situations which evi-
dence is itself fuzzy in nature, they allow decision making with estimated values under
incomplete or uncertain information, and they can inherently account for noise in the
data24.
5. Structure of the reasoning approach. A number of FISs25 were developed to combine the
evidence and the evidence attributes which were defined (e.g. sufficiency)26. The FISs
are repeated for all of the relevant evidence within the structure. The FIS calculations
implemented by the DSF were deliberately designed to allow for more simplified and
structured assessments to be conducted by stakeholders. This had benefits in terms of
allowing stakeholders to traverse the data tree and the node values using logical steps
which assists with the comprehension of the evidence and the structure.
6. Visualisation approach. The DSF provides informative data to the decision maker via
a Linkage Diagram27. The Linkage Diagram is suitable as it allows stakeholders to
capture and structure evidence in a logical manner and allows methodical analysis of
the data. In addition, the Linkage Diagrams allow a substantial level of information to
be viewed. This allows a holistic perspective to be gained as the supporting assurance
evidence is being assessed. Novel visual indicators developed as part of the research
allow decision makers to determine the quantified values of the evidence characteris-
tics28. The visualisation showed the level of confidence in the evidence at the node
level. It also demonstrated how evidence attributes propagate through the tree which,
importantly, identifies particular causes of concern or areas of strength.
7. Overheads associated with evidence changes. Any evidence may have theoretical value
to generate confidence. However, there are also practical aspects to obtaining such
23This includes, but is not limited to, having a lack of information, an abundance of information, and a
vagueness in language. See sub-section 8.2.4.1.
24Other methods considered included: Bayesian Theory and DST. See sub-section 8.2.4.4.
25The FISs included: Child Node Confidence, Sibling Nodes Assessment, and Parent Node Quality.
26See sub-section 8.2.5.
27Other visualisation methods considered included, but were not limited to: arc diagrams, chord diagrams,
and network diagrams. See sub-section 8.2.6.
28See sub-section 8.2.6.2.
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evidence. This includes the time taken to generate the evidence, the cost to obtain such
evidence, and the quality that can be achieved with any change to the evidence29. These
factors were classed as change overheads and featured within the DSF optimisation
calculations to inform realistic and practical solutions for the decision maker.
8. Implementation of an optimisation method. The process of optimisation is to select
the best element, or set of elements, from a set of available alternatives. The DSF
implemented a process to devise optimal sets of evidence in a novel approach. There
are a number of data optimisation approaches to achieve this process30. A GA approach
was determined to be of most value as it has a greater success of finding the global
optimal.
9. Data interrogation options. A key element to the DSF is the requirement to allow
decision makers to conduct what-if analysis and to explore scenarios. A rich set of
options to perform such analysis were devised. The options were based upon realistic
outcomes to ensure that the solutions were viable31.
Such an end-to-end framework has not been devised previously for the software safety
domain. In relation to other concepts which have been proposed in this area, sub-section
4.2.3 contains a substantial review of the existing research. Sub-section 9.7.2 details how the
selection and combination of attributes within the DSF differs from existing methods.
11.2.1.2 SLF
Modular safety cases provide a number of benefits over traditional monolithic safety cases,
e.g. ease of construction and a focus on integration boundaries (IAWG, 2010). Previous re-
search in the area of modular safety cases attempted to provide more structured and efficient
methods but there were still limitations, e.g. arguments were not supported by evidence.
The SLF32 provides a contribution to addressing the limitations of existing methods by ap-
plying a modularised approach at a systems level. This allows a greater level of detail to be
exposed for the assurance of safety-critical system components. The SLF consists of a flow
of information which is fed from the top level down to populate each stage: modular safety
cases, engineering models, and detailed analysis such as formal models.
29See sub-section 8.2.7.
30Other optimisation techniques which were considered included, but were not limited to, SA, PSO, and
Harmony Searches. See sub-section 8.2.8.
31See sub-section 8.2.9.
32The approach was published in two papers. The papers were written in collaboration between the RE,
two Dstl colleagues (Paul Caseley [Dstl, Senior Fellow] and Dr Mark Hadley [Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist
in Software Systems]), and a colleague from AWE (Helen Auld).
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The SLF helps to form a judgement on the interface interactions, how the relationships
occur, the formal proof of the relationships, and how the relationships can be met. It enables
dependency relationships to be defined at appropriate supply interfaces and at differing levels
of the SLF. The SLF supports the principle of adopting wider diverse evidence to achieve a
suitable level of safety assurance for a SoS; this is also of relevance to the lower-level software
safety assurance domain33. The concept of the SLF illustrates that safety processes adopted
by the MOD are subject to ongoing challenges. Issues such as multi-national procurements
and the use of legacy elements need to be considered as part of the methods to develop the
wider SMS. These challenges are also prevalent in the evidence which is required for software
and CEH assurance.
11.2.2 Lessons Learnt
An important element to the thesis is establishing lessons which can be used within a number
of domains which use judgements on evidence to be a key element in decision making. This
includes the MOD assurance domain, the wider safety-critical domains, and a number of
non-safety critical domains. The following thesis activities have contributed to these goals.
1. Adoption of Diverse Evidence. The research has outlined a number of factors which
drive the requirement for diverse evidence within the software safety assurance domain.
Such factors include: the continued and necessary adoption of novel technologies, con-
tinuing procurements via international partners and vendors, adoption of COTS and
MOTS equipment, and the desire within wider domains to utilise pre-existing qualifi-
cation evidence34.
2. Adoption of Evidence Within Non-Safety Related Domains. Observations have been
made regarding the use and types of evidence within non-safety related domains and
how these relate to MOD software safety assurance practice. A number of domains
adopt an evidence-based approach within a variety of contexts and the findings from
the non-safety domain evidence attributes were utilised in the research. This is in
addition to taking account of how other domains assess evidence confidence. Lessons
have been learnt from understanding evidence use within the criminal justice system,
healthcare and medicine, and government policy and strategy35.
3. Adoption of Evidence Within Safety-Related Domains. Similarly to the lessons learnt
from the non-safety domain there are also observations made within the thesis regarding
33See sub-section 3.3.2.
34See sub-sections 3.1.1 and 3.3.
35See sub-section 5.2.
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the use and types of evidence within safety-related domains. Domains such as: the civil
air traffic services, civil aviation, automotive, health information technology, and rail
(signals and rolling stock) have all garnered points relevant to MOD software safety
assurance practice. The use, type, and hierarchy of attributes and evidence differs
between domains and these insights have informed the thesis development and contain
lessons for wider research activities36.
11.2.3 Guidelines
The thesis has provided informative results not withstanding the constraints related to com-
mercial sensitivities and IP considerations. The outputs have directly informed DTs, e.g. via
directing qualification strategies, and also the wider software assurance community within
the MOD, e.g. via informative white papers. In the case of the MC processor research,
which adopts a staged assurance solution with wider more diverse supporting evidence, the
information has been shared with a range of safety domains.
1. Types and Benefits of Diverse Evidence. The research has generated guidance on
the types and benefits of diverse evidence for a software safety assurance approach.
Importantly, the guidance included a number of considerations to ensure that diverse
evidence can be contracted for appropriately and to allow direct informed discussions
with suppliers37.
2. Staged Approach to MC Processor Qualification. Guidance was generated on a potential
solution for the assurance of a novel technology, that of MC processors38. The staged
approach adopts the use of diverse evidence to provide confidence from non-standard
sources. The findings were shared with a safety domain audience39. The guidance has
also influenced further research activities40 and has directly informed discussions with
suppliers to ascertain how their system architecture could be developed to support a
qualification argument.
3. Underpinning Principles to Adopt Diverse Evidence. Guidance was generated on a
number of underpinning principles which must be factored into any use of diverse
36See sub-section 6.2.
37See the research output titled Use of Diverse Software Evidence within a Safety-Critical Software Air-
borne Qualification Strategy and the research informed customer deliverable Standish, Hadley and Lennon
(2017).
38Guidance written in collaboration between the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor (Dr Mark Hadley
- Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems).
39Illustrated within the research output titled Multi-Core (MC) Processor Qualification for Safety Critical
Systems.
40For example, Imperial College London’s MC test harness which was funded by Dstl. See the following
for more information: https://github.com/mc-imperial/multicore-test-harness.
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evidence. This ensures that the evidence is implemented correctly, consistently, and
appropriately. The principles also provide guidance on the practical use of diverse
evidence41
11.2.4 Pattern: Combination and Relationships of Evidence At-
tributes
Patterns, or blueprints, allow pre-existing methods to be re-used within frequently encoun-
tered problems. They can have many benefits to a range of stakeholders as they allow
consistent and repeatable solutions to be developed. An example in the software engineering
domain is with design patterns42.
The research devised a reusable pattern which outlined the evidence attributes which are
agnostic to the form of evidence/structure. The chosen attributes allow the characteristics
of the evidence to be understood as well as the relationship of the evidence to other forms of
evidence. The pattern also drives how the confidence in the evidence is judged as it dictates
how the attributes are combined43.
11.2.5 Model: Wheel of Qualification
Within this research a model is defined as a construct which expresses relationships among
concepts (Presthus and Munkvold, 2016). In this context, a model can allow complicated
concepts to be articulated.
The adoption of diverse evidence provides an increased solution space. However, these
can traditionally not have full process-based qualification evidence. Therefore, further forms
of evidence are required to gain a suitable level of software safety assurance confidence. This
could lead to issues for the perception, interpretation and comprehension of the evidence,
the source of the evidence, and how it relates to specific LRUs.
To address this issue a visualisation was created which was termed the Wheel of Qualifi-
cation44. The visualisation facilitates informed dialogue with a number of stakeholders (e.g.
MAA, DT etc.) who require an insight into the software/CEH evidence for the individual
LRUs of a platform. The model shows the relationship between the various evidence strands,
in relation to an ITE, supplier, and LRU. The model can allow areas of particular strength
or weakness to be shown both in respect to the LRUs of interest and the associated evidence
41See sub-section 7.2.
42See, for example, Helm and Johnson (2015).
43See sub-sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.5.
44Model developed in collaboration between the RE and the EngD Industrial Supervisor (Dr Mark Hadley
- Dstl, Senior Principal Scientist in Software Systems).
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which is being judged45.
The Wheel of Qualification has driven the requirements discussion at a number of project
workshops and has allowed the RE to articulate where further evidence is required. The
Wheel of Qualification is the cornerstone of an existing project qualification strategy. There
is no concept like this in current use within the software safety assurance domain.
11.2.6 Critical Success Factors (CSFs): Recommendations to En-
hance Software Safety Assurance Processes
Critical Success Factors (CSFs) describe activities which are necessary to ensure that a
positive outcome is reached. The term is based upon business and management principles;
however, the term is apt for the adoption of diverse evidence for software assurance.
The devised evidence-based CSFs (such as revised skill sets of SQEP staff) are based
upon 7 key themes (such as how evidence complexity is managed). Over 20 recommendations
are made to allow diverse evidence to be fully exploited within a software safety assurance
strategy46.
Non-process based software safety assurance evidence can be more difficult to measure
which results in a number of challenges to the adoption of such an approach. The research has
demonstrated the benefits of a diverse evidence strategy and it has also provided numerous
solutions to allow it’s adoption, e.g. the DSF. The recommendations, or CSFs, indicate how
the practical solutions provided by the research can be implemented and why they should
be adopted.
11.2.7 Rich Insight: Importance and Unintended Consequences
of Metrics
Metrics can provide valuable information to decision makers and those that wish to draw
conclusions from the data. However, metrics that are not chosen well can have negative con-
sequences if they lead to incorrect decisions. They can also lead to incorrect interpretations,
especially when they form a safety assurance argument.
An insight has been provided on the concept of ‘technical debt’ and it has illustrated
how the measurement of performance data can lead to unintended consequences47. The
sub-section regarding the unintended consequences of metrics has a focus on software main-
tenance, however the principle of being cautious with the use of metrics still holds. The
45See sub-section 7.4.
46See sub-section 9.6 and Chapter 10.
47Written in collaboration between the RE and a Dstl colleague (Rob Ashmore - Dstl, Senior Fellow).
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research provides support for ensuring that any measure of assurance must take into ac-
count the unintended consequences which could arise. Metrics adopted to make judgements
must be used with an understanding of their limitations48.
11.3 Research Legitimacy and Reflections
11.3.1 Research Quality
There are a number of measures which can provide an indication of research quality and it is
important for REs to make an appraisal of the measurements to refine any points within the
thesis itself. A common set of measures for quality are validity, reliability, and generalisability
(Leung, 2015, Ali and Yusof, 2011, Heale and Twycross, 2015).
• Validity. The concept of validity spans a number of areas, with the focus on the
appropriateness of the tools, processes, and the data. Is the research question valid
for the desired outcome? Is the choice of methodology appropriate for answering the
research question? Is the design valid for the methodology? Is the data analysis
appropriate? Are the results and conclusions valid for the context? (Leung, 2015).
The research grand tour and sub-questions were developed via an iterative process
which was refined as more knowledge became available via document analysis and
further qualitative methods. The structured research strategy generated a gradual
and stepped flow of information and salient observations. These fed into a number of
enhancements which could be made to the defence software safety assurance process.
The research question was appropriate for the desired and obtained outcomes. The
research methodology was also exploited to develop a theory which was then tested
via observations and case studies. The staged outputs from the activities, and their
variety, were proportionate and purposeful to acquire a suitable level of data to inform
the research outcomes. The research was centred on a military assurance domain with
applicable findings from other domains taken into account to apply to the military
context.
• Reliability. Refers to the exact replicability of the processes and the results. Such a
definition for reliability is challenging and counter-intuitive but the key is consistency.
A margin of variability can be tolerated as long as the methodology consistently yields
data which is ontologically similar but may differ in richness and ambience within
similar dimensions (Leung, 2015). This is the nature of research. Research decisions
48See sub-section 7.3 and the output regarding the unintended consequences of metrics.
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based upon subjective feedback, e.g. from SMEs, will influence the direction of the
research.
Within a research process there are varying types of analysis which can flow from the
development of creative concepts. These can be based upon insights to learning via
data analysis or observations. A key element to any research approach is the ability for
the RE to develop concepts with imagination and insight seen as a researcher quality
(Cauvery et al., 2003)49. Aspects of the approach taken to respond to a research grand
tour or sub-questions may not be repeatable (this is, to a degree, based upon the generic
and specific skills of the researcher) but they should certainly be defensible (Rolfe,
2006). The repeatability element is in relation to the results obtained from any data
and the ability to infer findings from any quantitative/qualitative analysis methods.
Importantly, the observations, enhancements, and contributions to knowledge from the
research are traceable and so the inferences are repeatable.
• Generalisability. The concept of generalisability may not be a key driver for some
research if it focusses on a specific issue or phenomenon (Leung, 2015). However, there
is still value in ascertaining the extent that the research results can be applied to cases,
settings, or situations beyond those examined in the study. The refined grand tour
and sub-questions for the research were based upon safety assurance within a specific
domain and for particular platforms, i.e. military airborne. This was a deliberate
and conscious decision in order to gain robust findings which were not diluted due to
expanding the findings to a wider setting. There a various layers to how generalisable
the study findings can be. The findings and outputs from the study can certainly
be used within the software safety assurance domain and there are elements which
are valid for the land and maritime domains, e.g. in the treatment and judgement
of evidence. Other findings are more domain specific due to them being based upon
particular airborne platform practices, e.g. DAOS.
The concept of generalisability is separate to that of transferability. Generalisability is
concerned with the explicit extension of research findings to other domains/settings.
Whereas, transferability is applied by the readers of the research with salient obser-
vations being applied to their problem areas to varying degrees (Given, 2008). The
outputs and findings from the research will have transferability as the contexts within a
number of assurance domains may have similar challenges and opportunities to embed
49Cauvery et al. (2003) state five general qualities which a researcher needs: scientific attitude, imagination
and insight, perseverance, quick grasping power, and clarity of thinking. Cauvery et al. (2003) states five
further specific qualities that a researcher needs in relation to the research itself: knowledge of the subject,
knowledge of the technique of research, personal taste in the study, familiarity about the information, and
an unbiased attitude.
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the use of diverse evidence within their assurance processes. The utility scale (from
specific, to general, to transferable) certainly applies to this research; however, there
are pertinent findings applicable for each of the scales.
11.3.2 Validity of the Research Implementation
The issue of validity is one which is worthy of further exploration as although the overall
research methodology and design are claimed to be sound, as proposed above, there are a
number of potential threats to the validity.
• There is debate, depending on the research paradigm, on the impact that the re-
searchers own philosophical stance has on the research process and outcomes. Within
a phenomenological paradigm the researcher interacts with that which is being re-
searched. There is also perceived to be benefits to having researcher involvement; with
it claimed to be essential (Leung, 2015). The experience and role of the RE within
the sponsoring organisation meant that there is a form of validity to the research
observations and from the wider analysis, e.g. via document analysis.
• A number of domains and research approaches, e.g. document analysis, were used to
gain information on how safety and non-safety domains conduct evidence gathering
and judgement. The lessons and observations were pertinent and allowed salient ob-
servations to be made but there could be a query regarding the sufficiency of the data
which was gathered. The domains which were not reviewed, e.g. teaching within the
non-safety domain, were scoped to assess if significant observations could be gained in
relation to the information already collected. The same is also true of the safety do-
mains which had a greater number of findings. It is believed that the domains reviewed
provided a sufficient level of observations to support the research50.
• A concept proposed by this thesis is that, to a degree, all evidence is of relevance
and that there is a large solution space to gain evidence to support a level of safety
assurance. The evidence proposed in support of this premise was not exhaustive. The
initial set of permissible evidence was gained via document reviews and other qualita-
tive factors to understand the evidence adopted within the wider safety-domains. In
addition, the evidence was also relevant to the case studies which were conducted. The
DSF provides the ability to add/amend evidence strands which can be assessed via a
proposed pattern. Therefore, the theory is scalable to use with wider evidence sets,
with this being a decision to attempt to counter this limitation.
50In essence, generalisations were made from other domains to support the thesis research.
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• A consideration for any research is the level of supporting data which is assessed to
gain confidence in the research outcomes. Depending on the types of study there may
be a large volume of quantitative data to statistically assess, whereas other types will
have smaller sample sizes. These variances are understood within the research field,
i.e. it is dependent on the methodological philosophical assumption. The cases studies
implemented and the supporting exploratory testing are deemed proportionate for the
derived observations and findings. It is believed that additional analysis would have
gained further supporting evidence rather than contradictory or additional observa-
tions.
• Intentionally the research approach and implementations allowed a dynamic set of
evidence and attributes to be captured for a given system. This approach leads to
having a defensible position rather than a repeatable one as the choices are made using
subjective judgement. It is quite possible that given the same sets of evidence that
differing attributes will be applied by different SMEs. However, this observation is
true for other domains and there is acceptance that there will be a variance of opinion
and judgement. The fact that differing opinions will be captured which will influence
the results does not invalidate the approach.
11.3.3 Limitations of the Research
An important element to the research is to understand the limitations of the activities
and the outputs. The research has resulted in a number of valid and defensible potential
enhancements to the software safety assurance domain. However, there are factors to take
into account which provides context to the findings. The limitations to the research below
are in addition to the evaluation of the DSF contained within sub-section 9.7.
1. Benefit of a wider set of participants. An aspect which the RE was cautious of was
the risk of group think 51 and the impact that this may have on the research outcomes.
This risk was lessened as the people involved in this research52 all have varying degrees
of experience and by the nature of their roles have expectations in terms of profes-
sional conduct and integrity. These principles should hold for when they are providing
feedback to those involved in assessing their domains as they should not be easily in-
fluenced by others by the nature of their roles. Also, one-to-one interviews and smaller
workshops were designed in order to allow more open discussions. However, a wider
51A psychological phenomenon where people set aside their own beliefs or adopt the opinion of the rest of
the group (Cherry, 2019).
52As an example, as part of semi-structured interviews and workshops etc.
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set of participants to the research may have provided greater support to the findings
and further reduced the risk of group think.
2. Nuances between software design and assurance diversity. There are well stated benefits
of adopting diversity within the design of safety-critical systems. Some of the benefits
to software design have been transferred within this thesis to assuring software safety
evidence. However, there may be subtle nuances in the applications and contexts
between the two. This may limit the benefits which can be transferred.
3. Non-exhaustive review of reasoning methods. The reasoning methods selected (fuzzy
logic supported by FISs) were declared suitable within the design decisions53. This
proved to be the case as valid observations were made on the DSF behaviour and out-
puts. In addition, suitable enhancements were supported by the identified node/attribute
behaviours within the DSF. A range of reasoning approaches were identified and as-
sessed as part of the design decision process, e.g. BBN, DST, etc. However, this
review was not exhaustive with some known approaches not under assessment, such as
hill-climbing54. There are obvious limitations to the review process as other suitable
methods may have been established. However, the premise of adopting a fit for purpose
reasoning method resulted in a suitable choice.
4. Reliance on expert judgement. The DSF is reliant on user judgements to capture
suitable evidence and attributes. The results of the DSF have been cross-referenced
with the findings from SMEs, e.g. via life-cycle process assessment reports. Therefore,
the DSF does represent a suitable reflection of SME judgements given the case studies
which were implemented. The stakeholders involved in the use of the DSF are SQEP
SMEs and therefore some risks are lessened, for example, the integrity of any feedback.
However, some of the fundamental issues with capturing expert judgements are still
present, e.g. evidence bias. The DSF does, however, attempt to mitigate this by
introducing the ability for consensus to be gained by the stakeholders.
5. Limited data interrogation options for greenfield projects. The focus of the DSF ac-
tivities has been on brownfield projects and mitigating shortfalls to widen the system
solution space. Further data interrogation options could have been provided for further
support for evidence generation for greenfield projects. The DSF currently supports
decision maker(s) to perform data interrogation options for greenfield projects; how-
ever, tailored options could have been considered further. Nevertheless, there is a need
53See sub-section 8.2.4.4.
54See the following for further information: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/hill-
climbing.
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to balance the DSF being to support decisions or as a method to drive decisions.
6. Non-time optimised GA calculations. From a practical perspective the optimisation
operations within the DSF using the R GA package55 are not optimal. The processing
of the GA calculations needs to be refined to ensure a more timely execution. The
current processing time did inhibit some of the interactions with stakeholders and it
may result in fewer iterations of what-if activities being performed if it is not resolved.
11.3.3.1 Potential Limitations with Practical use of the Research
As well as understanding the threats to validity and limitations of the research a number of
limitations have been identified regarding the longer-term adoption of the research philosophy
and outputs. There may be limitations with putting the research into practice.
1. Regulators maintaining the same risk appetite. The premise for the thesis research is
underpinned in the fact that the risk appetite within the software safety assurance do-
main for determining the validity of evidence will remain constant or become stronger.
At present the regulatory process uses MCRIs and Special Conditions in the event
of alternative evidence being adopted for a software assurance safety argument. The
theories within this thesis adopts these approaches. If the appetite to accept such
evidence changes, e.g. by regulators, then the thesis principles do not hold in full. The
DSF/principles are still valid for defining process evidence but the wider benefits of
exploiting diverse evidence would not be realised.
2. Determining counter-evidence risk via evidence branch reviews. A key concept with
any safety assurance process is how counter-evidence is treated. The degree to which
counter-evidence can be mitigated via other forms of evidence is very much open to
debate. The current DSF allows counter-evidence to be mitigated via other forms of
evidence if the attributes values are configured appropriately by the decision makers.
This is a deliberate feature of the DSF. However, this means that the use of the
DSF output, the DAL MFs, by stakeholders must take into account the need for
them to review evidence branches. This will ensure that where counter-evidence is
mitigated that it has consensus. The use of the DSF and the evidence capturing
mechanism through-life for a system, as recommended within this thesis, must assess
the underpinning evidence and not just the top-level DAL.
55See the following for further information: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/GA/GA.pdf/.
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11.3.4 Further Work for the Research
The research conducted has provided responses to the grand tour and sub-questions; however,
a number of opportunities have been identified to progress the research findings.
1. Guidance on what evidence can mitigate shortfalls. Within the software safety as-
surance domain a benefit would be an evidence cookbook which provides guidance on
what evidence can explicitly mitigate other evidence shortfalls. There is a need for the
varying forms of evidence to be empirically studied to ascertain their effectiveness. As
an example, at a software testing level there is evidence that it is the combination of
approaches which increases testing effectiveness (Hadley, 2013). Such a cookbook does
not exist and the debate on its content would continue infinitum. The DSF and the
research findings does not explicitly provide further guidance on this but it does allow
acceptable alternative strategies to be considered and analysed56. The DSF and the
stated enhancements act as a method to allow these concepts to be explored further.
2. Further review of non-safety domains. Within sub-section 5.2 there were three non-
safety domains subject to review; although the criminal justice system was subject to a
review in three sub-areas. A number of further domains to those which were reviewed
combine and assess diverse forms of evidence. There is a risk that relevant information
to the research may have been excluded. It is a belief that the domains subject to
the review were sufficient to gain suitable lessons; however, there is a risk that an
expanded review of the non-safety domains may have provided additional information
which could have informed the thesis research.
3. Generate patterns to reduce attribute/relationship selection. The DSF has deliber-
ately been designed to act as a scalable approach to account for numerous evidence
strands which may form part of a wider solution space for a platform. However,
possible further work could research the ability to apply patterns which reduce the at-
tribute/relationship selection process for the parent-child relationships. Such a method
would allow a greater number of evidential strands to be considered within any given
framework. Obviously, the results of the scaled framework would require suitable val-
idation.
4. Refine the overhead concept. As discussed in section 9.7, the use of the evidence
overhead to shape the reasoning was a greater advantage than originally anticipated.
Further activities could be conducted to refine the overhead approach to account for
a greater nuance of the current contributing factors, e.g. technical risk. A more
56In terms of the theoretical and practical implications.
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refined approach to the concept could significantly influence the reasoning results based
upon the interpretation of the evidential changes. Refinement could be to develop
further FISs or to conduct further expert analysis to gather metrics for the overheads
of relevance.
5. Gain confidence in the inputs to the DSF. The DSF acts as a method to record expert
judgement and it allows the processes and techniques to derive this information to be
user-defined. Further work could establish suitable methods to gain confidence in the
input values into the DSF. This would be prior to the data entering the framework.
Due to the way in which the information is adopted to inform expert judgement the
process to gain consensus and group input could be via a formally rigorous process57.
6. Capture judgements on extreme evidence types. The permissible evidence considered
within the initial DSF and part of the domain reviews considered evidence pertinent
to existing assurance claims58. This was deliberate as the focus was on allowing the
MOD software assurance process to learn from how evidence is gathered and treated
within other domains. The focus of the thesis was to develop practical enhancements.
However, a future approach could be to gain SME feedback on the extreme types
of diverse evidence and how this may negate shortfalls in process evidence. As an
example, the use of High Performance Computing (HPC) capabilities to undertake a
substantial and rigorous testing regime to negate risks with an in-house development
process. These would create theoretical proposals.
7. Refine how the Wheel of Qualification is reflected in the DSF. The DSF to date has
captured third-party oversight and review activities as separate strands within the
evidence structure. A method to reflect the Wheel of Qualification more accurately
may be to assign any positive inferences, e.g. from oversight activities, directly to the
evidence under review. As an example, if a third-party review has been conducted on
any V&V activities then the V&V strand itself could reflect this increase in confidence.
This type of information could be captured by refining the quality of the evidence. At
present the Wheel of Qualification principles are captured in the DSF; however a more
efficient and effective mechanism may be possible.
8. Implement further case studies. There is scope for further case studies to be imple-
mented to provide further confidence in the research findings and outcomes. The
number of cases studies are already stated as a threat to validity. Although the cases
57Via techniques such as Dynamic Hesitant Fuzzy Linguistic Group Decision-Making (DHFLGDM) which
can also capture degrees of certainty in any group decisions (Zhenzhen et al., 2018).
58See sub-section 7.1.
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studies and exploratory testing were proportionate there could be opportunities to ex-
ploit additional feedback. The concept of implementing further case studies is also
valid for the SLF; e.g account for humans and their influence of the depth and breadth
considerations of SoS assurance.
9. Alternative overall output types for the DSF. Another consideration for the DSFs overall
output may be that of a reliability figure (or a probability of failure) which would allow
direct input into a loss model (or fault tree), for example. Such an output would require
less interpretation than a DAL. Although it is recognised that DALs are a recognised
measure of confidence for software.
10. Refine the method to display DSF results. An accepted and utilised DSF may warrant
an improved data entry and visualisation approach. The current method to capture and
display information to inform decision making is fit for purpose; however, additional
features to assist with the underpinning DSF concepts may be of benefit59.
11. Expand the research to wider domains. The research has, purposefully, focused on the
military airborne domain; however, there would be benefit to expanding the research
to wider domains to gain relevant feedback. This would also allow those domains to
take lessons from the research, in essence this would be the principle of transferability.
Indeed, the design of the DSF, the Wheel of Qualification60, and the identified enhance-
ments can relate to other domains quite purposefully, e.g. with the method in which
the DSF output can inform a traditional Safety Case structure. Within many safety
domains the requirements and potential supporting evidence may have overlap, e.g.
staff competencies is a cross-domain consideration (if not a formal requirement). Pat-
terns could be developed to capture the evidence strands to account for a pan-safety
domain structure which may be validated via expert consensus. Non-UK domains
could also be explored as differing safety cultures, risk appetites, and tools/techniques
can lead to varying methods to address similar safety challenges.
11.3.5 Autobiographical Reflections
The activities conducted to support this research has allowed a number of observations to
be made in terms of research approaches (in the generic sense) in addition to observations
related directly to the research execution.
59R packages such as Shiny would be of value, see the following for further information: https://shiny.
rstudio.com/.
60The benefit of the model has been recognised by another research programme within MOD which is to
further investigate the utility of visualising the qualification status of LRUs.
DSTL/PUB121398. c©Crown Copyright (2020).
Page 283 of 328
The structure which a research strategy provides can allow the research to be conducted
with a solid premise with the research findings generated with a robust underpinning. Re-
search strategy theory is based upon, it can be argued, quite nuanced and subtle language
which requires those within the field (or researchers who are embarking on a substantial
research task) to become adept at identifying the position of the research within the various
paradigms and associated assumptions. Traditionally, the level of granularity required for
the decision analysis for the research strategy can vary between domains and paradigms.
However, it is recognised that there is fundamental requirement to implement robust strate-
gies at all levels of analysis. The research process certainly does not fit a linear waterfall
model with continuous iteration required. This was, at times, a frustrating task but certainly
a rewarding one.
The importance of expert judgement was another element of the research which was a key
finding. Any judgement needs to be underpinned by solid evidence and a position of experi-
ence/qualification. The ability to shape judgements from a position of knowledge is crucial
and is applied to all aspects of an assurance argument. This philosophy can inform how
the RE interacts with other stakeholders and how information can be reported/presented.
Related to this is the concept of experts being persuasive in their arguments and using their
style to reflect such an approach61.
There are continuous efforts to assist with measuring compliance to forms of evidence.
The evidence that is sometimes adopted is not always the most suitable for gaining confidence
but can be the most suitable due to its ease of measurement. This allows a commonality of
language and, in theory, a relatively straightforward process to gain confidence. However, the
technology landscape is becoming very complicated, e.g. due to digital twins, sophisticated
System-on-Chip (SOC) architectures etc. New verification techniques are required and due
to the maturity of these technologies there is a real need to ensure that SME judgements
are fully considered. However, experts do not always agree and this requires a consensus
approach. A new reliance on SME judgement may also result in wider opinions being sought,
and therefore more judgements being captured62.
The whole research process has been exceptionally rewarding and the process has altered
how the RE approaches complicated problems. The impact of the research has also been to
alter how the RE interacts with stakeholders to express judgements on evidence.
61Spriggs (2019) provides some interesting thoughts on the ability to make persuasive arguments in the
context of safety assurance via modes of persuasion (Logos, Pathos, and Ethos).
62This is where the DSF and supporting concepts such as the Wheel of Qualification may assist.
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Appendix A
Example of Workshop Discussion
Items (MAA)
An example of a workshop designed and delivered for the research is that with the MAA. The
workshop explored the use of evidence and how it can be assessed given disparate sources of
information. The topics/questions under discussion are below.
1. The focus. Outline of the workshop focus and the aims to gain information on the
use of evidence by the MAA. Also, to gain thoughts on some initial concepts of the
research.
2. What the law states. Overview of how the legal domain conceptualises evidence. Use
of rules to determine what evidence is considered and the weight of evidence. Also, the
law is concerned with the quantum (amount), quality, and type of proof needed. The
types of evidence were also explored.
3. The court of law. What can be learnt from how evidence is presented in court (structure
of evidence). The use of a persuasive and logically complete narrative.
4. Undermining evidence. Discussion on how evidence can undermine an argument. What
happens if a ‘pillar’ of the software safety argument is ‘disproved’ or is not robust as
first thought?
5. Other domains. Discussion on how evidence is treated within other domains, for ex-
ample within medical research.
6. Hierarchies of evidence. Discussion on the structure of evidence and how to determine
the importance of evidential types. Is there a clear hierarchy of evidence types?
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7. Air Traffic Controller (ATC) radar example. Discussion on the evidence for an ATC
radar. What software safety assurance evidence would be valid?
8. Types of evidence. Discussion on the types of evidence which could support a generic
software safety assurance argument.
9. Weight of evidence. Discussion on the weighting of evidence. How is it balanced? Does
one evidential type gain confidence in the event of a shortfall of another type?
10. Establishing a stopping point. Discussion on how much evidence is enough for a software
safety assurance argument.
11. EBPM example. Discussion on how the EBPM domain treats evidence. Factors in-
clude: importance of the decision; expertise of the decision-maker; and the openness
of the decision-maker to evidence.
12. The EngD. How the MAA can inform the EngD research.
13. Framework. Discussion on the use and role of a DSF to assist DTs, for example, with
making informed judgements. Could a tool inform DTs before they contracted for
assurance evidence? Extent of engineering judgement to determine diverse evidence?
What evidence would inform a tool? Does not gaining certain types of evidence matter?
Is there a weighting to evidence?
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Appendix B
Semi-Structured Interview Details
A number of semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather information on the use
of software safety assurance evidence within other domains. The interview style was based
upon the guidance within Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012), e.g. neutral questioning.
The main question types were open1 and probing2. The topics/questions under discussion
are below.
1. The focus. Outline of the focus of the semi-structured interview and why the informa-
tion from the particular domain can help.
2. The EngD. Outline of the EngD as a concept and the particular focus of the research.
3. Treatment of evidence: the regulations. Discussion on the regulations of the domain
and how software safety assurance evidence is gathered.
4. Treatment of evidence: the reality. Discussion on the reality of gathering software
safety assurance evidence. How do the regulations and the actual arguments differ?
5. Type of evidence. Discussion on the types of evidence which support a software safety
assurance approach.
6. Evidence structure. Discussion on how evidence is presented to stakeholders and how
this informs decision making.
7. Stakeholder structure. Discussion on the stakeholders/organisations involved in the
regulatory process and the roles/remit.
1Open questions allow participants to define and describe situations/events (Saunders, Lewis and Thorn-
hill, 2012).
2Probing questions allow significant responses to be explored (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).
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8. Tools to assist. Discussion on the tools/techniques which could assist SMEs to struc-
ture/judge evidence.
9. Next steps. Discussion on how the participant may inform the next stages of the
research and if there are any sources of information, e.g. third-party research papers,
which may inform the participants interest in the assurance domain.
The information from the interviews was recorded in a number of non-published outputs.
These outputs are stated below in no particular order.
1. Meeting with Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 2018.
2. Meeting with Dstl Land Platforms Systems Team Member. 2018.
3. Meeting with Dstl Software and Systems Dependability Team Member. 2018.
4. Teleconference with National Air Traffic Services (NATS). 2015.
5. Teleconference with Consultants to Government and Industries (CGI). 2015.
6. Teleconference with Lloyds Register (Rail). 2015.
7. Meeting with Dstl and Military Aviation Authority (MAA). 2015.
8. Meeting with MAA. 2015.
9. Meeting with Vehicle Certification Agency (VCA). 2015.
10. Teleconference with VCA. 2015.
11. Teleconference with UK MOD Naval Authority Group (NAG). 2015.
12. Meeting with Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). 2015.
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Appendix C
Sources to Inform Evidence Within
the Initial Framework
The evidence to be initially included within the framework is stated below. The evidence has
been derived (and is supported) from a number of sources and domains (e.g. automotive)
which were subject to discussion within Chapter 6.
[Appendix text redacted]
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